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“Reclaiming Reason” is the first full-length study of Geoffrey Chaucer’s prose.  Though 
scholars have written on the prose texts individually, the most pressing questions have yet to be 
considered: what, specifically, does Chaucer offer in these works, and why does he choose prose 
to do so?  In pursuit of answers to these questions, “Reclaiming Reason” examines the politics of 
reading and interpretation in the late Middle Ages and discovers that through his prose works—
the Boece, the Treatise on the Astrolabe, the Tale of Melibee, the Parson’s Tale, and the 
Retraction—Chaucer models principles of interpretation for a time when access to knowledge 
was controlled by a variety of self-serving authorities.  Indeed, these works offer readers 
strategies to assert their own agency, and thus intellectual autonomy, in the midst of the struggle 
over the power to control and ability to interpret knowledge.  By offering these methods in prose, 
Chaucer increases the accessibility of these subjects, while demonstrating the extensive benefits 
of these different forms of knowing (philosophical, scientific, judicial, and religious).  In the 
Parson’s Tale, for instance, he offers the religious practice of confession and repentance as a 
possible path to individual salvation; in writing for a lay audience, Chaucer implies that this 
information equally profits secular “selves.”  Thus, “Reclaiming Reason” argues specifically that 
these prose works are essential to a comprehensive understanding of Chaucer’s philosophy: that 
in an inherently flawed and fragmented realm, individuals can exercise authority over their 
choices by consciously developing habits of critical engagement.  Overall, it makes a case for the 
recursive reading of Chaucer’s work through the strategies of rational analysis that he provides in 
the prose.  Not only does such recursion shed new light on our understanding of Chaucer’s 
iv 
 
poetry, but by extension, the performance of Chaucer’s methods—the act of recursion—creates a 
progressive dynamic between the individual and whatever machine (i.e. text, scientific device, 
authority) he engages with to gain knowledge.   
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Introduction 
 
A Path to Reason 
 
 
 
“Reclaiming Reason” documents the centrality of Chaucer’s prose works to his vision of 
individual responsibility.  For Chaucer, such responsibility is exercised through a form of 
analysis that goes beyond the identification of personal failures to understand first the processes 
that lead to such “misdeemings” (the failures) and then to implement that understanding in “right 
deeming.”  As such, this dissertation is placed within the politics of reading and interpretation in 
the late Middle Ages.  During Geoffrey Chaucer’s era (1350-1400), the Church, Academy, and 
Court struggled for control over language, authority, and, above all, access to knowledge.
1
  
Starting in the 1370s, John Wyclif’s writings added a new dimension to this conflict by 
suggesting that the authority of ecclesiasts was established through the combination of word and 
deed instead of through words alone.  While Plato’s injunction (Timeaus) that the “word must be 
cousin to the deed” is a persistent concern from that point forward for reformers taking issue 
with specious rhetorical claims, it is most immediately, in Chaucer’s context, set out by Wyclif.  
According to Marie Borroff, Wyclif argued that “To ascertain the spiritual status of any 
professed member of the church, it was necessary only to observe his actions and see whether 
they accorded with the teachings of Jesus.”2  What made this idea so powerful for the laity was 
that it encouraged individuals to decide for themselves who was credible and who was not; for 
the ecclesiasts, this idea challenged their claims to what had been their unquestioned, God-given 
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authority.  These power struggles were then made more difficult by the tremendous social 
consequences of the Black Death and the impact of the child king Richard II’s selfish and 
manipulative advisors, whose actions created a crisis of governance as competing claims to the 
civil authority waxed and waned.  Chaucer responds to this historical situation by emphasizing 
means for self-authorization that are implicit in his source materials and thus empowering his 
audience to determine who and what is authoritative, and through that determination, to make 
intelligent and responsible choices in all aspects of life.   
While his poetry has received extensive critical attention, Chaucer’s prose works remain 
at best on the periphery of critical discussion and at worst wholly ignored.  Yet in his major 
prose works—the Boece, the Treatise on the Astrolabe, the Tale of Melibee, the Parson’s Tale, 
and the Retraction—Chaucer models principles of interpretation for the individual in a time 
fraught with civil unrest: he offers his readers strategies to assert their own agency and thus 
intellectual autonomy in the midst of this struggle over the authority and ability to interpret 
knowledge.  Unlike Wyclif, whose primary interest was chiefly in offering individuals Church 
doctrine in the vernacular, Chaucer gives his secular audience the means to assert their autonomy 
and agency in the domains of scientific, religious, and philosophical knowledge.  Through these 
writings, he indicates that these processes can provide a benefit to everyone, independent of 
religious affiliation, societal position, education, or age.  Thus, “Reclaiming Reason” argues 
specifically that these prose works are essential to a comprehensive understanding of Chaucer’s 
epistemology, one that asserts that in an inherently flawed and fragmented realm, the individual 
can exercise authority over his own choices by consciously developing skills of critical, recursive 
engagement that lead to right understanding and right deeming.  Of course, Chaucer’s oft noted 
interest in rational processes and in readerly participation are illustrated throughout his verse, but 
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it is in the prose that his position is both fully developed and more readily accessible.
3
  More 
broadly, this dissertation suggests that Chaucer’s literary prose provides both the Middle Ages 
and later eras powerful methods for reclaiming reason as an intellectual engine, for 
understanding the power of language to shape personal choice, and for reestablishing a personal 
agency necessary for the creation of a productive life.   
The process of recursive analysis is foundational to this act of reclaiming reason.  As 
Chaucer deploys it in the Retraction, recursion is a process of analysis that invokes the process 
as part of its operations.  For example, when Chaucer assesses both his work and his reading of 
that work, he follows the method of examination detailed in the Boece, as I demonstrate in 
Chapter One.  Part of this method requires that he analyze his own assessment by contextualizing 
it within a larger framework of the homiletic statement that “all that is written is written for our 
doctrine,” which is a fundamental epistemological assumption arising from the view of 
Providence espoused in the Boece: all that is written, like all that happens, in one way or another 
serves the highest good.  Similarly, through his use of conditionals at the beginning of the 
Retraction, Chaucer instigates his reader’s own recursive assessment by asking him to consider 
to what extent those conditions apply.  In order to determine the answer, the reader must call 
upon the methods that Chaucer offers in his prose works.  These include a recognition of the 
fractional nature of knowledge and communication (from the Astrolabe), a process of gathering 
and analyzing quality information (from the Melibee), and a method of developing productive, 
rational habits of assessment and action (from the Parson).   
To be clear, the process of recursion is distinct from that of self-reflection.  From the 
invention of the Seven Deadly Sins onward, self-reflection is a process of recalling and 
cataloging individual events as either problematic (the main focus) or beneficial; recursiveness is 
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a method for analyzing those events or behaviors as part of a process for self-improvement.  
Recursion can thus be seen as a systematic way of analyzing what is revealed by self-reflection.  
Examples from the prose exemplify this idea.  Boethius reassesses his experiences through the 
recursive mode of analysis offered by Lady Philosophy.  The user of the Astrolabe must go back 
and reassess what he thought he knew about the device (and its limits) as Chaucer’s exposition 
progresses.  Melibee has to reassess and reevaluate what he and others did.  The Parson’s 
penitent has to not acknowledge the events of sin but their interdependence and their pernicious 
processes if the penitent is to successfully mitigate them.  Finally, Chaucer reassesses a prior 
response to his own work in the Retraction. 
My approach to this study combines elements of New Formalism and Reader Response 
Theory.  More precisely, I engage in a New Formalist reading inflected by Aristotelian notions 
of form and by insights gleaned from textual criticism (codicology and paleography) and source 
study.  Within Reader Response Theory, I follow Hans Robert Jauss, one of the foundational 
reader-response critics, who views literature as a dialectical process of production and reception.
4
  
It is this idea of a dialectical exchange between text and reader that not only informs Chaucer’s 
much earlier consideration of that dynamic in his prose, but in fact inspires his careful inclusion 
of the act of recursive assessment within those works.   
For Chaucer, the individual derives his own authority and thus his responsibility by 
engaging in a process through which he can gain an increasingly competent (though always 
incomplete) understanding of language and knowledge.  This precondition is necessary for 
effective decision making, for “right deeming.”  Such a process requires persistence both in its 
development and its execution as the individual refines his techniques through experience.  The 
central role of language in such a process has been a focus of much modern criticism.  In 
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“Chaucer and the Nominalist Questions,” for example, Russell Peck explains that the need for 
this type of programmatic engagement is as necessary for audiences today as it was during the 
Middle Ages: “Man seems to have an almost infinite capacity for confusing himself, for tying 
himself up in dilemmas which are often little more than verbal tricks which the mind plays on 
itself.”5  To offer methods of engagement with this persistent issue, Chaucer chooses prose, a 
medium which allows him to develop such processes more clearly than would verse.  In 
“Chaucer’s Prose Rhythms,” Margaret Schlaugh writes that the choice of prose and the cadence 
of the different prose works are suited to their particular audiences, and Carol Lipson, writing 
about the Treatise on the Astrolabe, contends that the prose matches the subject matter of the 
individual compositions.
6
  Given Chaucer’s professional activities and the circle wherein he acts, 
it seems almost self-evident that his audience of such peers would have a vital interest in “right 
deeming” and thus in its necessary pre-condition of “right understanding” so that the counsel he 
and his peers proffer is as sound as possible.  The Astrolabe, while nominally addressed to his 
young son, represents a similar (and vexing) challenge to those peers, insofar as the astrological 
data derived from that technology shaped decisions in a variety of domains.  Of course, 
Chaucer’s audience of peers was not static.  As Paul Strohm has shown, the membership within 
the group of these peers “was in constant flux and that [this group] played a variable role in 
[Chaucer’s] life.”7  “Reclaiming Reason” adds to this discussion through its examination of the 
form of prose and argues that this particular form has distinct advantages over verse: clarity of 
expression, familiarity of structure, and the capacity for expansive discourse, to name a few.  The 
argument that this dissertation develops throughout is that Chaucer exploits the potential of these 
advantages to maximize his audience’s accessibility to, as well as their utility of, the methods of 
engagement that he exemplifies in the prose.   
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The idea of matching subject with style is offered explicitly either by Chaucer or by one 
of his characters in the prologues to all of the prose works, save the Boece where it is an implicit 
theme of the entire work.  The Prologue to the Tale of Melibee provides an example.  When the 
Host defines the verse of The Tale of Sir Thopas as “nat worth a toord” (VII.930), he invites the 
Chaucer-pilgrim (henceforth “Chaucer”) to “telle in prose somewhat, at the leeste, / In which 
ther be som murthe or som doctryne” (934-35).8  Priming his audience to receive a “moral tale 
vertuous” (940), “Chaucer” explains that while the story is familiar and the sentence the same, 
the way he tells his “litel thyng in prose” will be different (937).  In calling his audience’s 
attention to this change, the narrator implies that prose is the necessary medium for this tale 
because telling the Tale of Melibee in verse would obscure its meaning in “drasty speche.”  
Similarly, in the Parson’s Prologue, the Parson flatly refuses to attempt anything in verse—“I 
kan nat geeste ‘rum, ram, ruf, by lettre, / Ne, God woot, rym holde I but litel better” (X.43-44).  
While he initially suggests that he must choose prose because of his lack of poetic skill, he also 
refuses to “tellen fables and swich wrecchednesse” (34) because he would miss the opportunity 
to provide true nourishment: “Why sholde I sowen draf out of my fest, / What I may sowen 
whete, if that me lest?” (35-36).  He decides instead to sow the wheat of “Moralitee and vertuous 
mateere” (38) in his “myrie tale in prose” (46).  In each of these explanations, Chaucer not only 
draws attention to the choice of prose, but focuses on the reasons that this style is necessary: the 
Melibee narrator does not have the ability to set forth his sentence in verse; the Parson does not 
want to pass up the opportunity to sow wheat.  Along with according subject and style, these 
examples illustrate two further considerations: the matching of the form to the speaker (Melibee) 
and to the audience (Parson).  
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Chaucer’s employment of prose in his Treatise on the Astrolabe and his Boece accords 
with the Canterbury examples, though his reasoning is not equally clear in both cases.  In the 
Astrolabe’s Prologue, Chaucer explains, in propria persona, that he composes this work “under 
full light reules and naked wordes in Englissh” (26-27) because the primary audience for this 
piece, his son Lewis, cannot read the Latin treatises.
9
  Due to Lewis’ age and level of skill, 
Chaucer justifies to a larger secondary audience his choice to include what he calls the 
unsophisticated and superfluous quality of his composition: “The firste cause is for that curious 
endityng and hard sentence is ful hevy at onys for such a child to lerne.  And the secunde cause 
is this, that sothly me semith better to written unto a child twyes a god sentence, than he forgete 
it onys” (44-49).  In other words, Chaucer wants to make clear and understandable (to the degree 
possible) the astrology of the Astrolabe, and the choice of prose enables him to achieve that 
outcome.
10
  Chaucer’s decision in the Boece is not as obvious.  As is well-known, Boethius 
composed his Consolation in metre-prose form, but Chaucer’s work is entirely prose.  One 
theory is that he translated the metred passages into prose because he was simply following his 
sources, as Szilvia Malaczkov suggests.
11
  Others, such as A.J. Minnis and Tim Machan, explain 
that the issue is more complicated because Chaucer uses four sources for his Boece: “the Vulgate 
Consolatio, Jean’s translation, and the material from Trevet and a Remigian commentary.”12  
According to Minnis and Machan, the text that Chaucer creates from these sources is unique: “In 
the Middle Ages (and beyond), to translate is to interpret, and to this extent Chaucer was, in a 
sense, the author of both a translation and the ‘composite source’ thereof.”13  While Chaucer 
does not explain his reasoning as he does in the other works, I submit that his decision to 
maintain prose throughout the Boece results from a similar consideration that inspires his choice 
in the other works: that through prose, he can present his audience with a comprehensive method 
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of reading that examines information on, within, and outside of the page.  Just as he decides to 
include excessive explanation “under full light reules and naked words in Englissh” for the 
benefit of the Astrolabe’s audience (Prologue 26-27), so in the Boece he chooses prose to 
maximize the clarity of its sentence.  This choice is reflective of Philosophy’s immediate 
banishment of the Muses (I.p1.68-73) and subsequent question, in prose, if Boethius understands 
what she has said in verse (I.p4.1-6).  In both instances, Philosophy resorts to prose in order to 
communicate more effectively.  But prose, too, can be complicated.  As Boethius explains to 
Philosophy, “al be it so that I see now from afer what thou purposist, algates I desire yit to 
herknen it of the more pleynly” (III.p12.18-21).  In other words, Boethius understands the sense, 
but in order to draw the meaning in, he needs plain words. 
The idea of “plain words,” of what it means to communicate plainly, clearly interested 
Chaucer, but this idea is far more complex than the “plain” qualifier suggests.  Indeed, Chaucer 
makes twenty-eight references to pleyn speche throughout his work, the instances of which draw 
attention to the diverse potential of the claim to such speech.  From the Man of Law’s assurance 
that he does not, at least in this instance, embellish (“for to speke al playn” (CT II.219)) to 
Boethius’ request that Philosophy communicate more directly (“I desire to herkne it more 
pleynly of the” (Boece IV p2 96)) to the Parson’s instruction that a person confess a sin “pleynly 
with alle circumstaunces” (CT X.976), the importance of pleyn speche as a rhetorical form is 
obvious.  Communication that is “plain” claims to be more apparent, more complete, and thus 
more effective, although that isn’t always the case.  Unfortunately, “plain” does not unify 
signified and signifier perfectly; at best, it only moves closer to such a union.  Further, the utility 
of such assertions can be deceptive: for the Man of Law, it establishes ethos; for Chaucer’s 
Boethius, “plain words” more readily reveal truth; for the Parson, it wards against self-deception.  
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Though Boethius and the Parson both communicate concern about access to truth through 
language, the Man of Law, like many of Chaucer’s characters, frames his speech as plain to 
constrict the response of his audience.  He expects that they will accept the validity of his 
argument because of the proclaimed “completeness” of his speech.  Similarly, Troilus’ Pandarus 
declares that his words are truthful—“so pleynly for to seyne” (TC II.1126)—because they speak 
the “full” meaning, and the Legend of Good Women’s God of Love contends that there is no need 
to “glose” the “pleyn text” (F 328).14  By providing examples both of honest attempts to 
communicate clearly and of deceptive efforts to create the appearance of clarity, Chaucer 
demonstrates that “plain speech” requires the same investment in its consideration as do other 
modes of communication.  Though similar to Wyclif in his interest in the relationship between 
words and deeds, Chaucer’s particular concern is with the text as an independent object that 
requires a consideration of all that is contained within it.   
To create “plain” communication with words alone, Chaucer employs doublets and 
metaphors.  While the assertions of his characters rely on the supposition that plain speech is 
“whole” and thus requires no analysis, the fact that Chaucer supplements many of the “plain” 
iterations with doublets belies the notion of perfection.  In fact, Chaucer’s use of these doublets 
demonstrates his persistent concern about the potential for language both to beguile and to 
advance understanding: “short and playn” (GP 790, KnT 1091, ClT 577, SNT 360); “plat and 
pleyn” (MLT 886); “openly and pleyn” (SqT 151); “al open and pleyn” (SNT 284); “ful plat and 
ek ful pleyn” (MkT 2757); “bare and pleyn” (FranT 720).  Of course, even communication that is 
“full clear and also full plain” fails to convey the full sense of the idea for the simple reason that 
language is inexact.  The prose works are not exempt from this limitation.  That Chaucer also 
utilizes metaphor in these texts attests to an ultimate need for supplementary linguistic tools, 
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though such use does not diminish his attempt at plain speech, as the contemporaneous Lollard 
practice makes clear.  According to Rebecca Wilson Lundin, the Lollards’ “plain discourse 
indicated neither the absence of figurative language nor a lack of rhetorical nuance in meaning.  
Rather, Lollards used the idea of plainness to signify their theological and rhetorical dissociation 
from medieval scholasticism and thus from orthodoxy.”15  While Chaucer’s concern was not to 
distinguish his writings from the authority of the Church (he was, after all, writing for a secular 
audience), he shares with the Lollards an interest in making knowledge accessible to the 
individual members of his audience.  In his prose, he calls attention to the limitations of language 
and then writes in such a way as to cause his readers to experience the near-hits and the near-
misses that such limitations inevitably create.  Of course, the use of doublets in translations into 
English is not unique to Chaucer.  The pairings offered two different linguistic registers—one 
from Anglo-Saxon, the other from Norman French—and were, as Karla Taylor notes, “self-
glossing.”16  The point is not that Chaucer’s use of doublets is particular to him; rather, he 
utilizes this structure to highlight the fact that even “plain speech” isn’t plain.  The experience of 
the lack of a concrete explanation can then contribute to the reader’s craft of wise judgment that 
Chaucer offers through these writings.  As R.F. Yeager writes, “Reading Chaucer is to read 
about reading.”17  Though I largely agree with this sentiment, I argue that to read Chaucer is to 
learn how to read.      
As part of my study, I consider the various material representations of these works in the 
manuscripts and what these representations do for the reader.  I thus endeavor to understand, to 
borrow from William Kuskin, “the historical reasons for any one construction” of the texts.18  
For Kuskin, such understanding results from an acknowledgement of both the material and the 
intellectual constructions of a text, a point which underscores the collaboration between auhor, 
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scribe, and reader.  My investigations of the manuscripts of Chaucer’s Treatise on the Astrolabe 
in Chapter Two read the resonances between the text and the accompanying diagrams of the 
astrolabe as an opportunity for the reader to gain both experience and knowledge.  In this 
particular work, words alone—even plain words—are insufficient.  Indeed, the illustrations of 
the various components of the astrolabe serve to expose the intricacies of the device in much the 
same way as the words, Chaucer’s “naked wordes in Englissh,” attempt to address the limits of 
language, textual authority, and ultimately, of knowledge itself.  My examinations of the 
manuscripts which contain the Melibee and the Parson outside of their Canterbury frame have 
yielded similar results.  I found comparable relationships between the texts, their physical 
positioning on the page, and Chaucer’s different purposes in each composition.  Inclusions of the 
Melibee in other compendia, for example, highlight the benefits of Prudence’s counsel both to 
Melibee and to the reader, while the Parson’s position within a manuscript that is largely 
devoted to works about active and contemplative lives testifies to the recognized benefit of the 
Parson’s Tale to religious and lay audiences alike.  Throughout, the methodology I used in my 
examinations of these manuscripts includes a review of textual criticism, a consideration of the 
work’s placement in each manuscript, the physical attributes of the piece, and the correlation, if 
any, between text and image.  I am, therefore, less interested in theme, i.e. Chaucer’s sexuality or 
his polity, subjects that have dominated Chaucer studies since the 1980s, than in genre and 
literary form, which I believe is both a fundamental organizing principle and a foundational 
charge of literary studies.  Through my analysis of Chaucer’s deliberate attempts to create an 
affinity between pleyn speche and knowledge, the textual relation between poetry and prose, and 
the textual positioning of the prose works in the manuscripts, I hope to begin a discussion not 
only of the importance of Chaucer’s prose, but also of the power he attributes to wise judgment. 
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I offer my analysis in four chapters.  Chapter 1, “Returning to the Path of Reason: the 
Value of Recursive Assessment in the Boece and Retraction,” explores the recursive dynamic 
between Chaucer’s final work, the Retraction, and the only work for which he expresses 
gratitude in that composition, the Boece.  The Boece is a dialectic about the benefits of reason, 
the perils of emotion, and the programmatic system which leads the engaged participant to a 
position from which he can “deem rightly”; as such, this work serves as Chaucer’s introduction 
to the potential for literature to effect change in daily life.  In recognizing the Retraction’s 
connection to the Boece, I argue that this final work is a sincere piece of prose that invites the 
very evaluative processes that Chaucer learned through his translation of the Boece and then 
illustrates in his Treatise on the Astrolabe, the Melibee, and the Parson’s Tale.  There are thus 
two concurrent yet independent driving forces in the Retraction.  The first is Chaucer’s own 
assessment of his process of reading: as the writer, can he recognize the profit of his work?  The 
second is the prompting of the reader, guided by Chaucer, to judge his or her own methods of 
reading and interpretation.  These recursive analyses provoke an effort to contextualize the 
information in order to understand rightly—Chaucer’s within the Boethian vision and the 
reader’s within Chaucerian doctrine.   
One of the lasting debates in the scholarship of the Retraction concerns its earnestness.  
James Dean, Ian Johnson, and John S. P. Tatlock believe it to be genuine attempt to retract the 
bulk of Chaucer’s work; Olive Sayce argues that it draws on conventional exculpatory motifs; A. 
P. Campbell suggests that the work is a heartfelt response from Chaucer the pilgrim.
19
  Chapter 1 
seeks to extend this debate by suggesting that the dual purposes of the Retraction inform a new 
perspective about what Chaucer intends this final work to accomplish. By referring back to the 
Boece in the Retraction, Chaucer calls attention to the connection between his own act of internal 
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assessment—in determining the relationship between his intentions in writing and what he 
actually produced—and that in which Boethius engages through his dialogue with Philosophy.  
Through this connection, Chaucer invites the reader to reflect upon her understanding of his 
writings, to perform her own act of recursive analysis to discover which of her interpretations 
remain valid and which require modification.  This process underscores the limitations of 
language and knowledge by suggesting that recursiveness is a necessary component of individual 
understanding precisely because those limits deny the possibility of perfect knowing but allow 
better knowing through such recursive analysis that refines such knowing. 
In Chapter 2, “Learning to Know: Approaching the Universe through Chaucer’s 
Astrolabe,” I turn to Chaucer’s most difficult prose text, the scientific Treatise on the Astrolabe.  
Manuscript evidence suggests that Chaucer uses the astrolabe simultaneously to signify the 
impossibility of achieving complete understanding and to show that the approach to 
knowledge—like the degrees on the physical device—can be incrementally enhanced.  Further, 
Chaucer’s illumination of imperfect and incomplete knowledge speaks directly to issues of the 
textual representations and reproductions of information.  The fact that early reproductions of the 
Astrolabe include diagrams to help guide the reader between the text and the device signals 
Chaucer’s awareness of the need to supplement the text with more visual, physical 
representations of what was more imperfectly represented in words.  Further, he calls attention to 
the deficiencies in his own text, highlights the benefit of critical engagement, and models 
methods of using the idea of inherent partiality to form credible (though incomplete) 
conclusions.  While the Astrolabe has received surprisingly little attention, with those scholars 
who do address it typically dismissing it as a teaching text, Andrew Cole has recently suggested 
that the Prologue is of much greater importance than was previously thought: contending that it 
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is central to an understanding of Chaucer’s perception of vernacularity and its politics, he argues 
that this work is “an important indicator of Chaucer’s sense of literary authority.”20  I read the 
Prologue as a powerful attempt by Chaucer to inspire authority in his audience rather than to 
assert his own.  The images in Parts One and Two of the Astrolabe corroborate this idea, for 
evidence from the early manuscripts suggests that the images were integral to understanding the 
descriptions of the various plates of the astrolabe, as well as the different functions of each 
section of the device.  By intentionally using “naked words” when translating his sources into 
English, Chaucer makes scientific information both available and accessible to an audience 
outside of the control of the established “authorities” (i.e., the Church and the Academy).  His 
concern in the Astrolabe is not to compose a definitive, scientific treatise in the vernacular; 
rather, he puts forward the idea that, in the fractured sublunar sphere, a deliberative method of 
acquiring knowledge leads to an understanding that is less imperfect and more personal.  The 
work’s main accomplishment is that it models the critical evaluation of information and experts 
through practice, understanding, and experience. 
Chapter 3, “Chaucer’s Dialectic of Expectation: Thopas, Melibee, and the Benefits of 
Effective Listening,” suggests that Chaucer connects the Thopas and the Melibee in order to deal 
with the problems inherent in unscrutinized expectations from different perspectives.  More 
specifically, it argues that in the relationship between the Thopas and the Melibee, Chaucer 
challenges the idea that forms—i.e. types of structure or schema—are the most important factors 
in determining meaning, and that one’s expectations of form and unthinking reactions based 
upon those expectations limit the individual’s ability to judge rightly the information 
communicated by and through those forms.  Such limitations are illustrated in three ways: by 
Harry Bailly’s initial response to Chaucer-pilgrim, by Melibee’s unthinking rejection of 
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Prudence’s advice because of her gender, and by the reader’s invited reaction to the pilgrim-
narrator.  For instance, by exposing the issue of expectation in the voice of his Canterbury 
character, Chaucer creates an opportunity for the reader to reconsider whatever preconceived 
notions inform his or her understanding of these two tales because they are offered by 
“Chaucer.”  Indeed, the “elvyssh” Thopas/Melibee narrator intends to expose both the reader’s 
and Bailly’s opening assumptions and to reinforce the idea that the processes of information 
gathering and decision-making call upon faculties beyond sight (or imagination) (VII.703).
21
  
Further, the narrator’s unclear identity—he is like an elf; he could be a doll—serves to force the 
audience into a position from which they must determine the value of the Tale on its own merit 
and determine truth and application not from the relation between teller and tale or that between 
teller and reader.  Rather, the assessment of the Tale must come from an understanding of the 
value of the process of wise judgment: gathering counselors, evaluating personal motives, 
scrutinizing future consequences, and basing decisions on sound information.  Melibee’s 
dismissal of Prudence’s counsel works to the same effect, as he rejects her words based not on 
their worth but on her womanly form.  Once he learns to look beyond her form and the 
expectations that it has created, Melibee discovers how to participate in a process of wise 
judgment that benefits him and the community he governs because his objective changes from 
revenge to peaceful accord with the adversaries.  My core argument in this chapter is that, 
through the Thopas-Melibee association, Chaucer presents his audience with examples of the 
limitations that result from misleading assumptions that impact their capacity to understand 
rightly—locally in the Canterbury Tales and more broadly in real-world decision making.  I then 
suggest that Chaucer puts forth a method of engagement that counters these self-imposed 
restrictions.  Offered through Melibee’s Prudence, this method models a conscious and specific 
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process of reading (of all “forms”) and reasoning that is as necessary to his modern readers as it 
was for his contemporary audience.   
Finally, Chapter 4, “Choosing Destiny: Language, Habits, and the Power of Knowing in 
the Parson’s Tale,” reads the Parson’s Tale as a text that foregrounds individual agency and 
downplays institutional means to salvation.  Though these tenets may suggest an accordance with 
Lollard beliefs, the Parson’s focus on auricular confession to an extent distances him from that 
potential, as Katherine Little has pointed out.
22
  Other scholars brush this tale aside as either a 
sermon about penitence or as conforming to the standards of a penitential manual.  I argue that 
the Parson’s Tale has a far wider scope; indeed, there are far more fundamental and more 
significant implications for both the reader of this particular tale and for those who engage with 
the other tales of the Canterbury collection, implications that address issues of language, rhetoric, 
and habits of thoughtful decision-making.  For the Parson, the deceptive use of words leads 
ultimately to self-deception and damnation.  Words that are cousin to the deed and plainly 
spoken, on the other hand, can result in the speaker’s emancipation from the mental and spiritual 
stagnation that habitual sin creates.  Though the issues raised by the Parson do form a sermon, 
that “lesson” is complex and applicable to both an examination one’s own life and to an 
examination of how others live theirs to the same end.  From the knowledge gained through such 
an examination, the individual can reframe those habits of mind and action that result first in 
more effective choices within this fallen world and, through those choices, in the achievement of 
personal salvation.  This promotion of the correct use of words, and the resulting ability to 
consider the word choice of others, shapes the Parson’s initial call for judgment as he begins his 
tale: “‘Stondeth upon the weyes, and seeth and axeth of olde pathes (that is to seyn, of olde 
sentences) which is the goode wey, / and walketh in that wey, and ye shal fynde refresshynge for 
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youre soules’” (76-77).  This interrogatory process—stand on the existing paths, observe, and 
interrogate the former doctrine in order to find the “good” within those teachings—is individual 
and perspectival, and it requires the seeker to make a thoughtful judgment.  Ultimately, I suggest 
that Chaucer’s consideration of the disconnected natures of knowledge, language, and the self in 
this work promote the audience’s own process of engagement with the world and their own 
understanding of themselves in order to develop productive habits and to choose who and where 
they want to be. 
“Reclaiming Reason” contends that Chaucer’s prose works are relevant today.  He wrote 
these works to provide a context—a providential frame, to borrow from Boethius—through 
which readers could discriminate between reliable and misleading information.  We live in a 
world that is increasingly crafted by mediated exchanges: print and aural media, television, 
celluloid, and the Internet contribute to an inundation of news and narrative.  While the ubiquity 
of these various, powerful, and cooperant forces within our society is often recognized, solutions 
to the problems raised by such mediated communications remain scarce.  The models that 
Chaucer offers in his prose works, the application of which enables wise judgment and then 
judicious responses to information that is crafted with sophistication and intent, are as 
fundamental for decision-making today as they were during the Middle Ages.  The prose works 
are didactic to be sure, but following Chaucer, all writing is instructional; the focus of this 
dissertation, therefore, is on how this instruction can impact our understanding of the world.  
Chaucer and his contemporary audience lived neither in the Golden nor the Dark Ages: his 
world, and the potential productivity of humans in that world, was constrained both by the 
inherent problems of language, as well as by the guilors who understood how to manipulate 
those problems to their own ends.  What Chaucer gave his contemporary audience, and what he 
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gives his readers today, is a method of applying the philosophical ideals, found in his Boece, of 
right understanding and wise judgment by flawed individuals in an imperfect world.  Of course, 
much more work needs to be done on the prose texts, both in and of themselves and in relation to 
their sources.  While “Reclaiming Reason” considers these issues in part, its main objectives are 
to consider the processes of wise judgment that Chaucer offers in the prose, the ways in which he 
reveals these methods, and the benefits of such methods to the reader.   
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Chapter One 
 
Returning to the Path of Reason: the Value of Recursive Assessment in the Boece and the 
Retraction 
 
 
The twelve lines of the Retraction’s prose comprising Chaucer’s ostensible final work are 
as pregnant as they are deceptively simplistic.  Though he seems to suggest that he is retracting 
the bulk of his work, the list he provides is less a definitive collection and more an expressed 
potential: 
preye for me that Crist have mercy on me and foryeve me my giltes; / and namely 
of my translacions and enditynges of worldly vanitees, the whiche I revoke in my 
retracciouns:/ as is the book of Troilus; the book also of Fame; the book of the 
XXV. Ladies; the book of the Duchesse; the book of Seint Valentynes day of the 
Parlement of Briddes; the tales of Caunterbury, thilke that sownen into synne;/ the 
book of the Leoun; and many another book, if they were in my remembrance, and 
many a song and many a lecherous lay.  (X.1084-87) 
While refusing to tell us which of his works might be understood as writings about worldly 
vanities, Chaucer leaves the final judgment to those readers “that herkne this litel tretys or 
rede.”1  While refusing to express his interpretation of these possible “vanitees” openly, Chaucer 
asserts value of only one specific work and some general types of work: “But of the translacion 
of Boece de Consolatione, and othere bookes of legends of seintes, and omelies, and moralitee, 
and devocioun,/ that thanke I oure Lord Jhesu Crist and his blissful Mooder, and alle the seintes 
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of hevene” (1088-89).   That he calls attention to the benefit of his Boece in the Retraction 
signals a connection between the process required in the act of retraction—recursive analysis 
(i.e., a specific method of analysis that can be applied to its own result)—and the work that 
provides a method for such examination—the Boece.   
The practice of recursive analysis requires that the individual follow a particular process 
of evaluation in order to assess a specific issue; the result of that assessment is then incorporated 
into the reader’s future analyses of the issue.  For example, when Boethius assents to 
Philosophy’s process of analyzing both false and real goods in Book III, Philosophy challenges 
him to utilize that process to affirm the qualities of the Good.  If Boethius accepts that “alle thing 
that is good…[is] good by the participacioun of good” (III.p11.40-42), then he must grant “by 
semblable resoun that oon and good be o same thing” (44-46, my emphasis).  The reason to 
which Philosophy refers in this statement is the method of rational analysis that she uses 
throughout the text; here, that method becomes recursive because she highlights the need to 
employ this identical process of reasoning in order to reaffirm two propositions (God is found in 
goodness; humanity can participate in that Good) and to establish a third (that unity and 
goodness are the same).  In other words, the process of recursive analysis encourages a habit of 
evaluation and modification of one’s interpretations of and responses to the world in order to 
better that individual’s understanding—in the Boece, Boethius comes to understand the Good 
and refigures his responses to his situation in light of that knowledge.  Boece’s influence on the 
Retraction is, in fact, extensive and exemplifies this act of recursive assessment.  As such, its 
study can shed light on what Chaucer intends his Retraction to accomplish.  
The Boece, Boethius’ Consolation of Philosophy, is a work about developing the skill to 
judge wisely, to use reason and rational analysis in order to make well-informed, profitable 
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choices.  Boethius wrote the Consolation while awaiting execution in Pavia, and it is thus the 
product of his own struggle to overcome his emotional paralysis and to regain the strength of 
reason.  This narrative journey begins as Boethius, lamenting the loss of his good fortune, fails to 
recognize his teacher, Philosophy: as he explains, “And I, of whom the sighte, ploungid in teeres, 
was dirked so that Y ne myghte noght knowen what that woman was of so imperial auctorite, I 
wax al abayssched and astoned, and caste my syghte doun to the erthe” (I.p1.77-82).2  The depth 
of Boethius’ feeling of blind impotence is immediately reframed by Philosophy as the 
consequences of his choice to be led astray from reason by the force of his own emotion: “Allas!  
How the thought of this man, dreynt in overthrowynge depnesse, dulleth and forleteth his proper 
clernesse, myntynge to gon into foreyne dirknesses as ofte as his anoyos bysynes waxeth without 
mesure, that is dryven with werldly wyndes” (I.m2.1-6).  Put another way, in choosing to permit 
the Muses to “endit[e] wordes to [his] wepynges” (I.p1.44-45), Boethius likewise chooses to 
surrender his powers of analysis.   
Through their dialectical exchange, Philosophy comes to understand that Boethius’ 
problem stems from his inability to recognize the interrelated conditions of his situation, an issue 
which itself results from the fact that his emotions have overridden his reason.  The consequence, 
she explains, is that Boethius has forgotten who he is.  More troubling for Philosophy is her 
assessment that Boethius does not know what he is: “‘Now woot I,’ quod sche, ‘other cause of 
thi maladye, and that right greet: thow hast left for to knowen thyselve what thou art’” (I.p6.68-
70).  Once he remembers that he is a rational being in a world of Fortune, that Fortune presents 
myriad opportunities not only for personal edification but also for the exercise of rational 
analysis, and that Providence ultimately turns everything to Good, Boethius can see that he has 
power only over himself.  Simply put, his reactions, judgments, interpretations, and choices are 
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within his control; the way that society creates or destroys his reputation, the beliefs and actions 
of others, the wickedness of those in authority, and indeed everything external to him is outside 
the scope of that control.  Once Boethius “remembers” who and what he is, once he understands 
the context of his situation, he can reclaim his sight and understand how to exert his power to 
create true, lasting happiness.  
What the Consolation offers, both to Boethius and to his reader, is a rational, analytic 
process that includes several variables: self-analysis, an understanding of what is within one’s 
power to control, a consideration of the “eende of thynges” or the context of the information, and 
deliberation about how the knowledge gained from such analysis can benefit the individual.  I 
call this process wise judgment.  An essential part of this practice is recursion: with Boethius, it 
is the modification of his confusion through a return to a rational understanding by performing 
the analytic process that Philosophy helps him remember.  It is in this vein that I argue Chaucer’s 
Retraction utilizes the Boece.  As his final work, the Retraction offers an occasion wherein both 
he and his reader can engage in this method in order to judge the value of his work and its utility; 
through this opportunity, Chaucer creates a link between recursive analysis, authorship, and 
readership.  The extension of this idea is that the Boece and the Retraction suggest both that the 
processes of reading and reflection are recursive and that such recursiveness is a necessary 
component of the ability to judge wisely and use information well.   
Chaucer indicates his belief in the importance of this system through his choice to 
translate this work into prose.  Though I discussed this point briefly in the Introduction, a larger 
consideration here will illuminate the Chaucer’s concern to make this information available to 
his audience.  Ralph Hanna III and Traugott Lawler’s work on the Boece helps to make this 
point.  In their interpretation of the fact that Philosophy banishes the Muses and yet intersperses 
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poetry throughout the text, Hanna and Lawler conclude that “presumably what has been chased 
away is only meretricious poetry that focuses on partial goods, for poetry is embedded deeply in 
the fabric of the work.”3  Their suggestion, of course, speaks to the difference between 
ornamentation and substance, partiality and completeness (considerations which will be fully 
developed in the following chapters).  If poetry is indeed “embedded deeply in the fabric of the 
work,” and I believe that it is, then what Hanna and Lawler are implying is that poetry is defined 
by what it is able to achieve instead of by a quality of ornamentation.  Chaucer’s choice to 
compose the Boece’s original prosimetrum style entirely in prose, then, does not necessarily 
make his composition less poetic, but rather allows him to bring to English readers the well-
known and philosophically important Boethian text by broadening its accessibility through the 
simplification of its form and the inclusion of glosses.  
I offer my argument in four phases.  To understand more specifically how the Boece 
shapes the Retraction, I begin with an examination of the Boethian themes that translate most 
apparently to Chaucer’s final work.  These themes, I suggest, shape Chaucer’s personal 
assessment and inspire his reader’s own recursive moment.  Next, I consider the significance of 
the Retraction’s placement at the end of the Parson’s Tale with respect to the processes of 
reflection and wise judgment developed in the Boece.  As part of this section, I discuss the 
current critical responses to the Retraction and the four analogues to the “authorial humility” 
topos that Chaucer employs in the first two lines of the Retraction—Jean de Meun’s Le 
Testament, John Bromyard’s Summa Praedicantium, Don Juan Manuel’s El Conde Lucanor, and 
Giovanni Boccaccio’s Genealogia Deorum Gentilium.  I then trace Chaucer’s use of the methods 
of recursive analysis as he employs them to analyze his oeuvre.  Finally, I assay the analytical 
process that Chaucer instigates in the Retraction to discover what benefits the reader might gain 
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through this exercise.  I focus in this final section primarily on the methods of developing 
rational habits of analysis and judgment that he offers in his prose because it is in these works 
that he most plainly reveals the means to gather and assess data.  In recognizing the connection 
between his first prose work and his last, I argue that Chaucer reveals the importance of the 
Consolation not only to his work but also to his life; in offering this benefit to his reader, he 
simultaneously creates an opportunity to practice wise judgment, while suggesting that the 
benefit of knowledge is found in its actuation through such wise judgment. 
The guiding principle behind Boethius’ vision of the universe is that the world is ordered 
and governed by reason, and as such, it is approachable through analysis.  Indeed, the 
Consolation itself represents Boethius’ own analytic modification of his emotional response to 
his imprisonment as he works to regain a rational, objective understanding.  For Philosophy, 
Boethius’ initial inability to reconcile the seeming inequity between his self-imposed impotence 
and the power of those who wittingly distorted the facts to sabotage him signifies the degree to 
which he focuses on earthly, emotionally-driven concerns.  The core problem with such a focus 
on the immediate situation is that it limits one’s ability to gather and consider any information 
that resides outside of such particular circumstances.  In other words, Boethius looks only to the 
immediate result of his imprisonment; his inability to balance what he sees (his own confusion) 
in relation to what he knows (all things are governed by reason) causes distress.  This result is 
particular to the earth-bound gaze: as Philosophy explains, “whatsoevere thou mayst seen that is 
doon in this world unhopid or unwened, certes it es the ryghte ordre of thinges, but as to thi 
wikkid opynioun it is confusioun” (IV.p6.234-37).  Boethius’ confusion, and by extension 
humanity’s, is therefore the product of his own misunderstanding: because the universe is 
ordered, there is a reason for everything that happens.  Emotions, then, serve to restrict man’s 
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ability to comprehend the eternal, providential order of the world, to increase his perplexity, and 
to create needless suffering.  The potential of this theory is that if all men naturally tend toward 
the Good but are, to varying degrees, misled by their own unique incapacities to understand the 
Good in any particular moment, both the fault of understanding and the faculty to reclaim that 
knowledge reside, at the same time, in each individual.  These two themes—man creates his own 
confusion; man has the capacity to regain his rational mind through habits of wise judgment—
are central to Boethius’ personal consolation.    
In assigning his confusion to “wikkid opynioun,” Philosophy stresses that Boethius’ 
bewilderment results from his constricted perspective.  Initially, he is unable either to assess his 
situation rationally or to contextualize Fortune properly, and worse, his emotional state then 
encourages the habituation of such irrationality.  Understandably, the incongruity between what 
he intended to do (protect the Roman Senate from an unreliable charge of treason) and how this 
action was purposefully twisted to charge him with treason baffles him.  For Boethius, this unjust 
and unmerited action against him is exacerbated by the fact that he is being judged based on the 
immediate, perceivable result, rather than on knowledge of a reasonable, if not total, 
understanding of its surrounding circumstances.  He explains that rash conclusions result from 
“the gessynge and the jugement of moche folk ne loken nothing to the desertes of thynges, but 
oonly to the aventure of fortune; and jugen that oonly swiche thynges ben purveied of God, 
whiche that temporel welefulnesse commendeth” (I.p4.282-88).  Chaucer’s gloss of this passage 
indicates the destructiveness of such “guessing”: “As thus: that yif a wyght have prosperite, he is 
a good man and worthy to han that prosperite; and whoso hath adversite, he is a wikkid man, 
and God hath forsake hym, and he is worthy to han that adversite.  This is the opinyoun of some 
folk” (288-96).  According to Hanna and Lawler, this gloss is “Largely Chaucer’s paraphrase 
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joining material on adversity from Trivet…and material on prosperity from [Jean de Meun].”4  
Through this gloss and its two sources, Chaucer increases the reader’s access to Boethius’ 
philosophy.  As both the philosopher and Chaucer explain, for the majority, Boethius’ guilt rests 
solely on the fact that he is imprisoned: he has experienced adversity, has been forsaken by God, 
and is therefore a wicked individual and deserving of punishment—or so the reasoning goes.  
The fallacy in such “good gessynge” stems from its assumption that there is a direct correlation 
between an individual’s virtue and his circumstances; because the long-term outcome of the 
situation is not readily apparent, any attempt at an immediate, concrete judgment is problematic, 
particularly if that conclusion is predetermined by the acceptance of such faulty logic.   
Though Boethius’ capacity to understand and participate in the Good ultimately permits 
him to disregard the base evaluations of others, he initially struggles with those opinions.  In fact, 
he laments his wrongful imprisonment not only because of his inability to reconcile his current 
circumstances with his belief that the universe is divinely arranged, but more so because “moche 
folk” unthinkingly dismiss his integrity in favor of accepting the easiest conclusion: in an 
ordered cosmos, for them, Boethius’ misfortune automatically signifies his wickedness.  Though 
his experience of being the subject of such negligent conclusions is reasonably discouraging, it is 
through this incident that Boethius learns that the opinions of those who “look not to the merit of 
things, but only to the chance results” have naught to do with him.  Indeed, Boethius agrees 
immediately with Philosophy’s assertion that “high renown,” even if properly situated, has very 
little intrinsic value.  False praise, she explains, is shameful, and true praise cannot benefit its 
receiver: “yif that folk han geten hem thonk or preysynge by here dissertes, what thing hath 
thilke pris echid or encresed to the conscience of wise folk, that mesuren hir good, nat by the 
rumour of the peple, but by the sothfastnesse of conscience?” (III.p6.12-17).  In agreeing that the 
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wise individual disregards the “rumor of the people” in favor of measuring his value by the truth 
of his conscience, Boethius comes to recognize that anguishing over rumors of his wickedness is 
as fruitless as basking in glory.  Only he knows the veracity of the relationship between his intent 
and his actions; with this knowledge, he is best equipped to evaluate his situation and discover 
within those circumstances a profitable, reasoned response.   
Even though the governed order of the universe permits exploration and understanding of 
that universe through rational analysis, misperceptions about the significance of that order 
nonetheless persist.  As the “gessynge and the jugement of moche folk” demonstrates, the 
acknowledgement of a world governed by reason does not, in itself, automatically illuminate the 
correct conclusion because one’s understanding is directly dependent upon his own individual 
capacity to comprehend any particular issue, subject, circumstance, etc.  In fact, as Paul 
LaChance notes, this limitation is compounded by the “absence of moral virtues in the will 
[which impose] a destructive force on the operation of the mind—at least in so far as the will 
exercises some control over the intellect.”5  Not only is it fruitless, then, to pay immediate heed 
to the opinions of the masses or to seek their approval, but any endorsement or condemnation 
(even if that response is the product of care and deliberation) is useful only to the degree that the 
individual has himself the faculty to understand and assess the situation with reason.  The point 
that Philosophy offers to Boethius through this discussion is that he is only responsible for the 
choices that he makes; he is not accountable for the “gessynge and the jugement” of others 
because they understand his situation not for what it is, but rather through the ways their own 
individual aptitudes shape it.  As Ann Astell points out, “True perception…depends on the recall 
and the matching of the proper form—a form belonging to the knower, not the object of one’s 
knowing.”6  Ultimately, “knowing” has more to do with the individual and that individual’s 
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ability to judge well than it has to do with the subject or the authority conveying the knowledge; 
the development of a habitual practice of wise judgment, therefore, is tantamount to realizing 
one’s innate potential as a human being.   
Even as Boethius himself claims to be “replenysshid and fulfild with [Philosophy’s] 
techynges, and enformed of [her] maneris,” he confesses a total lack of understanding of his 
situation (I.p4.76-77).  In fact, his absolute surrender to the seductive power of the Muses clouds 
his reason as it simultaneously perpetuates his emotional torment.  For Philosophy, this 
perpetuation of irrationality, if unchecked, habituates man to a state of stagnation: the Muses  
nat oonly ne asswagen noght his sorwes with none remedies, but thei wolden 
fedyn and noryssen hym with sweete venym.  Forsothe thise ben tho that with 
thornes and prikkynges of talentz or affecciouns, whiche that ne bien nothyng 
fructigyenge nor profitable, destroyen the corn plentyvous of fruytes of resoun.  
For thei holden hertes of men in usage, but thei delyvre noght folk fro maladye. 
(I.p1.50-59)   
Though the Muses ostensibly comfort Boethius during his difficulty, the fact is that their 
presence undermines the possibility of fruitful consolation and fosters further distraction.  Worse 
yet is the potential for Boethius to habituate himself to unreasoned and unproductive responses 
because he is being “nourished with sweet venom.”  While emotional reactions are a component 
of human nature, Philosophy’s concern is that one’s capacity for reason, the faculty through 
which the individual understands the Divine, can be diminished by the passions if its potential is 
not properly and consciously exercised.  By demonstrating the degree to which even a practiced 
philosopher can lose sight of reason in the midst of emotional upheaval through the narration of 
his own confusion, Boethius indicates that the processes of rational deliberation and conscious, 
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well-considered choice that Philosophy offers are a practice of life that must be exercised and 
used persistently.  As she reminds him, “ful anguysschous thing is the condicioun of mannes 
goodes; for eyther it cometh nat altogidre to a wyght, or ells it ne last nat perpetuel” (II.p4.75-
78).  Because the potential for confusion and mistaken interpretations is ever-present, so the 
attempt to judge wisely and respond productively must be persistent.  Philosophy’s return then 
serves as a reminder both to Boethius and to his reader that adversity is endemic to the human 
condition, but it is in the way that one chooses to respond to such hardship that determines one’s 
ability to find the Good.   
Though Boethius bemoans the “good gessynge” of the people, he is guessing too when he 
concludes that Fortune abandoned him.  In reality, his struggle is with the fact that he doesn’t 
deserve to be imprisoned and awaiting execution, but his “guess,” his mistake in judgment, 
restricts his capacity to recognize the framework of Fortune.  By reminding Boethius that the 
nature of Fortune is change, Philosophy implies that “the same chaungynge from oon into 
another (that is to seyn, fro adversite into prosperite) maketh that the manaces of Fortune ne ben 
nat for to dreden, ne the flaterynges of hir to be desired” (II.p1.86-91).  Put another way, there is 
little reason to desire the attention or lament the abandonment of Fortune; both are experiences 
of the Wheel.  As a result of learning that the opinions that others hold of him are irrelevant to 
his own understanding and that he can resolve his dismay about his current condition by properly 
contextualizing the role of Fortune and her Wheel, Boethius can better understand how to 
respond productively to his situation.   
As Philosophy explains, because everything happens for a reason, “thane is alle fortune 
good” (IV.p7.12).  If all fortune has a purpose—to reward or discipline, to punish or chastise—
then the claim of misfortune precludes an understanding of how an individual can profit from the 
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experience.  Earlier Philosophy had asserted that looking at an immediate outcome and expecting 
to find significance in that occurrence alone severely limits an individual’s ability to profit from 
the experience; now she asserts that an inability to understand the potential benefit of all types of 
fortune suggests an inadequate understanding of the fundamental principle that the universe is 
governed by reason, and as such, the end of everything is the Good.  Within this system, fortune 
can be said to present each person with opportunities to exercise his capacity to judge any given 
situation wisely and thus discover that Good.   
In this way, Boethius is brought to see that Philosophy’s system of wise judgment 
requires an acceptance of the idea that understanding is perspectival: he can only dismiss his 
immediate, emotional reaction by shifting his perspective from a position of confused 
powerlessness to one of rational empowerment.  While he has no control over what is happening 
to him, he can absolutely control how he responds.  As Philosophy explains, “For it is set in your 
hand (as who seith, it lyth in your power) what fortune yow is levest (that is to seyn, good or 
yvel)” (IV.p7.101-3).  Bluntly put, it lies within each individual’s power to determine his own 
perception of fortune.  Even adverse fortune, then, benefits the individual who can, through a 
change in perspective, situate himself within the context of Providence and understand that there 
is profit in all experience.  Such capacity to judge, though, is entirely individual: “For every 
thing that may naturely usen resoun, it hath doom by whiche it discernith and demeth every 
thing; thanne knoweth it by itself things that ben to fleen and things that ben to desiren” 
(V.p2.10-15).  Because man has the ability to reason, he also has the responsibility to determine, 
for himself, what to desire and what to avoid (although as Philosophy points out, man just as 
easily misguides himself in his pursuits as he does in his reactions to fortune). 
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By remembering the perils of remaining in an emotional haze and then working through 
the methods of evaluating his reactions and selecting profitable responses, Boethius empowers 
himself to transform his turmoil into understanding.  In other words, his ability to modify his 
assessment of his situation and transition from confusion to clarity relies on his willful 
participation in the Good.  Siobhan Nash-Marshall’s study of what she calls Boethius’ “doctrine 
of participation” illuminates this point.  She explains that Providence, for Boethius, “is both the 
formal and the efficient cause of contingent things’ perfection.  For (1) God moves all things in 
the universe through Providence; (2) Providence itself is God’s knowledge; and (3) God’s 
knowledge is contingent things’ forms.”7  For man’s part, Boethius offers three main ideas of 
human ‘good’: “his being ‘sui compos’ (self-sufficient), that is, his possessing himself”; “his 
participating in the First Good”; and his virtuous behavior, which is its own reward.8  Nash-
Marshall concludes that this “doctrine of participation” is dual: “it claims (1) that things must 
participate in God in order to acquire their actuality, and (2) that they must participate in His 
ideas in order to acquire the modality of their actuality: their essences.”9  Given the view that the 
universe, in all forms, is governed by reason, man can choose to participate in the Good and 
thereby create a space for personal enrichment, reasoned awareness, and self-sufficiency.  More 
locally in the Consolation, Boethius’ recollection of the Good inspires a renewed appreciation of 
the purpose of fortune, of wicked men, and of his own current situation.   
An essential component of this practice is a return to the self, to self-assessment, and to 
inborn knowledge.  When one understands, according to Philosophy, that everything, at the most 
basic and fundamental level, desires the Good and that the end of all things is the Good, then one 
can use that knowledge to contend with uncertainties and to assess the rationality of desires.  
There is thus in the Consolation a sense of the importance of returning to the beginning to 
 33 
 
include, in an assessment of the present, a consideration of what knowledge one had in order to 
understand more fully the knowledge that one has:  
Glosa.  Whoso wol seke the depe ground of soth in his thought, and wil nat ben 
disseyvid by false proposiciouns that goon amys fro the trouthe, lat hym wel 
examine and rolle withynne himself the nature and the propretes of the thing; and 
let hym yet eftsones examinen and rollen his thoughts by good deliberacioun or 
that he deme,  and lat hym techyn his soule that it hath, by naturel principles 
kyndeliche yhud withynne itself, al the trouthe the whiche he ymagineth to ben in 
things withoute.  And thane al the derknesse of his mysknowynge shall [schewen] 
more evidently to the sighte of his understondynge than the sonne ne semeth to the 
sighte withoute forth. (III.m11.13-27) 
While this gloss comes from Trivet, the fact that Chaucer includes it in his translation indicates 
its importance for the reader as it calls attention to the depth of consideration that Philosophy 
suggests is necessary for the individual to reacquaint himself with the Truth.
10
  To know a 
“thing,” she states, one must “seek the deep ground of truth” as a sturdy foundation from which 
“false proposiciouns” may be recognized and then “well examine and roll within himself the 
nature and the properties of the thing.” That is to say, in order to gain an understanding of a 
subject, the individual ought to engage in a multidimensional study that considers different 
angles and perspectives.  Before he “deems” or judges the matter, moreover, he must examine 
his own thoughts by “good deliberation” with the knowledge that, innately within him, he 
already possesses the Truth.  It is through this consideration that man has the capacity to clarify 
the darkness of his own misunderstanding.  In seeking the “depe ground of soth,” Boethius 
returns to the knowledge of the Good; in examining and rolling “his thoughts by good 
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deliberacioun or that he deme,” he refigures his understanding of his situation and thereby 
creates his own Good. 
Boethius achieves this rational perspective by remembering what he had forgotten: “that 
good is the fyn of alle things” (III.p11.229-30); that Fortune and her Wheel operate within the 
bounds of Providence and always present opportunities for learning; that emotions foster 
impotence and irrationality; that misunderstanding and confusion actually denote man’s 
individual mistakes in drawing informed conclusions; and that man innately possesses the 
capacity to rectify those mistakes through deliberation and to learn, or remember, how to judge 
wisely.  A key element of this method is its recursiveness, its demand that one develop the habit 
of returning to “the deep ground of truth in his thought” in order to reassess his particular 
perspective and the experiences that led to that viewpoint.  To be sure, there is a great deal of 
self-reflection in this process, but Boethius moves beyond the act of self-reflection by invoking 
Philosophy’s method of rational analysis as part of his own process of examination.  Each 
instance of remembering listed above results from this process and is then utilized as a 
component to that method as Boethius continues his progress from a state of confused blindness 
to one of clear discernment.  While Philosophy makes clear that this potential to remember is 
inherent in man, Boethius’ creation of Philosophy in the Consolation hints at the vast benefits of 
counsel and the need to consider other points of view.  In speaking of those who endeavor to 
discover the truth, Philosophy states, “Thanne who so that sekith sothnesse, he nis in neyther 
nother habite, for he not nat al, ne he ne hath nat al foryeten; but yit hym remembreth the somme 
of things that he withholdeth, and axeth conseile, and retretith deepliche things iseyn byforne 
(that is to seyn, the grete somme in his mynde) so that he mowe adden the parties that he hath 
foryeten to thilke that he hath withholden” (V.m3.47-56).  The point is clear: he who seeks truth 
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is neither wholly ignorant nor completely informed, yet he may increase his understanding and 
decrease his errors in judgment through counsel and deliberation.   
Through the dialectical dialogue of the Consolation, Boethius uses his reason to assess 
both his situation and his response to a predicament over which he has no control; through that 
engagement, he realizes where his power lies and how to exercise his knowledge constructively.  
The Boethian vision of wise judgment and the enormous personal advantages which result from 
such engaged assessments are not of singular value to Boethius; indeed, in medieval Christian 
society (and the Stoic society which preceded it), the benefits were accessible to all.  Having a 
practical knowledge of what lies within one’s power to control, realizing that all experience 
offers valuable lessons, and remembering, above all, that the universe is governed by the rational 
order of God are tools of exceptional value to the creation of a productive, self-sufficient life.  
Boethius maintains that part of the process of wise judgment is the ability to situate, rationally 
and individually, one’s responses within the larger system of information which is that vision.  It 
is through such contextualization, I argue, that Chaucer performs an act of self-assessment of his 
experiences as a writer in the Retraction, while asking, at the same time, for his readers to 
engage in an individual assessment of their experiences of his writing as readers.   
Though the importance of the Boece to Chaucer’s work is widely understood, the degree 
to which this early translation informs the Retraction has escaped notice.  Instead, critics attend 
to questions about Chaucer’s purpose in writing this final composition.  Both James Dean and 
Jameela Lares, for example, read the Retraction as a statement of repentance that the reader is 
meant to accept with all sincerity, while Larry Scanlon argues that this work serves as a 
consolidation that “deauthorizes the ‘sinful’ tales [without] necessarily depriv[ing] them of all 
value.”11  Richard Newhauser and Gregory Roper independently suggest that the Retraction is a 
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literary, confessional response about the act of writing.
12
  Others interpret the Retraction as the 
work of Chaucer the pilgrim: Mary Flowers Braswell contends that this work is an ironic 
statement; A.P. Campbell suggests that the pilgrim retracts the work of the poet; Peter Travis 
speculates that this persona is “probably as unreliable and incomplete as any of [Chaucer’s] other 
fictive creations.”13  Though I largely agree with Scanlon, Newhauser, and Roper, I believe that 
the placement of the Retraction at the end of the Parson’s Tale is crucial not only to our local 
understanding of this work but also to a more general, and individual, insight into the utility of 
knowledge.  What I’m arguing, then, is that the Retraction offers a glimpse into Chaucer’s 
understanding of his own work through this moment of reflection, while at the same time 
attempting to instigate the readers’ assessment of their own understanding of and reactions to 
that work.  This instigation, following close upon the Parson’s Tale, connects what the 
Retraction requires—self-assessment—to what the Parson offers—a programmatic method for 
such an assessment.  While Chaucer sets the Retraction, in physical position, as the final 
comment on his work, the Boethian themes which he incorporates create not an ending, but a 
beginning. 
The Retraction is situated so closely to the Parson’s Tale in the manuscripts, in fact, that 
their distinction isn’t readily apparent.  According to Miceal Vaughan, the limited rubrication 
that distinguishes the two works results from an editorial choice.
14
  Vaughan’s main contention is 
that this choice, made first by the scribes and then followed willingly by modern editors, creates 
a false separation of the two works.  Worse, this choice serves to craft an acceptable relationship 
between the Parson’s Prologue, the Tale, and the Retraction that the text, sans rubrication, does 
not support.  He writes,  
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Though modern editors regularly acknowledge the rubrics’ scribal origin, they 
nonetheless retain the rubrics to help readers (including themselves) avoid facing 
the possibility that if the Retractions can be assigned to Chaucer in propria 
persona, then the Parson’s Tale should also be delivered in his own authorial 
voice…The choice is clear: either dismiss this entire tale’s assignment to the 
Parson (and deny it a place in the Canterbury Tales), or else find an alternative 
way to resolve the ambiguous attribution caused by the tale’s prologue and 
“epilogue,” an alternative that maintains the necessary critical distinction between 
Parson and poet, fiction and fiction-maker.
15
   
Although Vaughan’s argument serves as a reminder that rush judgments or artificial delineations 
ultimately limit our ability to comprehend this piece, the rubrics should not force us into the 
interpretive opposition that Vaughan creates.  Indeed, the change of voice within the text which 
signals the move from the Parson’s Tale to the Retraction is not anomalous within the 
Canterbury collection.  As Ian Johnson notes, the change in voice from the Parson to Chaucer the 
poet “was recognized by the Ellesmere scribe, who inserted at this juncture the critically alert 
comment ‘Heere taketh the makere of this book his level.’”16  Given Chaucer’s chastisement of 
his scribe’s negligence in “Chaucers Wordes unto Adam, His Owne Scriveyn,” I submit the 
possibility that the rubrical clarification was approved by Chaucer.  Even if the rubrication were 
removed entirely, there is still a clear distinction between the Parson and the Retraction: the 
Parson speaks to the pilgrim audience who “list to heere / Moralitee and vertuous mateere,” and 
Chaucer addresses the Retraction to “alle that hernke this litel tretys or rede” (X.1081).  This 
statement alone creates an obvious demarcation between “this little treatise”—i.e. the Parson’s 
Tale—and the Retraction.  Indeed, Chaucer’s use of this type of linguistic shift to signify a 
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change in character is not without precedent.  The pilgrim-narrator’s interjection at the end of the 
Miller’s Prologue is one example.  While modern editions use an end-quote to make clear the 
moment when the narrator stops repeating the Miller, this designation does not occur in the 
Ellesmere, and yet, there is no question about who is speaking.  At the end of the Clerk’s Tale, 
the scribe distinguishes between the Clerk’s narrative and the textual response to the narratorial 
depiction of steadfast and patient oath-keeping by labeling the latter “Lenvoy de Chaucer.”  
Similar to the shift from the Parson’s Tale to the Retraction, the “Lenvoy” indicates a change in 
speaker through a modification of the audience.  Instead of speaking to the fellow travelers, 
“Chaucer” speaks to an extended group that includes “noble wyves” (IV.1183), “archewyves” 
(1195), and “sklendre wyves” (1198).  This change, while made more obvious through the 
rubrication, is nonetheless apparent.  What I am suggesting is that the rubrics clarify the shift in 
speaker from the Parson to Chaucer and create a clear distinction between these two works in 
order to set the Retraction as a work closely associated with, and yet distinct from, the Parson’s 
Tale. 
In figuring the Retraction as an extension of the Parson’s Tale and the latter’s 
programmatic method of self-assessment, Chaucer implies that these analytic strategies continue 
into this final work.  This implication prompts the process of recursive analysis because the 
Retraction invokes those very methods that extend into it.  The practice that the Parson 
recommends expands upon the process of repentance.  The manner through which one may 
realize “verray repentance” is predicated on that individual’s ability to self-analyze correctly: the 
recognition and lamentation of one’s faults; an honest and complete confession that is 
communicated through plain language; “satisfaction,” or enjoined actions which are intended to 
inspire the formation of new, productive habits; a steadfast intention to avoid the sinful behavior; 
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and the continued performance of “good works.”17  Without investing in the identification of the 
what, why, when, where, and how of the sin, the potential for change remains unrealizable, while 
the potential for damnation increases.  By endeavoring, truly, to understand the causes which 
inspired the occasion for and the permission to commit the sin, the individual can consciously 
participate in his own salvation by purposefully creating new habits of fruitful behavior while 
evading iniquitous thoughts, speech, and actions.  Through the recursive invitation in the 
Retraction, the reader is encouraged to consider the what, why, when, where, and how which 
resulted in the initial interpretation and to evaluate, given new information and a different 
perspective, the value of that initial assessment. 
The Parson’s choice to begin his Tale by quoting Jeremiah—“Stondeth upon the weyes, 
and seeth and axeth of olde pathes (that is to seyn, of olde sentences) which is the goode wey,/ 
and walketh in that wey, and ye shal fynde refresshynge for youre soules, etc.” (X.77-78)—
frames his subsequent discussion of penitence as an action that requires reflection, investigation 
of the “pathes” and “sentences” available, and deliberate choice about the best method of 
proceeding along one’s individual “way” through life.  One of the goals of this system of self-
assessment, fundamental to the conscious cultivation of beneficial habits, is to form a practice of 
engagement with and analysis of all forms of knowledge: given the instabilities of life, the 
individual who situates himself within different “weyes,” observes and inquires of the authority 
of “olde pathes” and “olde sentences,” and uses that information to determine the “goode wey”  
must revisit this process when presented with new information or experiences to ensure that he 
continues, deliberately, in the ‘good way.’  In other words, this process, like that which 
Philosophy offers to Boethius, is continuous and meant to buttress the individual and lessen his 
confusion through its exercise.  Even though the Parson focuses on the religious aspect, this 
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system translates effectively into the secular world: acceptance of personal consequences, 
understanding the reasons why an action occurred and how to prevent or encourage it, 
endeavoring to use this knowledge to craft habits of reason, all promote the creation of a 
productive life.  In placing the Retraction at the end of the Parson’s Tale, Chaucer invites both 
religious and secular readers alike to join in this practice from a point where they can look back, 
if only to their interpretations of the Parson’s Tale, to assess the effectiveness of their responses.  
The Retraction’s placement at the end of the Parson’s Tale, and perhaps that of the 
Canterbury collection, distinguishes it from the majority of its literary topoi analogues.  As Anita 
Obermeier points out, these analogues tend to situate such information in the prologues to their 
companion pieces, instead of in their epilogues.
18
  For example, Jean de Meun writes in Le 
Testament, 
Et s’il y a nuls biens, en la glorie Dieu aille, 
Et au salut de m’ame et as escoutans vaille; 
Et de mal, s’il y est, leur pri qu’il ne leur chaille, 
Mais retiengnent le grain et soufflent hors la paille. 
“And if there is any good, may it go to the glory of God, and to the salvation of my soul and may 
it be of worth to those who are listening, and of the evil, if it is there, I beg them not to be 
concerned but to retain the wheat and throw out the chaff.”19  Another analogue comes from 
John Bromyard, a fourteenth-century preacher.  In his Summa Praedicantium, he states, 
“Ceterum quicquid in hoc opusculo reprehendendum estimatur/ mee asscribatur insufficientie, 
quicquid vero vtile/ saluatoris et perpetue virginis attribuatur clemencie” ‘Moreover, whatever is 
deemed reprehensible in this work should be attributed to my inadequacy; whatever is truly 
useful should be attributed to the mercy of the Savior and the perpetual Virgin.’20  Don Juan 
 41 
 
Manuel’s El Conde Lucanor, a prose treatise on morality written in 1335, serves as an especially 
good example because its wording is most similar to that of the Retraction.  At the beginning of 
this work, Don Manuel advises his audience to bear in mind his intention in writing: “por la su 
merced [de Dios] et por la su piadat quiera que los que este libro leyeren que se aprovechen dél a 
servicio de Dios et para salvamiento de sus almas et aprovechamiento de sus cuerpos, así commo 
Él sabe que yo, don Johán, lo digo a essa entención” ‘for the mercy of God and for his 
compassion I wish that those who read this book profit of its devotion of God and for the 
salvation of their souls and benefit of their bodies, as He knows that I, don Juan, say these things 
with this intention.’21  Further, his readers are to consider what is and what is not “well said”: “Et 
lo que ý fallaren que non es tan bien dicho, non pongan la culpa a la mi entención, mas pónganla 
a la mengua del mío entendemiento.  Et si alguna cosa fallaren bien dicha o aprovechosa, 
gradéscanlo a Dios, ca Él es aquel por quien todos los Buenos dichos et fechos se dizen et se 
fazen” ‘And whatever they might find that is not very well said, let they not blame my intention, 
but rather fault the deficiency of my understanding.  And if they find something well said or 
useful, let them thank God, as He is the one through whom all good sayings and deeds are 
spoken and done.’22  By including this gesture at the beginning, Don Manuel frames the stories 
that follow as his conscious effort to provide, with God’s help, solace and pleasure to both the 
bodies and the souls of his readers; whatever each reader encounters that falls short of that mark 
should be attributed to Don Manuel’s lack of understanding and not to his intention.  The 
positioning of this information primes the reader to discover divinely-approved lessons in the 
reading, and within that expectation, he crafts his response accordingly.  Bluntly, the reader is 
instructed to find something beneficial in the reading and such instruction both limits his ability 
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to respond to the work comprehensively and restricts the greater utility of the recursive process 
that Chaucer encourages in the Retraction. 
The posterior position of the Retraction changes the reader’s reception of Chaucer’s work 
dramatically.  Instead of approaching his work from an author-controlled position, as do readers 
of Jean de Meun, John Bromyard, and Don Juan Manuel, Chaucer’s readers first experience and 
respond to his compositions naturally and are only later encouraged to reflect upon the efficacy 
of those responses.  By choosing not to frame the Canterbury Tales, or any of his other works, as 
opportunities to consider, from the outset, their potential to benefit the audience, Chaucer creates 
an occasion for the audience to think about their own methods of reading and utilizing the 
information gained through that effort.  To be clear: in using “authorial humility” to introduce 
their subsequent compositions, Jean, Bromyard, and Manuel prime their readers to seek a “good” 
within their works.  While such priming may result in finding a particular benefit within the first 
reading, it also limits the reader’s ability to discover the greater profit that develops from the 
type of recursive evaluation that Chaucer instigates.  But it isn’t only the position that achieves 
this end, as the conclusion of Giovanni Boccaccio’s Genealogia Deorum Gentilium 
demonstrates.  Written in 1360 and revised until 1374, this work is the final analogue to the first 
two lines of Chaucer’s Retraction.  In it, Boccaccio writes, “si quid boni inest, si quid bene 
dictum, si quid votis tuis consonum, gaudeo et exulto, et exinde labori meo congratulator, verum 
scientie mee imputes nolo, nec lauros aut honores alios ob id postulo; Deo quippe, a quo omne 
datum optimum et omne donum perfectum est, attribuas queso, eique honores impendito et 
gratias agito” ‘If it contains anything good, if it is well said, if it is suitable for your wishes, I am 
delighted and happy; from that I derive joy for my labor.  I do not want you to impute truth to my 
learning, nor do I ask laurels or other honors for it; certainly, give to God, from whom every 
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good and every perfect gift comes, the honors and thanks.’23  Although Boccaccio includes these 
statements in the Conclusio, there is a distinct difference between his words and Chaucer’s: there 
is no call to reflection in Boccaccio, nor is there a prompt to recursive assessment.  Simply put, 
the Retraction’s position and its provocation of such analysis offers each reader an opportunity to 
challenge and to learn from the interpretations dictated by his or her own initial perspective.  
Through that learning the reader may, like Boethius, discover where his power lies.  
Echoing the Parson’s suggestion that one “seeth and axeth of olde pathes” (X.77) and to 
Philosophy’s recommendation that Boethius return to the “depe ground of soth in his thought” 
(III.m11.13-14), Chaucer’s self-assessment hints at the recursive demands of wise judgment.  
The ability to evaluate one’s own efforts and to determine, for himself, their value requires that 
the individual situate a particular result within the body of information and experiences that 
contribute to that outcome.  Again, there is a clear element of self-reflection in this process, but 
wise judgment requires the citation of the method in its performance.  The idea, as used both by 
Boethius and by Chaucer, is that recursion is a process of analyzing what is discovered through 
self-reflection.  Without any consideration of the universal conditions within which man abides, 
for example, Boethius’ confusion and anger over his imprisonment incapacitates him; by 
reframing his position through the lens of Providence, he regains his ability to participate in the 
Good.  The Parson’s Tale suggests that one’s investment in determining the circumstances of a 
sin prepares the individual not only to avoid future iniquities but also to participate in his own 
salvation.  In the Retraction, Chaucer works through these processes himself: he reflects upon his 
motives in writing, contemplates how well he translated those intentions into his work, and 
determines which of his writings succeeds and where his responsibility for those successes or 
failures lies. 
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The guiding objective of Chaucer’s work, as he defines it, is to offer benefit through 
instruction: “For oure book seith, ‘Al that is written is written for oure doctrine,’ and that is myn 
entente” (X.1083).  The significance of this quote cannot be overstated: everything that is written 
is instructive.  While he certainly draws upon Romans 15.4, Paul conceives of this idea in terms 
of scripture: “For whatsoever things were written aforetime were written for our learning, that 
we through patience and comfort of the scriptures might have hope.”24  In his Second Epistle to 
Timothy, Paul explains that scripture is infused with the Divine: “All scripture is given by 
inspiration of God, and is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in 
righteousness.”25  Paul’s focus, then, is particular to the Bible: the Spirit informs Scripture, and 
scripture is doctrine.  Chaucer’s treatment of this concept is decidedly more comprehensive than 
Paul’s, as he follows the Boethian expansion of this theory to include all writing.  By calling his 
reader’s attention to this principle, Chaucer effectively situates his work—including the 
“translaciouns and enditynges of worldly vanitees,” those tales of Canterbury that “sownen into 
synne,” and “many a lecherous lay”— within the vast and extensive corpus of educational 
opportunities.   
Philosophy’s explanation of the benefit of doctrine emphasizes the importance of such 
instruction: “For certes the body, bryngynge the weighte of foryetynge, ne hath nat chased out of 
your thought al the cleernesse of your knowynge; for certeynli the seed of soth haldeth and 
clyveth within yowr corage, and it is awaked and excited by the wynde and by the blastes of 
doctrine” (III.m11.28-34).  Doctrine, as Philosophy conceives it, has the power to blast through 
the body’s “weight of forgetting” and to awaken and excite the “clearness of knowing.”  By 
aligning his work with “doctrine,” Chaucer at once focuses on what is within his control—i.e. the 
matching of his intentions to his actions—while at the same time distancing himself from the 
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interpretations and reactions of his reader.  Boethius’ illumination of the role of conscience 
highlights this point: the wise “mesuren hir good, nat by rumour of the peple, but by the 
sothfastnesse of conscience” (III.p6.15-17).  As I argue, there are two distinct objectives in the 
Retraction: Chaucer’s self-assessment and that which the reader performs for himself.  In this 
author-centered moment, Chaucer is the only individual who can, through the truth of his 
conscience, determine the merit of his writings in relation to his original objectives.  Whatever 
good he finds has nothing to do with the “rumour of the peple.”  Instead, Chaucer’s evaluation of 
his efforts—both in writing and in reading—situates his work within the larger milieu of doctrine 
and hints to his audience of the value he finds. 
Chaucer’s process includes a reflection on the link between his compositions and his 
goals.  Given his interest in the relationships of words and deeds—the Canterbury narrator states 
that, following Plato, “The wordes moote be cosyn to the dede” (I.742); the demon in the Friar’s 
Tale explains that truth is found in the equivalency between intention, word, and action; the Fair 
White of the Book of the Duchess consistently dismisses the Black Knight until his words and 
intentions match his behavior—it is unsurprising that in the Retraction, Chaucer ponders the 
relationship between his own intentions (the words) and his writings (the deeds).
26
  Though he 
chooses not to make explicit whatever conclusions he may have drawn, the crux of Chaucer’s 
assessment rests with his interpretation of how well his own “entente” relates to his actions: that 
he expresses thanks for “the translacion of Boece de Consolatione, othere bookes of legendes of 
seintes, and omelies, and moralitee, and devocioun” indicates that he sees an equivalent 
correlation between his intention and the product of his efforts.  Given that the determination of 
which works belong to which categories speaks largely to the individual’s judgment, this generic 
list of topics serves to communicate only that there are other works in which Chaucer finds 
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value.  The fact that he does not elaborate on his own assessment accords with the Boethian 
vision: Chaucer’s interpretation of his work should not be the primary factor in his reader’s own 
personal assessment.   
By calling attention to the Boece, Chaucer emphasizes the overall authority of this work 
and, by extension, illuminates the guiding principles of rational analysis which drive its 
philosophy.  Throughout the Consolation, there is a provocation to reclaim reason, a necessity 
which, at its core, results from the human capacity to forget through distraction: Boethius 
incapacitates himself by permitting his emotions to reign with abandon; in returning, 
systematically, to a place of rational understanding, he recovers his power and creates his own 
happiness—even while in prison and awaiting his execution.  In reflecting upon the relationship 
between his intentions and his writings, Chaucer essentially performs the same sequential 
process: as part of his evaluation, he separates himself from any emotional desire that would, like 
the Muses who write Boethius’ words, limit his capacity to access all information available; he 
reflects upon his initial goal in writing; he judges, from this particular standpoint, how well he’s 
done.  In tacitly performing this process, Chaucer indicates his depth of appreciation for the 
Boece in that he actuates the knowledge that he gained through its translation.  Based on the 
degree to which this one work informs his subsequent writings, I submit that Chaucer both 
recognizes and highlights the advantage of the Boece not only through his use of Boethian 
themes in his writings but also in what that use represents: the sharing of knowledge, the sharing 
of fictional narratives which are intended to entertain as well as to inform.   
In expressing his appreciation for the translation of the Boece and the “other books,” 
Chaucer thanks “oure Lord Jhesu Crist and his blisful Mooder, and alle the seintes of hevene.”  
Pushing beyond this statement of gratitude, Chaucer beseeches them to act on his behalf:  
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that they from hennes forth unto my lyves ende sende me grace to biwayle my 
giltes and to studie to the salvacioun of my soule, and graunte me grace of verray 
penitence, confessioun and satisfaccioun to doon in this present lyf…so that I may 
been oon of hem at the day of doom that shulle be saved.  (1090-1092) 
The general Christian tenor of this passage leads Ian Johnson to interpret this work as an honest 
appeal for salvation.  Indeed, he writes that Chaucer’s use of Romans 15.4 (‘Al that is written is 
written for oure doctrine’) serves as “a confessional passage declared before God, with the patent 
intention of saving his soul,” and “To dismiss the Retracciouns…as no serious spiritual 
transaction but only a ‘literary’ ploy is to overlook the Pauline context of hope—truly 
hopeless.”27  Yet the intrigue of this passage comes not from the Christian sentiment, as Johnson 
believes, but rather from what Chaucer is asking and from whom he is asking it.  As the Parson 
explains, grace is a gift from God that may be extended through Him, Christ, or the Holy Ghost; 
because it is a gift, the individual may choose to accept or to reject it.  In his exposition of pride, 
for example, the Parson states that “a man to pride hym in the goodes of grace is eek an 
outrageous folie, for thilke yifte of grace that sholde have turned hym to goodnesse and to 
medicine, turneth hym to venym and to confusioun” (X.470).  The extension of grace, itself, is 
thus insufficient to cause goodness if man abuses its nature.  In asking for help from those 
inhabitants of Heaven who, through their individual experiences in this life, learned how to 
match good words with good deeds, Chaucer signifies his commitment to the process of wise 
judgment.  Instead of asking God or the Holy Ghost to grant an extension of grace, he asks those 
who exemplify the “good way” to help him continue to progress down his own path and to 
choose, intentionally, that grace which is extended to him.  
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That Chaucer extends an opportunities in his writings through which the reader may 
educate himself neither makes such learning Chaucer’s responsibility, nor reflects upon him 
should the reader choose to ignore that extension, accept it waywardly, or profit greatly from it.  
Following Boethius, the idea that Chaucer is accountable for any misunderstanding on the part of 
his reader is as nonsensical as it is confused, though critics continue to assign blame.  Peter 
Travis, for instance, insists that Chaucer is “responsible for our misreading of his intent,” and 
Rosemarie Potz McGerr claims that Chaucer is liable for the “works in which he has not 
sufficiently emphasized the need for the reader’s active engagement in distilling truth from 
fiction.”28  Were he to assume this liability, he would at once seek the glory of those who 
understand correctly and expect that all of his readers possess equal abilities to comprehend—
both of which are contrary to those express Boethian themes that flourish in Chaucer’s work.  In 
fact, Chaucer rejects such responsibility from the first sentence of the Retraction: if the reader 
finds anything of value, he is to “thanken oure Lord Jhesu Crist, of whom procedeth al wit and al 
goodnesse”; if he is displeased by Chaucer’s work, he should “arrette it to the defaute of 
[Chaucer’s] unknonnynge and nat to [his] wyl, that wolde ful fayn have seyd better if [he] hadde 
had konnynge” (X.1081-81).  What I would like to suggest is that the Retraction is not about 
disowning or regretting his work: as Chaucer says, he intends to write for doctrine, and 
everything is doctrine.  Further, to recommend that some or all of his writings be rejected would 
suggest that Chaucer misunderstood or denied the tenets of wise judgment that Boethius offers, 
i.e., that these writings would, of necessity, be turned to Good in a cosmos governed by 
Providence.  As it relates to Chaucer’s self-assessment, then, the Retraction is purposefully 
ambiguous because Chaucer’s assessment of his work does not, and should not, define what the 
reader gains.  
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Though Chaucer disowns in the Retraction any responsibility for the interpretations of 
others, he does not abandon his reader to work through the issues alone.  Indeed, by specifically 
defining his audience—those “that herkne this litel tretys or rede” (X.1081)—Chaucer implies 
that before the individual may productively begin the process of evaluation himself, he must first 
understand the principles of self-assessment as defined by the Parson.  These principles include a 
willingness to reflect starkly and honestly upon the factors which conceive of, permit, and 
occasion one’s behaviors; the point is to determine which behaviors are beneficial and which are 
destructive, and to form conscious, thoughtful habits of choice.  In connecting the Retraction to 
the “litel tretys,” Chaucer frames his final work in terms of the Parson’s Tale: for those who 
have hearkened or read this Tale, the Retraction reads as a meditation, a “standing upon the 
ways” in an effort to determine the “good way” to proceed.  Put another way, the reader must 
evaluate each work both singularly and in relation to the sum total of what he has read, i.e. all of 
the “olde pathes” of his learning.  The paths through which Chaucer instructs and delights his 
audience are many, and he offers his Retraction as a moment during which his reader may 
evaluate the worth of each.         
Because the process that Chaucer advocates is individual, it is instructive to focus 
initially on what he offers in each of the prose works because, through these compositions of 
plain speech, the explanations of the systems of rational analysis are most clear.  While these 
works deal with their own specific subjects, they share an overarching theme: through consistent, 
conscious effort, one can develop habits of wise judgment which promote personal 
empowerment, freedom from the bonds of emotional torment, and ultimately, happiness.  The 
Boece, as discussed above, offers a method of returning to the most fundamental knowledge—
that the universe is governed by order—and using that insight to contextualize the constant 
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changes of life, to develop the practice of reason, and then to choose what to pursue and what to 
avoid.  In the Parson’s Tale, along with his method of self-assessment, the Parson also suggests 
that once knowledge is obtained, the individual is responsible for how he uses that information—
with free will comes accountability.  In the Astrolabe, Chaucer explains that, because of the 
inherent limitations of this realm—constraints of knowledge, our ability to understand, the 
shortcomings of authorities, and the complications of infinity—one’s approach to knowledge is 
more important than the knowledge itself.
29
  Finally, in the Melibee, Chaucer offers specific 
methods of garnering wise counsel in an effort to distance oneself from the haste of emotion and 
to make conscious, well-considered choices.  The principle underlying all these works is that 
good judgments and their subsequent actions result both from a recognition of personal 
limitation and a learned, analytical response meant to counter that limitation to the extent that 
one is able.  As I argue, when Chaucer stands on the ways, he reflects on the perceived and 
actual outcomes of his efforts.  In creating a similar moment, the reader can utilize these methods 
to initiate an assessment of his own responses and reactions in order to understand more fully his 
own mindset, as well as to evaluate any changes to his current process to make future choices 
more productive. 
As the prose works suggest, the need for such reflection is continual because the natural 
limitations of one’s ability to “know” prohibits any complete or lasting resolution in a world 
defined by change.  The Boece, for example, suggests that one must exercise the habit of wise 
judgment because the mutability of Fortune challenges the individual with accolades and 
dishonors which, if unchecked by rational analysis, obfuscate reason.  As Philosophy states, “yif 
thou wolt loken and demen soth with cleer lyght, and hoolden the weye with a ryght path, weyve 
thow joie, dryf fro the drede, fleme thow hope, ne lat no sorwe aproche…For cloudy and derk is 
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thilke thought, and bownde with bridelis, where as thise thynges reignen” (I.m7.14-21).  Not 
only does Philosophy point out the necessity of “clear light” to the “looking and deeming of 
truth,” she also hints at the perpetual nature of this endeavor: in order to “hold the way with a 
right path,” one must avoid joy, fear, hope, and sorrow, for emotions inhibit the mind’s potential 
to “see clearly.”  Similarly, Chaucer’s Parson interprets sin, especially “synful usage,” as self-
created confusion: “ye shul understonde that in mannes synne is every manere of ordre or 
ordinaunce turned up-so-doun” (X.260).  In the Melibee, Prudence’s instruction in the 
solicitation of counsel calls to mind the limitations of perspective while at the same time 
explaining the need to judge the counsel one receives; in the Astrolabe, Chaucer foregrounds his 
work by highlighting the limitations that all individuals must face.  Though these restrictions 
deny perfect understanding, they inspire both a continual pursuit of knowledge and recursive 
analyses of how one interprets that knowledge.  Through the Retraction, then, the reader has the 
opportunity to reconsider previous judgments in order to uncover, in part, the doctrine of 
Chaucer’s work, but more so, to discover the wisdom inherent in the act of self-assessment. 
Of course, Chaucer includes examples of similar moments of reflection throughout his 
poetic works, and the reader may certainly learn from each.  For example, the Wife of Bath 
provides an insightful glimpse of a character who refuses to become a victim of her different 
circumstances and instead uses each as an opportunity to refine her own approach and to utilize 
what power she possesses.  The men in both her Prologue and her Tale are victims of their own 
reactive and untutored habits, and each must learn the futility of those unthinking and destructive 
routines before discovering more rewarding approaches.  After chastising the poor for their 
wickedness, the Man of Law tells the story of Constance, a young maiden who survives the 
many tragedies which befall her because, as he argues, she is protected by God.  For the Man of 
 52 
 
Law, such protection is an immediate and definitive indicator of Constance’s “goodness”; of 
course, this line of reasoning also allows him to assert that he is a good person because he is 
successful.  Though we learn from the Boece that one’s fortunes dictate naught about one’s 
nature, the Man of Law’s implication of his own “goodness” presents the reader with a chance to 
ponder the superficiality of such a claim.  Outside the Canterbury Tales, the formel eagle, from 
the Parliament of Fowls, successfully opposes the pressures from the other birds and asks for 
time to consider her decision: “I axe respite for to avise me, / And after that to have my choys al 
fre” (648-49); in the Book of the Duchess, the Black Knight contemplates the magnitude of his 
loss; the narrator of the Legend of Good Women is given time to reflect upon a different way to 
perceive narrative histories.  Though the examples of such moments are plentiful and 
demonstrate a character’s moment of reflection (the Wife), or lack thereof (the Man of Law), and 
give the interested reader larger ideas to ponder, such occasions center themselves around 
specific examples.  In contrast, the prose works provide specific, programmatic methods of 
forming the very habits that will lead to the virtue of rational response both to Chaucer’s tales 
and to life. 
 One of the crucial elements to this process is the ability to situate information within a 
larger context.  Though Chaucer differs from Boethius by focusing less on Providence per se, his 
investment in the power of perception and the need to remain actively aware of its influence 
encourages him to reveal his “entente” in writing.  Through this disclosure, the audience is 
invited to refigure their initial interpretations within the idea that all writing is instructive.  As 
Philosophy points out, an individual’s perception can exert exceptional control: “nothing [is] 
wrecchide but whan thou wenest it.  (As who seith, thow thiself ne no wyght ells nis a wrecche 
but whanne he weneth himself a wrechche by reputacion of his corage)” (II.p4.109-13).  In other 
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words, things will only be what one determines they are: in this case, a person becomes a wretch 
when he thinks of nothing but what a wretch he is.  Boethius transforms from a state of misery to 
one of contentment when he moves from a mindset that “wenest,” or supposes a conclusion, to a 
process that rationally analyzes the situation.  Similarly, Chaucer encourages his audience to 
perform an act of recursive evaluation in order to increase that their knowledge-base and thus 
their understanding.  Such analysis requires that the individual assess his response to Chaucer’s 
work through the external frame that Chaucer provides.  If there is some benefit to be gained 
through all writing, then it is the individual’s duty to determine what that profit is and how to use 
it. 
Chaucer encourages this practice by suggesting that the determination of any potential 
benefit gained from his work requires each reader’s individual deliberation:  
Now preye I to hem alle that herkne this litel tretys or rede, that if ther be any 
thyng in it that liketh hem, that therof they thanken oure Lord Jhesu Crist, of 
whom procedeth al wit and al goodnesse./  And if ther be any thyng that displease 
hem, I preye hem also that they arrette it to the defaute of myn unkonnynge and 
nat to my wyl, that wolde ful fayn have seyd better if I hadde had konnynge./  For 
oure book seith, “Al that is writen is writen for oure doctrine,” and that is myn 
entente. (X.1081-83)  
The syntactic structure of the first two sentences invites the reader to ponder the value of the 
Parson’s Tale: for whatever he defines as worthwhile, he should thank Christ; for that which 
displeases him, Chaucer asks that the reader ascribe it not to a willful desire to offend, but rather 
to the inherent limitations of his ability.  As Olive Sayce notes, there is a formulaic quality to this 
structure: “The first two sentences combine the familiar idea of authorial incapacity with that of 
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Christ as the source of all good and of the poet’s talent in particular, and therefore as solely 
responsible for any merits of the work.”30  Chaucer’s employment of this construct, however, is 
more complicated than Sayce’s reading allows.  While distancing himself from any 
responsibility for how others read his work—again, he neither solicits praise nor accepts 
blame—Chaucer highlights the reader’s obligation to reassess previous interpretations.  The 
conditional clauses ask the reader to decide not only what he finds valuable in the Parson’s Tale 
and what he believes useless, but to make this determination with specificity.  By following these 
conditionals with his intent—to write for doctrine—Chaucer subtly suggests that, even if the 
reader initially ascribes “any thyng” in the Parson’s Tale as displeasing, there is yet some 
“good” to be learned both from the Parson’s Tale itself and from this preliminary response.  And 
while the reader is encouraged to thank Christ for the capacity to find the good, the effort 
required to discover that benefit comes solely from the reader.  Thus in the first three lines of the 
Retraction, Chaucer inspires a reflection not simply about the Parson’s Tale, but about its utility; 
he then immediately asks the reader to reevaluate this initial response, given the new information 
about his intention.  As the Retraction continues, Chaucer revises this process to provoke the 
reader’s reassessment of his other works.   
As part of this re-examination, the reader must engage not only in a consideration of each 
work, but also in its categorization.  Aside from the Boece, the “othere books of legends of 
seintes, and omelies, and moralitee, and devocioun” for which Chaucer gives thanks are included 
only as a generic list, and those that may fall into the category of “translacions and enditynges of 
worldly vanitees” are offered only as potentially qualifiable: “as is the book of Troilus; the book 
also of Fame; the book of the XXV Ladies; the book of the Duchesse; the book of Seint 
Valentynes day of the Parlement of Briddes; the tales of Caunterbury, thilke that sownen into 
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synne;/ the books of the Leoun; and many another book, if they were in my remembrance, and 
many a song and many a leccherous lay” (X.1086-87).  Such deliberate ambiguity emphasizes, 
once again, Chaucer’s interest in provoking his reader’s investment in his own interpretations 
and reassessments of his work.  Victor Yelverton Haines elucidates this point: “If Chaucer had 
wished to emphasize the meaning that the books themselves should be annulled, he would have 
left out the ‘as is’ and just listed the books.”31  Further, by utilizing the Boethian idea that one 
understands based not on the subject but on the individual’s capacity to know, Chaucer invites 
the reader to empower himself to learn where his individual strengths and weaknesses lie, and 
through that knowledge, to adapt his own approach to the gathering and interpretation of 
information in order to make that process more productive.  Though Chaucer cannot know the 
real-world outcome of his works, save the Boece, his reader can: through dedication to the craft 
of knowing, the individual can determine how to use the knowledge that he gains through the 
reading or hearing of Chaucer’s work and decide that outcome for himself. 
While I argue that this list of works and categories inspires the reader’s participation, 
some scholars believe that Chaucer uses the list to establish his canon.  Olive Sayce, for instance, 
writes that “there is a striking contrast between the precise listing of the works to be condemned 
and the vague general designation…of those works for which credit is claimed, which suggests 
that Chaucer is more concerned with the establishment of the canon of his works than with their 
rejection.”32  Sayce is certainly correct to call attention to the peculiarity of this contrast, and the 
idea that Chaucer is attempting to establish his canon through this list is tempting.  Yet the 
omission of any mention of his Treatise on the Astrolabe would then suggest that Chaucer either 
neglected to include his scientific treatise as part of the collection of his most influential works or 
simply that he deemed the Astrolabe insufficient to include: I will contend in Chapter Two that 
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the Astrolabe is not only essential to Chaucer’s objectives but also that he recognized its 
importance.  As an alternative, I argue that this list, beyond facilitating the reader’s recall, offers 
a chance to situate each work within a different frame: i.e., doctrine.  In fact, Victor Yelverton 
Haines makes a case that the meaning of “‘Retraccioun’…derive[s] from correspondence with 
the act of dragging something back over again, from A back to B.”33  In this sense, “retraction” 
implies the very activity that Chaucer calls upon his reader to perform—recursion.  
Above, I argue that the universality of the Boethian vision both influenced Chaucer’s 
work and likewise resonated with the poet’s medieval Christian audience.  What I would like to 
suggest here is that these themes, offered through the prose works and evoked in the Retraction, 
benefit his modern readership as well.  Because wise judgment requires the contextualization of 
information, the same strategies of rational deliberation hold: in learning that the nature of the 
world is change, the individual is freed from the pains of expectation and ownership; in 
discovering that unbridled emotions obscure reason, one may become skilled at recognizing and 
limiting the influences of the passions; in realizing that the only power that an individual truly 
has is over his choices, he empowers himself to create happiness; in understanding that the only 
assessment that really matters is self-actuated, the individual may gain the wisdom to improve 
his understanding and thus himself.  If one puts faith in a universe governed by order, then one 
must also accept, as Boethius does, that everything is good.  If one supposes the universe to be 
chaotic and disordered, the conclusion remains relatively the same: there is no point to 
complaint, to giving way to emotional torment, to creating self-impotence through distraction.  
As Chaucer tells us in his Retraction, he intends his work to instruct, and after six centuries, it 
continues to blast his readers with doctrine.  It is up to us, as individual readers, whether we 
choose to accept the invitation.
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Chapter Two 
 
 Learning to Know: Approaching the Universe through Chaucer’s Astrolabe 
 
 
 
When Chaucer composed his Treatise on the Astrolabe in the mid-1390s, he was, as he 
tells us, responding to the “bisi preyere in special to lerne the Tretis of the Astrelabie” (Prologue 
4-6) putatively made by his son, “Litell Lowys”.1  Through this composition, he intends to “teche 
a certein nombre of conclusions apertenyng to” (13-14) this remarkably sophisticated instrument.  
Along with astrologia, the astrolabe was used to find ecliptic latitudes and longitudes, calculate 
time and distance, navigate, survey, track and predict the movements of heavenly bodies, and 
fathom space.
2
  In his Astrolabe, Chaucer creates more than a definitive manual about this 
device: he constructs a treatise that serves to facilitate his reader’s understanding not only of the 
design, functions, and potentialities of the physical machine, but also about how his text and the 
astrolabe together can be used to comprehend far greater and more abstract universal concepts.  
More specifically, from the Prologue through Parts One and Two of his Astrolabe, Chaucer 
models a way of engaging with the text that pushes the reader beyond the simple act of reading 
into a more involved system of recursive reading: one learns, Chaucer avers, by participating in a 
continual process of gathering information, determining the accuracy of said information, and 
then applying the knowledge that one gains.  What he ultimately offers in the Astrolabe, to an 
audience larger than Little Lewis, goes beyond the teaching of the “conclusions,” or the 
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applications, of the astrolabe; he also invites his reader to participate in a philosophical 
consideration of knowledge.  What does it mean to “know”?  How do personal and external 
limitations affect one’s capacity for understanding?  What is the relationship between a concrete 
device and the intangible dynamics of the universe?  Indeed, what Chaucer does with the 
Prologue and Astrolabe together is suggest that, in a world of infinite imperfection and 
possibility, one may gain a degree of understanding and authority by coming to see that the way 
one approaches knowledge is as, if not more, important than the knowledge itself. The idea of 
subordinating the outcome to the process from which it results compels the individual not only to 
learn through recursion but, through that practice, to acknowledge the problems intrinsic to 
understanding: for example, imperfect language, problems of scribal reproduction, and limited 
human capacity.  What Chaucer offers through this theory is a method of learning that 
encourages the type of perspectival understanding that Boethius learns through Philosophy.  
This theory, and the incredible potential it offers, has remained unnoticed.  In the mid-
twentieth century, scholars tended to accept the Astrolabe at face value, with responses typically 
admiring Chaucer either for his ability to translate a scientific text in language accessible to a 
child or for his understanding of the importance of matching style to the intended audience.
3
  
Through the 1970s, the Astrolabe was regarded as a curiosity—Derek Brewer writers that it was 
“a laborious task done for love at a time when one would have expected Chaucer to be anxious to 
get on with other things,” and Mahmoud Manzalaoui describes it as “an unexpected use of his 
talents”—and then in the 80s and 90s responses, critics such as Sigmund Eisner, Peter J. Hager, 
and Ronald J. Nelson shifted the focus to a consideration of Chaucer’s role as a technical writer.4  
More recently, scholars have begun to recognize other possible implications of the importance of 
this work: for Seth Lerer, it is “a meditation on responsibility”; Frances McCormack argues that 
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it is “as much about translation as it is about astronomy”; and Andrew Cole maintains that “the 
sheer accumulation of allusions in the Prologue renders it central to our understandings not only 
of the poet’s use of literary traditions and authorities but his sense of vernacularity and its 
politics.”5  However useful to our understanding, these perspectives focus more on the Prologue 
than the treatise proper and in so doing, pass over the complexity inherent in the treatise itself.  
Viewing the Astrolabe as a whole allows us to recognize the potential of what Chaucer calls 
“learning to know.” 
This “learning to know” philosophy, which offers a method of reading that differs from 
the religiously prescribed approaches of the late-Middle Ages (e.g., the lectio divina), stresses 
the value of analyzing information, testing it for accuracy, and determining its applicability.
6
  In 
the third conclusion of Part Two of the Astrolabe, Chaucer refers to his own method of approach 
as “learning to know.”7  After using both his text and astrolabe to work through the process of 
finding “the howr of the nyht and [the] assendent” (II.3.61-62), he states that it is “thus” that he 
discovers “in which manere” (61) he can derive the time and the ascendant at night.8  This 
controlled and conscientious method, for Chaucer, defines not only what an individual 
understands, but also how he understands it.  In this way, Chaucer subordinates knowledge to the 
method of acquiring and utilizing it: instead of highlighting the conclusion (the answer), he 
emphasizes the importance of the process of gathering and assessing the information that leads to 
it.  In the vein of Boethius’ awareness that rational analysis is the most profitable method of 
regaining his reason and Chaucer’s final utilization of this system to assay his own understanding 
in the Retraction, Chaucer encourages his reader to perform this method of “learning to know” in 
order both to discover and to analyze its outcomes.  Only through such effort can an individual 
understand the imperfections in human knowledge, how to compensate for those limitations to 
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the extent that he is able, and how to draw reasonable conclusions from incomplete data.  In 
short, Chaucer teaches us how to learn.   
This exemplification of a personal, engaged methodology, at its core, invites the 
Astrolabe’s reader to realize not a perfect understanding of the universe—as such understanding, 
to follow the Boece, is an inherent impossibility in this realm—but to become less imperfect in 
the way that he understands the world, as well as his role within it.  By examining the way 
Chaucer frames his Astrolabe in the Prologue, as well as the relationships he creates between text 
and image, reader and text, and individual and universe, I argue that the Astrolabe is fundamental 
not only to understanding what Chaucer views as the limits of language and knowledge, but also 
to how he would have his audience judge information and authorities in a productive and 
profitable way.  Such judgment, Chaucer reveals, is necessarily personal: just as the conclusions 
of the astrolabe “ben suffisantly lerned and tawht” (Prologue 41-42) in many languages “by 
diverse rewles, ryht as diverse pathes leden diverse folk the ryhte wey to Roome” (42-44) so his 
reader must plot his own path to the acquisition and utilization of knowledge, a path that is as 
fundamental to understanding as it is unique to the individual.  The course that Chaucer’s 
Astrolabe prescribes suggests that it is through engagement with (and assessment and application 
of) knowledge that the reader can discover his own productive “wey,” a process which demands 
the application of the recursive analysis discussed in Chapter One.  This course, moreover, 
connects the Astrolabe to rest of Chaucer’s canon through its emphasis on a contributory and on-
going form of learning; exercised here with the technical and literary aspects of the Astrolabe, 
these methods can easily be extended to reconsider earlier interpretations of Chaucer’s poetry 
and prose.  Outside of that canon, the reader can “learn to know” any subject available to him.  If 
the thrust of Chaucer criticism—perhaps, medieval English literary criticism overall—has been 
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to recognize the significance of fourteenth-century vernacular literary exploration, then the 
Astrolabe shows us not only how to participate in a scientific method of reading, but also how to 
learn productively. 
The path that this essay takes “to Roome” develops in four segments.  First, it begins with 
an examination of the textual history of the Astrolabe, including the sources that Chaucer claims 
to “lewdly compile,” the scribal changes that were made to his text, and the resultant 
implications for the reader.  Next, I turn to the manuscripts themselves.  Through my study of 
nineteen of the thirty-two extant manuscripts which contain all or part of the Astrolabe, I 
discovered that several of the early manuscript copies contain accompanying diagrams.  As such, 
I include images from two early reproductions—MS. e. Museo 54 and MS. Dd.3.53—to 
demonstrate the importance of the diagrams to this work.
9
  I argue that these illustrations are 
crucial to Chaucer’s goal of promoting his reader’s active involvement with the text.  My 
analysis then moves to a consideration of a concept that Chaucer adds to his Astrolabe—that of 
infinity—and how this idea relates not only to the “smale fraccions” (I.8.12) marked on the 
device but also to reading, interpretation, and learning.  As Chaucer is the first to introduce the 
“infinite” into English, his choice to supplement his source texts with this concept underscores 
his appreciation for the limitations of knowledge.
10
  Finally, I challenge the scholarly focus on 
the Prologue alone to suggest that in reading the Prologue against the actual manuscripts, the 
reader can discover a cogent theory of erudition that Chaucer proposes through the Treatise on 
the Astrolabe.  As I understand it, Chaucer’s text is a metaphor for the astrolabe; both are 
knowledge machines for calculating the infinite nature of the universe on a human scale, and 
both mediate intangible ideas through tangible devices to encourage a form of vernacular reading 
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that allows the reader to participate in his own process of learning the information that was 
becoming increasingly accessible through translation. 
Chaucer adds to this body of translated information by assembling and translating 
scientific treatises, for which he is quick to disavow intellectual ownership.  He tells his reader: 
“considere wel that I ne usurpe nat to have fownde this werk of my labour or of myn engin.  I 
nam but a lewd compilatour of the labour of olde astrologens, and have hit translated in myn 
Englissh only for thi doctrine” (Prologue 63-67).  He has, in other words, simply collected and 
translated texts—the knowledge is not “his,” but rather part of a larger pool of information that 
he invites his reader to consider.  Upon examination, Chaucer’s compilation turns out to be more 
complicated than he gives us to believe.  Noting that the Astrolabe is “an assemblage, put 
together out of materials that were themselves assemblages,” Edgar Laird argues that Chaucer’s 
two most important sources, the pseudo-Messahalla De Compositione et Operacione Astrolabii 
and John of Sacrabosco’s Tractatus de Sphaera were themselves compilations.11  Alkabucius, 
one of two authorities that Chaucer names in his Astrolabe, similarly creates his own text by 
gathering together knowledge from different writers: as Laird summarizes, Alkabucius, in 
recognizing the problems with the works that came before, “began to make his own book, and 
has collected (‘collegi,’ ‘gadered togidre,’ ‘conqueulli’) what was necessary for his science from 
the sayings of ancient authors.”12  That the Astrolabe seems to be a compilation of compilations 
might further substantiate Chaucer’s proclaimed identity as a “lewd compilatour,” a collector of 
data who is not its master.  Yet as Carol Lipson points out, Chaucer’s debt to these ancient 
collections is not as large as he suggests: because Chaucer’s readers did not have to assemble 
their own astrolabes, given that the devices were readily purchasable during his time, he 
forewent the inclusion of the construction section of the earlier manuals, such as the pseudo-
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Messahalla.
13
  This choice, Lipson suggests, required “an expanded version of Messahala’s parts 
list, which he called a description.”14  As Lipson calculates it, this description “is seven times 
longer than Messahala’s thirty-three line version; he tells us not only what is the part’s name and 
function, but also what it looks like, how it is used, why it is named what it is.”15  Further, his 
consistent interjections throughout Parts One and Two of the Astrolabe, as well as the detailed 
explanations of the sequences he works out in Part Two, undermine his claim that he is a mere 
compiler of others efforts; he is working with compiled data, to be sure, but his interjections in 
and interpretations of the text make this work very much his own.    
These personal interjections into the text, in fact, become important guide-posts for the 
Astrolabe’s fifteenth-century reader.  Chaucer’s Astrolabe, it seems, found a strong following 
during this time: there are thirty-two extant manuscripts which contain all or part of this work, 
placing the Astrolabe second only to the Canterbury Tales in reproduction.  Of these thirty-two, 
twenty-eight are dated from the fifteenth century, and eleven contain diagrams, which vary in 
their degrees of completion and expert rendering.
16
  Based on the fact that the manuscripts “are 
not all descended from one another,” Catherine Eagleton suggests that “it is very likely that the 
original version of Chaucer’s text was illustrated with a set of diagrams.”17  Though these images 
are, as I argue, essential to the text, they nearly disappear from production during the fifteenth 
century.
18
  While four of the six manuscripts copied during the first quarter of this century have 
diagrams, only four of the eleven second-quarter, one of the six third-quarter, and one of the four 
fourth-quarter manuscripts retain the images.
19
  That Chaucer intended for his text to contain 
illustrations is clear in his explanation of the planned third part of the Astrolabe, a section which 
was meant to contain “diverse tables of longitudes and latitudes of sterres fixe for the astrolabie, 
and tables of declinacions of the sonne, and tables of longitudes of citeez and of townes—and as 
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wel for the governance of a clokke as for to finde the altitude meridian—and many nother 
notable conclusioun” (Prologue 80-87).  M. C. Seymour theorizes that the scribes intentionally 
abandoned these various figures because they were too taxing to include: “The ‘diverse tables’, 
being troublesome to copy, soon dropped from the scribal tradition; the exactly comparable fate 
of the diagrams of the astrolabe (originally at least 61 and shrinking by stages to none) is evident 
in the extant manuscripts.”20  Indeed, of the nineteen fifteenth-century manuscripts I’ve 
examined, none contain Chaucer’s prescribed tables and only eight contain diagrams; of these 
eight, there are variations between both the images that are chosen for inclusion and their degree 
of completion, as we will see below with Dd.3.53 and e. Museo 54.
 21
    
The elimination of necessary visual information is just one difficulty with which later 
readers of the Astrolabe must contend.  In the Astrolabe’s Prologue, Chaucer communicates a 
desire to reduce “curious enditing and hard sentence” through the use of “ful lihte rewles and 
naked wordes in Englissh” (Prologue 49, 29-30).  The purpose of this endeavor is to offer the 
information contained within this work in the clearest, most accessible way.  Yet the accepted 
structure of the Astrolabe, which Chaucer establishes quite plainly in the Prologue, may well 
have become confused in the manuscript editions.  Seymour explains: “It is at once apparent that 
the extant manuscripts both lack some features of this plan (i.e. the tables and concluding theory) 
and add some others (i.e. some duplicate propositions), and the major task facing the reader is to 
discover the outlines of the original text.”22  Based on a reference in Part Two that points the 
reader to Part Four of the Astrolabe—“This conclusioun wol I declare in the laste chapitre of the 
4 partie of this tretis so openly that ther shal lakke no worde that nedeth to the declaracioun” 
(II.11.17-20)—Seymour concludes that “the idea that having a clear statement of contents in the 
Prologue, he then gave to ‘litel Lowys’ (and no doubt to his friends in London) an incomplete 
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version, lacking the essential tables and part of the text, is nonsense.”23  Adding to this 
discussion, Andrew Cole suggests that the Prologue was the last thing that Chaucer wrote for this 
work.
24
  If Cole’s assumption is reasonable, and I believe that it is, the extension of his proposal 
is that Chaucer’s Astrolabe was complete and circulated with diagrams and diverse tables, both 
of which were present to support the reader’s understanding.25  These analyses of the 
manuscripts advance the very problem that Chaucer highlights in his Prologue: texts, like the 
ideas they contain, are both changeable and variable.  By highlighting this issue in the Prologue, 
Chaucer essentially frames his work as one that contains solid information, though it may 
contain authorial or scribal errors.  Thus, the reader may be grossly misled if he does not 
consider the possible faults of the “mediacion of this litel tretis” (Prologue 12) before he chooses 
to accept or deny a truth that such mediation conveys.  While textual discrepancies in any written 
work may encourage the reader to construct meaning, the fact that Chaucer calls attention to this 
issue underscores his idea that everything contains discrepancies.  The process of recursive 
analysis that Chaucer’s learns from the Boece is thus called upon even in works of science.  In 
short, Chaucer frames his Astrolabe as a contribution to a larger, inherently imperfect though 
necessary discussion about learning in which the reader himself must actively participate; the 
textual history of the Astrolabe demonstrates this basic principle of learning. 
One of the tactics that Chaucer uses to support his reader’s understanding is repetition, 
what he calls his “superfluite of wordes” (Prologue 47-48).  Though he asks his reader to excuse 
his verbal excesses, the point that he makes is that superfluity is needed to translate “curious 
enditing and hard sentence” in a way that exposes the potential of the astrolabe and enhances the 
reader’s use of both the text and the scientific device.  By considering that his apology here is 
actually an introduction to his strategy of communication, the additional explanations, his 
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“superfluous speech,” become necessary not only to Chaucer’s localized undertaking with his 
translations, but also to his larger reflection about reading and learning.  In fact, Chaucer offers 
the ostensibly gratuitous information to maximize correct understanding not just for the 
proclaimed recipient of this work—“Litell Lowys”—but for his entire audience.26  Throughout 
Parts One and Two, Chaucer interprets and denudes the material he translates, calls attention to 
important issues—“tak kep,” “Forget nat this,” “have this in mynde”—and recapitulates 
potentially confusing phrases—“that is to seyn.”  While these phrases may be formulaic, their 
use is important, as they serve to guide the reader through the text in the same way as do the 
illustrations.     
The first “superfluous” interjection occurs in I.7:  
Fro this litel + up to the ende of the lyne meridional under the ring shaltow fynden 
the bordure devyded with 90 degres; and by that same proporcioun is every 
quarter of thine astrolabie devyded.  Over the whiche degrees ther ben nowmbres 
of augrym that devyden thilke same degres fro 5 to 5, as shewith by longe strykes 
bytwene.  Of whyche longe strykes the space bytwene contienith a mile wey.  
And every degree of the bordure contieneth 4 minutes, that is to seyn, minutes of 
an howre.  And for more declaracioun, lo here the figure. (Fig. 2.1)   
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Figure 2.1—MS. e Museo 54, 4r 
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This description accomplishes several goals: it draws attention to the degrees of the border, while 
informing the reader that the diagram is intentionally incomplete—only the first 90 degrees are 
marked; it explains the significance of the “longe strykes” and Arabic numerals which mark 
intervals of 5 degree increments; it indicates the space and time contained within each 5 degree 
interval; and concludes, “every degree of the bordure contieneth 4 minutes, that is to seyn, 
minutes of an howre,” before inviting the reader to reference the diagram.  The inclusion of this 
additional information—that is to say, minutes of an hour—allows the reader to connect the 
different aspects of this description: the marked border contains 90 degrees; the “long strikes” 
measure the space of 5 degrees; each degree equals 4 minutes.  The “long strikes,” then, measure 
20 minutes of time and one mile of space.
27
  Thus Chaucer’s interpretive gesture—“that is to 
seyn, minutes of an howre”— actually clarifies his reader’s understanding by anticipating and 
answering the fundamental problem of incomplete representation.
28
  In recognizing Chaucer’s 
desire to minimize his reader’s confusion by providing specific, declarative statements, these 
moments become less redundant and more crucial to the overall goal of this work, especially in 
light of the differences between manuscripts.  Chaucer, through his “rewde endytyng,” 
“superfluite of wordes,” and use of diagrams, composes a work on astrologia that invites the 
reader’s participation in the discovery of knowledge, as that reader moves from text, to image, to 
the astrolabe itself.   
Because both the text and the knowledge contained therein are necessarily incomplete, 
Chaucer uses descriptive language and familiar references to help the reader make the 
connection between a particular passage and the device.
29
  For example, he likens azimuths (the 
lines that extend from the zenith to the horizon lines) to “the clawes of a loppe, or elles like to 
the werk of a womanes calle” (I.19.2-4) to facilitate the reader’s ability to distinguish these lines 
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from other markings.  The azimuths become readily apparent when the reader looks for an image 
akin to spider’s legs or a woman’s hairnet, instead of the more abstruse “krokede 
strykes…kervyng overthwart the almynkanteras” (2-5).  Yet as a practical text, the verbal 
descriptions and the mental images they invoke are insufficient because of the astrolabe’s 
complexity; as such, the diagrams are less a trivial component of the early manuscripts and more 
a fundamental part of what Chaucer wants to accomplish with his Astrolabe.  Surprisingly, these 
illustrations have received surprisingly little attention.
30
  I argue that Chaucer included the 
diagrams intentionally to facilitate the reader’s ability to recognize the distinct parts of the plates, 
as well as the different plates themselves, along with their respective and cooperant 
applications.
31
  The illustrations in e Museo 54 and Dd.3.53 clarify this point.
32
   As the diagram 
above and those below show, the manuscript orientation of the Astrolabe situates the diagrams 
within the textual space, a placement which suggests their importance to this work.  Bruce 
Eastwood argues that diagrams which appear in the textual space were either prescribed by the 
authors or because the scribes believed them to be integral parts of the text, and as Kari Anne 
Rand Schmidt contends, the placement of the text around the diagrams of Dd.3.53 suggest that 
these images were drawn in before the text was written.  Indeed, the diagrams in both e Museo 
54 and Dd.3.53 support these views: e Museo 54 prescribes roughly thirteen line-spaces per 
image, and Dd.3.53 affords roughly thirteen to fourteen.
33
  In the case of the Astrolabe, the text 
itself implies that the choice to integrate the diagrams within the textual space was not scribal.
34
  
The illustration that accompanies I.7 (Fig. 2.1), for example, draws the reader’s gaze to the 
upper-left quadrant, providing a visual reference for the text: “Fro this litel + up to the ende of 
the lyne meridional under the ring shaltow fynden the bordure devyded with 90 degres; by that 
same proporcioun is every quarter of thine astrolabie devyded” (1-5).  The inclusion of the final 
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clause suggests that the accompanying diagram offers partial information.
35
  Instead of visually 
replicating this particular aspect in its entirety, the 90 degrees are numbered by 10s, marked in 5 
degree increments, with only the first 15 degrees identified by the smaller tick marks.  Thus, the 
diagram provides sufficient information to aid the reader in identifying the exact feature of the 
explanation on the device—in this instance, the border, divided into 360 degrees, as well as the 
space and time that each 5 degree interval contains.
36
  Not only does the positioning of the 
diagrams suggest their importance to this work then, but the text itself hints at both the presence 
and reductive aspects of the illustrations.  The abridged qualities of the verbal and visual 
elements require the reader to engage with the information and to demonstrate understanding by 
completing the sequence.  Though this process of reader-involvement is not necessarily unique, 
the fact that Chaucer highlights the incompleteness of both of these textual elements makes the 
experience overt and deliberate. 
Before the reader can begin to put the astrolabe to practical use, he must first be able to 
identify its various components, an endeavor which requires the employment of the textual 
diagrams.  As Chaucer explains, “it is necessarie to thy lernyng to teche the first to knowe and 
worke with thine owne instrument” (II.5.5-7), and so “The firste partie of this tretis shal reherse 
the figures and the membres of thin astrolabie, by cause that thow shalt han the grettre knowyng 
of thine owne instrument” (Prologue 69-72).37  In turning from Prologue to the Astrolabe proper, 
the reader first encounters descriptions of each element of the device, which are then 
accompanied by illustrations that help guide him between the text and his astrolabe.  Though the 
diagrams of Part One are simplistic and often incomplete, showing only that portion of the 
device that the text describes, they provide concrete examples of the descriptions.  While e 
Museo 54’s I.7 diagram (Fig. 2.1) contains the + and the label “the bordure” as guides, it does 
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not follow the textual explanation precisely: the diagram marks only the first fifteen of the ninety 
degrees of the border; instead of providing “nowmbres of augrym that devyden thilke same 
degrees fro 5 to 5, as shewith by longe strykes bytwene” (6-8), the diagram replicates the long 
strikes but prints the degrees by ten, not by five.
38
   
These slight variations should not indicate, however, that the diagrams are not useful.
39
  
Following Chaucer’s declaration in the Prologue that texts are, in varying degrees, altered and 
alterable, it is irresponsible to expect that any information is complete or to accept it, 
immediately and thoughtlessly, as accurate; still, the reader may use to his benefit the awareness 
of the fractional quality of a datum that is part of a greater, unknown whole.  In I.7, while 
acknowledging that neither the description nor the diagram provide the “entirety,” both factors 
are purposefully clear and effective: Chaucer explains, for instance, that “every degree of the 
bordure contieneth 4 minutes,” and then interjects, “that is to seyn, minutes of an howre” (10-
11).  The diagram, then, serves as both a visual aid to the description and as a tool for gaining a 
practical, if not elementary, understanding of an abstract equation.
40
  By providing only basic 
information, Chaucer offers his reader an opportunity not to read and accept the text passively, 
but rather to engage with it and participate in its construction of knowledge.  Working through 
this description, for example, affords the following: if one degree equals four minutes of time, 
simple arithmetic offers that 360 degrees equal 1440 minutes, and one revolution equals twenty-
four hours.  In other words, I.7 and its accompanying diagram offer a way of understanding the 
revolution of the universe around Earth. Thus, the medieval reader gains a concrete way of 
understanding the workings of the universe by discovering and utilizing the mathematical 
expressions of movement of cosmological units on a tangible device.  
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Not only are the diagrams pertinent to their respective descriptions, but the relationship 
between illustration and text extends beyond any one particular section.
41
  Throughout, the 
reader must refer back to previous diagrams in order to recognize not only the different elements 
of the device but also the relationships between those various aspects, a requirement which 
points to the intricacy of the astrolabe.  In this, Chaucer’s Astrolabe is like the astrolabe, a textual 
device that requires operation.  Chaucer, in fact, tells us as much in the Prologue, by describing 
the text as a “mediacion.”  With the diagrams in Parts One and Two, the reader’s need to operate 
the text is even more apparent, as he must move about the book, returning to previous images in 
order to make whole a series of visual fragments.  Thus, the text becomes not only a “mediacion” 
through which Chaucer may teach, but also a tool for discovery of knowledge.  Section I.8, for 
example, begins by referring the reader back to the previous description: the zodiacal signs on 
the astrolabe are written “Under the compas of thilke degres” (1) that I.7 describes.  In this 
example, the adjectival reference to “thilke degres” intends to situate I.8 in relation to I.7 on the 
device, as the text makes clear: “and the nombres of the degres of tho signes ben writen in 
augrim above, and with longe devysiouns, fro 5 to 5, devyded fro the tyme that the signe entreth 
unto the laste ende”(5-9).  As the top illustration in Figure 2.2 shows, I.8’s diagram does not 
include the “longe strykes” (I.7) or “longe devysiouns” (I.8) that mark the 5 degree intervals, an 
omission that requires the reader either to transpose one image on top of the other mentally or to 
identify both elements on the physical device in order to understand their relationship.   Though 
the beginning of I.8’s explanation refers to information presented in I.7, “tho signes” qualifies 
the statement by relating the long division lines directly to the zodiacal signs, a move which 
makes these markings relevant to two different equational components of the astrolabe.   
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Figure 2.2—MS. e Museo 54, 4v 
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That the text provides neither entire explanations nor complete diagrams demands that 
the reader become involved in processing the information.  Case in point: in MS. e Museo 54, the 
descriptions and their accompanying diagrams do not necessarily appear together on one page.  
For example, 3v contains the illustration for I.6 and the description for I.7; 4r offers I.7’s 
diagram (Fig. 2.1), which is followed by the explanation for I.8; the diagram for I.8 (Fig. 2.2) 
appears on 4v, along with both the text and the diagram for I.9.  The association between I.7’s 
text on 3v and its diagram on 4r is simple enough provided the reader is paying attention; 
however, in order to assemble the illustrations of I.7 and I.8 visually, the reader must physically 
turn the leaf from 4r to 4v, a move which renders either diagram temporarily absent.  This point 
is important: while Chaucer could not have known that this particular manuscript would be 
oriented in this manner, his familiarity with other manuscripts and the potential for variations of 
the same work between manuscript copies may have contributed to his desire to make his reader 
cognizant of the need to engage in the process of learning.  Further, the text that appears within 
several of the diagrams forces the reader to manipulate the manuscript physically: in Figure 2.3, 
for example, “thy altitude” is written perpendicular to the text on the page for ready 
identification of the altitude line; “thy est orisonte” is written upside down; the signs of the 
zodiac are written as they would appear on the device (Fig. 2.3).   
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Figure 2.3—MS. Dd.3.53, 11r 
Unless the reader were adept at reading script in different directions, he would need to 
manipulate the manuscript physically by turning it to where he could easily read the words.  
Such required repositioning of the manuscript mimics the movements the user would need to 
make with the astrolabe itself in order to utilize its potential.  To read this text passively—to read 
the words and glance at the images without thinking about their relationships—is to miss the 
point; based on the possibility of the different textual orientations of the manuscripts, the act of 
reading the Astrolabe becomes more an exploration and amalgamation of information than a 
simple process of acceptance.  In other words, the text and diagrams, the orientation of the 
Astrolabe in the manuscript, and the incomplete nature of the illustrations and explanations call 
for the reader’s active involvement, which in turn permits an experience of the acquisition and 
consideration of that knowledge which is available in our fragmented sublunar realm.   
The abstract concepts that Chaucer offers in this work further emphasize the need for 
active reading.  For example, I.7 uses concrete examples to familiarize the reader with the more 
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intangible idea of universal movement; in a similar way, I.8 uses the long divisions of the 
degrees as a way to contain and simplify knowledge about the zodiacal signs.  These ostensibly 
physical limitations allow for the introduction of an even more abstract concept, that of infinity, 
while at the same time restricting its application specifically to the degrees of the signs.  Chaucer 
advises, “But understond wel that thise degrees of signes ben everich of hem considered of 60 
mynutes, and every minute of 60 seceondes, and so forth into smale fraccions infinit, as seith 
Alkabucius.  And therfor, know wel that a degree of the bordure contieneth 4 mynutes, and a 
degre of a signe contieneth 60 minutes, and have this in mynde.  And for the more declaracioun, 
lo here thy figure” (I.8.9-17).  Though I.7 and I.8 make use of the same long division lines, the 
lines mark different quantities: in reference to the universe’s movement around the earth, it takes 
four minutes of time to move one degree of angle; in this description, “these degrees of signs” 
may be divided into sixty minutes, each minute into sixty seconds, and so forth.  Whereas one 
full revolution in I.7 equals 1440 minutes, or twenty-four hours, the completion of 360 degrees in 
I.8 equals twelve zodiacs, or one year.  To extend this proposition further, each zodiac represents 
thirty degrees of rotation and each degree may be continually divided by increments of sixty into 
infinity.  The potential problem with these two descriptions stems from the fact that they rely on 
the same sub-units of data—an entanglement for the reader that Chaucer tries to mitigate through 
his emphasis on the different applications: “Understand well that these degrees of signs contain 
sixty minutes”; “know well that a degree of the border contains four minutes and a degree of a 
sign contains sixty”; “keep this information in mind.”  Because these descriptions rely on the 
same visual information, Chaucer seems anxious to obviate any possible confusion by inserting 
clarifying statements.  Though these insistent reminders may read like the superfluous 
information for which he apologizes in the Prologue, their purpose is clear: to help the reader 
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navigate the visual and verbal representations effectively and, through such navigation, to begin 
to disentangle the complexities of the device and its numerous applications so that when he is 
called on to use this knowledge in the conclusions of Part Two, he may do so accurately. 
The introduction of infinity demonstrates one such complexity.
42
  The perception of 
infinity in late medieval England comes, in part, from Aristotle, whose texts are also 
fragmentary, insofar as they consist of talking-points, rather than full expositions.
43
  In his 
Physics, the philosopher maintains that while infinity may apply to different categories, it can 
only exist potentially and reductively: taking the division of magnitudes as an example, 
determined, fractional quantities are finite and actual, while the infinite refers to the potential for 
those fractions to be bisected continually.
44
  Though a particular measurement may be 
perpetually divided, its magnitude cannot be increased.  As Aristotle explains, “What is 
continuous is divided ad infinitum, but there is no infinite in the direction of increase.  For the 
size which it can potentially be, it can also actually be.”45  In On the Heavens, Aristotle considers 
the cosmic implications of a potential infinite within the bounds of a finite form.  Ruminating 
about what may exist beyond the universal First Mover, Aristotle writes, “whatever is there, is of 
such a nature as not to occupy any place, nor does time age it; nor is there any change in any of 
the things which lie beyond the outermost motion; they continue through their entire duration 
unalterable and unmodified.”46  Based on the unchanging and unchangeable quality of that which 
lies “beyond the outermost motion,” Aristotle theorizes that the universe is contained within a 
finite form. 
In the Middle Ages, the concept of a determinate universe was adopted into Christianity; 
in place of the perfect invariant “outer-bounds,” Church doctrine substituted God above the ninth 
sphere.
47
  The universe, then, became incorporated within the Divine.  In opposition to 
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Aristotle’s theory of an unchanging, and thus bounded, presence, Thomas Aquinas reasons that 
God is infinite: “since the divine existence is not received in anything, but is itself its own 
subsisting existence…it is clear that God is infinite and perfect.”48  While God may have been 
conceived as unbounded, the universe remained within the fixed, Ptolemaic structure, and the 
concept of infinity remained largely unchanged because the universe and, by extension, its 
ability to be infinite, was still bounded within a magnitude.  Aquinas, in considering whether 
anything other than God may be “infinite in magnitude,” reaches the same conclusion as 
Aristotle: “through the division of a whole we arrive at the matter, for the parts are related to the 
whole like matter; but through the addition of the parts we arrive at a whole, which is related to 
the parts as form to matter.  And thus we do not find an infinite in the addition of magnitude, but 
rather only in the division of magnitude.”49  William of Ockham extends the idea of “potential 
existence” to suggest that the infinite exists in actuality.  For Ockham, Aristotle’s theory of 
potentiality demands that a continuum be inseparable:  
although the Philosopher posits infinite parts of the same proportion to be actually 
in every continuum, still he does not posit that they can actually be separated from 
one another.  And therefore he admits that infinity exists potentially and not 
actually—and so, for the same reason, he posits that number is infinite potentially 
and not actually, not because there are not present an actual infinite number of 
parts, but because all the parts are not and cannot be separated.
50
   
Ockham’s reading of Aristotle, then, puts forward the notion that an “actual infinite number of 
parts” can exist within a potentially infinite, inseparable whole, which is, in fact, what Chaucer 
refers to.
51
  Whether potential, actual, or both potential and actual, the understanding of infinity 
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in the Ptolemaic universe limited the concept to reduction: nothing extended beyond the 
established boundary, but the space within that magnitude could be divided infinitely.   
In order to situate this concept within the astrolabe, the reader must return to “thise 
degrees of signes”—i.e. the long division lines which quantify each sign of the zodiac by degrees 
of five.
52
  An examination of the diagram with respect to infinity necessitates the reader’s initial 
reliance upon the illustration, while simultaneously highlighting the limitations of the image: just 
as words can define the meaning of infinity but cannot accurately convey its extension, so I.8’s 
diagram can serve only as a visible magnitude which functions as a preliminary, tangible 
reference for the infinity of information to which the device, the images, and Chaucer’s 
Astrolabe overall, can only allude.  Based on the inherent constraints of knowledge and language 
that he first exposes in the Prologue—“truste wel that alle the conclusiouns that han ben fownde, 
or elles possibli myhten be fownde…ben unknowe perfitly to any mortal man in this regioun, as 
I suppose…that sothly, in any tretis of the astrelabie that I have seyn there ben some conclusions 
that wole nat in alle thinges performen hir byhestes.  And some of hem ben to harde to thy tendre 
age of x yer to conseyve” (Prologue 17-27)—Chaucer advises his reader of the need for 
engagement in the discovery of knowledge and then provides him the opportunity to experience 
the limitations of both the text and the diagrams in this process.  In other words, Chaucer’s use of 
the infinite in I.8 pushes the reader to advance beyond the visual symbols on the page and into a 
space of active inquiry, a space where the relationship between I.7 and I.8 establishes a material 
foundation from which the reader may consider the abstract, bounded infinity of the Ptolemaic 
universe.  By including this gesture toward infinitely small fractions, Chaucer calls upon the 
contemporary understanding of the bounded infinite to underscore the limitations of human 
knowledge.  Meaning, just as his reader can conceive of the potential, but not actual, knowledge 
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that “possibli myhten be fownde in so noble an instrument as an astralabie” (Prologue 18-20), he 
can imagine, but not fully fathom, the infinity that extends from the zodiacal sixty minutes, into 
the sixty seconds of each minute, and so forth. 
What I am arguing is that in the Astrolabe, Chaucer uses the inherent, incomplete aspects 
of the text and the diagrams to create a space where participation with texts and authorities is 
necessary.  By reinforcing the idea that knowledge is innately imperfect in the sublunary world, 
Chaucer creates a foundation from which his reader may learn to deal productively and 
competently with such limitations.  In fact, Chaucer models an approach to such information in 
Part Two by providing examples of this section’s propositions and working through the 
conclusions himself.  In II.1, for instance, he explains that “To fynde the degree in whych the 
sonne is day by day, after hir cours abowte,” the reader must “Rekene and knowe which is the 
day of thi monthe, and ley thi reule up that same day, and thane wol the verray point of thy rewle 
sitten in the bordure, upon the degree of thy sonne” (II.1.1-5).  Though this statement seems 
straightforward, Chaucer illustrates the solution by including a real-world example: “Ensample 
as thus: the Yer of Oure Lord 1391, the 12 day of March at midday, I wolde knowe the degree of 
the sonne” (6-8).53  After describing step by step his process of finding the degree of the sun, 
Chaucer affirms that he understands the governing principle of this procedure after he performs 
the solution: “And thus knowe I this conclusioun” (15-16).  He doesn’t gain its “ful experience” 
(25), however, until he works the problem again with different variables.  Through this careful 
search for accuracy, Chaucer reminds his reader of the possibility to falter: it is necessary to 
perform the action more than once to ensure the accuracy of the manuscript’s propositions, the 
exactitude of the astrolabe being used, and the user’s correct grasp of the conclusion.  This “ful 
experience” assures Chaucer that his method of approach to the first conclusion works because 
 84 
 
he can repeat the sequence to find another degree at a different time of the year.  What this 
process suggests to the reader is that reliable understanding is born from fidelity, a concept that 
seems a striking precursor to the replicability central to the scientific method.  Such 
understanding, of course, must recognize the problems of manuscript reproduction (as Chaucer 
advises in the Prologue) and the potential of infinite variation, both of which underscore the 
necessity of the rational approach to knowledge that Chaucer offers. 
Chaucer again employs this strategy in conclusion three, as he describes, and then 
demonstrates, how “To knowe every tyme of the day bi liht of the sonne, and every tyme of the 
nyht by the sterres fixe, and eke to knowe by nyht or by day the degree of any signe that 
assendeth on the est orisonte, which that is cleped communly the assendent, or elles oruscupum” 
(II.3).  In this conclusion, he pushes the point that his experience facilitates his understanding of 
the method, not the solution.
54
  Having worked the formula once, Chaucer declares, “And in this 
wyse hadde I the experience for evermo in which maner I sholde knowe the tyde of the day, and 
ek myn assendent” (II.3.37-40); after his second attempt, he states, “And thus lerned I to knowe 
ones for ever in which manere I shuld come to the howr of the nyht and to myn assendent, as 
verreyli as may be taken by so smal an instrument” (60-63).  In each of these instances, Chaucer 
draws attention to the process instead of the result: it is “in this way” that he gains a permanent 
understanding of this method of discovery.  It is “thus” that he “learns to know,” forevermore, in 
which manner he can determine the information.
55
  Chaucer’s focus on this programmatic 
process of “learning to know” elevates his approach to the acquisition of knowledge over its 
significance, suggesting that the approach to a subject dictates how that subject is understood and 
how that knowledge can be used.  Thus, his inclusion of the conditional clause—“as verreyli as 
may be taken by so smal an instrument”—underscores the importance of the method, as it 
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reminds the reader that the astrolabical device is limited: the information Chaucer gains is 
reliable only insofar as the device is exact.  Given that the astrolabe can only gesture towards the 
infinity of knowledge that forever remains outside the bounds of human cognition, Chaucer’s 
practice of “learning to know” creates a powerful dynamic between the reader’s approach to 
knowledge and the machines which contain it.  By announcing the deficiencies in his own text 
and including diagrams to help the audience make connections between their own astrolabes and 
the treatise, Chaucer guides them through his own practice of reading.  In acknowledging the 
imperfections of the device, the text, and human authorities, his readers can better prepare 
themselves to acquire useful knowledge.   
The diagram that accompanies II.3 contributes to this design.
56
  Whereas the illustrations 
in Part One are meant to facilitate the connection between the descriptions and the device, II.3 
both depicts the actual relationship between specific parts of the astrolabe and provides a visual 
reference for Chaucer’s first “experiential method.”57  In fact, the text included within the 
diagram guides the reader to the specific areas of the astrolabe that Chaucer uses (Fig. 2.4).
58
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Figure 2.4—MS. e Museo 54, 12r 
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The identified “label” points to the “X” from whence he concludes, based on the counting of 
letters from the line of midnight, that the time is 9 o’clock (II.3.28-34).  From this point, he looks 
“down upon the est orisonte, and fond ther the 20 degree of Gemynis assending, which that I tok 
for myn assendent” (34-37).  In the diagram, the degree of 20 is labeled on the outside of the 
zodiacal signs, above and to the left of Gemini; directly below the “20” and the concentric zodiac 
border is the label “the assendent.”  Thus, the diagram serves, together with the text, to grant a 
type of rudimentary experience of the method.
59
  The second example Chaucer provides for this 
conclusion, however, renders the diagram less effective, as he necessarily uses different 
variables.  This difference is important: instead of relying entirely on the authority of the text, the 
interested reader must follow Chaucer’s verbal illustration on his own device, which affords him 
a greater opportunity for engagement with the process and, therefore, a more practical 
understanding of the potential of the astrolabe.  
Occasions for the reader to “learn to know” the various potentialities of the astrolabe 
abound in Part Two.  In fact, out of the forty extant conclusions, only six include examples of the 
solutions.
60
  The remaining thirty-four offer precise directions for working through a formula, 
examples of responses to authority, or explanations about different responses to the conclusions.  
Based on Chaucer’s provocation of his reader’s engagement in the Prologue, his encouragement 
of such participation in Part One where the reader must use both diagram and text to assemble an 
understanding of the different elements of the device, and his introduction of the idea of learning 
to know through experience, it seems credible that the lack of comprehensive, author-centered 
examples in Part Two intend to promote active participation in the acquisition of knowledge and 
to discourage the passive acceptance of information.  The logical extension of what Chaucer 
offers in this work is that knowledge is a product of learning, and learning extends from an 
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experiential relationship between the individual and the information proffered by authorities.  
While this relationship allows him to know “ones for ever” a method of gathering and assessing 
information, his consideration of the knowledge obtained from investigation is governed by his 
awareness that understanding is imperfect, experience is perspectival, and authorities are limited.  
Just as the reader must contend with the fact that the limitations of knowledge and 
authorities deny the potential for “perfect” understanding and the possibility that the manuscript 
he uses contains errors, the astrolabe itself is a constraint.  To highlight the possible restrictions, 
Chaucer makes this point repeatedly throughout the treatise: astrolabes are accurate, he argues, 
“yif so be that the makere have nat erred” (I.21.7); “This conclusioun is verrey soth, yif the 
sterres in thine astrolabie stonden after the trowthe” (II.34.11); “Now is thine orisonte departed 
in 24 parties by thy azymutz, in significacioun of 24 partiez of the world (al be it so that shipmen 
rikne thilke partiez in 32)” (II.31.7-9).  The conditional nature of accuracy is amplified by 
Chaucer’s choice of syntax: by including “if so be,” “if the stars,” and “all be it so” in these 
phrases, Chaucer reinforces the possibility of imperfect knowing.  The combination of these 
different modes of communicating and obtaining ostensibly whole, but in fact partial, 
information, for Chaucer, denies the attainability of absolute knowledge.  In truth, these various 
possibilities reinforce the significance of Chaucer’s inclusion of infinity in this work, as the 
potential for errors or intentional modifications (to the text, to the device, to one’s understanding) 
are endless. 
Along with these contingencies, the reader faces one more obstacle to “knowing”: he 
must determine how the treatise he reads relates to the device he uses.  In two instances in the 
Astrolabe, Chaucer points out that Louis must first learn to use his own device, a less-accurate 
model, before he provides information about the other, more precise astrolabes.
61
  If the reader is 
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using a device that is either calibrated for a different location or is of a different quality than that 
which Chaucer describes, he will need to adjust his use of the Astrolabe to account for the 
differences.
62
  Further, as Chaucer points out in II.39, explanations that various authors provide 
lack congruity: while some authors claim that “The latitude of a clymat is a lyne ymagined from 
north to south the space of the erthe” (27-29), others “seyn that yif men clepen the latitude thay 
mene the arch meridian that is contiened or intercept bytwixe the cenyth and the equinoxial” (32-
35).  In this example, though the writers are essentially referring to the same lines on the 
astrolabe, Chaucer includes both identifiers, “latitude” and “arch meridian,” to demonstrate 
another possible variant: here, the perspective of the “auctour.”  These passages point to the fact 
that, as with Chaucer’s Astrolabe, other treatises on the astrolabe are not universal: because there 
are different devices and different ideas about how to explain the astrolabe’s potentiality, the 
information contained in each treatise will not necessarily be entirely, or accurately, dependable, 
and the only way to discover the reliability of the information is through the type of engagement 
that Chaucer models in Part Two.  Mindful of the probable variations, the reader can better 
mitigate any possible problems which result from different manuscripts, devices, and 
descriptions.  The idea that Chaucer puts forth is that the translation of one’s awareness about the 
imperfect nature of information can permit the critical reader to operate within that flawed 
system in a productive way and draw, as he does, reliable, though ultimately incomplete, 
conclusions. 
Chaucer uses the factors which contribute to this flawed system—imperfect language, 
deficient authorities, and individual capacity for understanding—as a way to construct his ideas 
about reading.  As he tells us in the Prologue, there are two main reasons why he translates the 
Astrolabe: he has “perceived well by certeyne evidences [his son Lowys’] abilite to lerne 
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sciencez touching noumbres and proporciouns” (Prologue 1-4), and he is compelled by Lowys’ 
“bisi preyere in special to lerne the Tretis of the Astrelabie” (4-6).  Chaucer’s use of the word 
“lerne” in this context suggests an attempt to unite the processes of reading and learning and to 
apply those systems locally to the manuscript and to the astrolabe, and generally to all 
knowledge machines; ideally, the application of this knowledge leads both to mastery of medium 
and of content, a point which Chaucer stresses throughout the Astrolabe proper.  What he alludes 
to through this word choice here is that the impetus behind this work, in essence, is a desire to 
expose a beneficial means of knowledge acquisition—a practice which requires consideration of 
language, authority, and one’s reasonable responsibility to determine the validity and utility of 
information.  This first sentence also gives us a glimpse into Chaucer’s thought process: while he 
considers Lowys’ desire to read the Astrolabe, he focuses primarily on whether or not that 
inclination “to lerne the Tretis of the Astrelabie” is proper.  Chaucer deems his son’s desire 
rightful after he “perceives well” and observes “certain evidences.”  Though his own method is 
not yet explicit, this initial section looks forward to the Astrolabe’s overt examples of 
engagement with and assessment of information that Chaucer relies upon, consistently, to make 
thoughtful choices.   
After establishing that this work is the product of his determination of the righteousness 
of Lowys’ petition, a rectitude that then extends to the virtue of his own understanding, Chaucer 
quickly points out that his Astrolabe is not a definitive work about the device.  Instead, he views 
it as a companion to the “sufficient astrolabe” that he has given to Lewis: he writes, “therfor have 
I geven the a suffisaunt astrelabie as for owre orizonte, compowned after the latitude of 
Oxenford, upon which by mediacioun of this litel tretis I purpose to teche the a certain nombre of 
conclusions apertenyng to the same instrument” (Prologue 9-15).  According to the MED, 
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“mediacioun” signifies “by means of something” or “by way of something.”  Chaucer’s 
fashioning of the Astrolabe as a mediation, then, suggests that he views this work as a medium 
through which ideas may be shared: what he offers will come to include his knowledge of the 
astrolabe, its potential applications, and the methods for obtaining specific information, along 
with his own personal observations about knowledge, authority, and the determination of 
whatever “truth” might be found in this realm.  The included description of this particular 
astrolabe, sufficient for “owre orizonte, compowned after the latitude of Oxenford,” narrows the 
scope of both Lewis’ astrolabe and Chaucer’s Astrolabe.  This limitation, then, focuses his son’s 
attention, and ours, on the fact that the information mediated through this work needs to be tested 
by the reader to ensure its accuracy because of possible differences between Lewis’ astrolabe and 
others not calibrated to Oxford’s latitude.  Put another way, the information that Chaucer offers 
may or may not translate precisely to different instruments; as such, the task of determining 
exactitude, by necessity, remains with the reader.  Following this reasoning, Chaucer’s Astrolabe 
is a means through which both he and his reader participate, individually and collectively, in the 
act of knowledge acquisition and assessment.   
By offering only a “certain nombre” of conclusions, Chaucer intentionally limits the 
scope of the work and thus further frames his Astrolabe as a result of his personal engagement 
with his own method of learning.  As he explains, there are “thre causes” which define this 
limitation:  
The furste cause is this: truste wel that alle the conclusiouns that han ben fownde, 
or elles possibli myhten be fownde in so noble an instrument as an astralabie, ben 
unknowe perfitly to any mortal man in this regioun, as I suppose.  Another cause 
is this: that sothly, in any tretis of the astrelabie that I have seyn there ben some 
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conclusions that wole nat in alle thinges performen hir byhestes.  And some of 
hem ben to harde to thy tendre age of x yer to conseyve. (15-24) 
What Chaucer proffers in these reasons is the idea that knowledge is confined within boundaries: 
not only does he submit that all information that has been found is “unknowe perfitly,” but the 
construction of future potentiality through the repetitious “possibly might” pushes the point that 
a complete understanding of the information derived from the astrolabe is impossible precisely 
because such information is intrinsically fragmentary.  In other words, imperfect understanding 
inhibits the potential of current knowledge, which in turn is bounded by the fact that there is 
knowledge yet unknown.
63
  Both Chaucer’s Astrolabe and the physical device, then, become 
tangible magnitudes which contain information that is infinitely, though not irredeemably, 
incomplete.   
Chaucer complicates this perspective, moreover, by asserting that there is no authority, 
no expert, to whom one may turn to gain absolute mastery of this information: as he writes, there 
is no mortal man in his region who has a complete understanding of the astrolabe…as he 
supposes.  While this statement, on the surface, seems to indicate that knowledge is 
geographically situated, that somewhere there may be a man, mortal or otherwise, who has 
perfect knowledge, the point that Chaucer makes here is that he doesn’t know: he, as an author, 
as a potential authority, can only deduce conclusions based on what information he has.
64
   By 
highlighting the partiality of his knowledge, Chaucer refigures his authorial position from the 
role of authority to one of rational, though limited, credibility.  In fact, Chaucer drives home this 
declared lack of expertise by protesting that this work isn’t even his: “But considere wel that I ne 
usurpe nat to have fownde this werk of my labour or of my engin.  I nam but a lewd compilatour 
of the labour of olde astrologens, and have hit translated in myn Englissh only for thi doctrine” 
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(63-67).  As a “lewd compilatour,” Chaucer asserts no ownership over the treatise that he 
compiles; he translates the “labour” of others solely for the instruction of his readers.  Chaucer’s 
decision to distance himself from the role of authority challenges the expectations of readers who 
assume that what is written is necessarily true.  Instead, he offers them the reasons why the 
actuality of a completely and perfectly reliable authority is extremely problematic: what 
knowledge there is remains fractional; the information is not perfectly understood; an authority 
cannot render a subject flawlessly.  In so doing, Chaucer gives warning against the immediate 
and uncritical acceptance of information, a warning which promotes the awareness of alternative 
possibilities. 
Chaucer reinforces that warning by suggesting the possibility that the written 
transmission of ideas may likewise lack reliability.  Along with the incomplete nature of human 
knowledge and the limited capacity of and differences between astrolabes, manuscripts may well 
contain errors: “that sothly, in any tretis of the astrelabie that I have seyn there ben some 
conclusions that wole nat in alle thinges performen hir byhestes.”  Not unlike the first cause in 
which the limits of his knowledge allow him only to suppose a conclusion, Chaucer here first 
avers the fractional quality of his information: he is dependent solely on those manuscripts that 
he has seen.
65
  That he acknowledges the existence of other information beyond his ken reminds 
the reader of the fractionality of knowledge in general.  Beyond that fractionality lies another 
problem: in the treatises which he does know, incorrect figures and their subsequently false 
conclusions exemplify an error with either the formulae or the calculations themselves.  As 
Chaucer states, some will not, in all things, perform what they promise.  Expressly put, 
calculating a flawed equation with different variables leads to inaccurate results.  This problem 
with the information provided by his sources illustrates the limitations of both generalizations 
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(the formulae) and their application (the calculations) in making effective use of an astrolabe, a 
problem that many of his characters elsewhere (Melibee and Januarie being but two instances) 
fail to confront.  The extension of Chaucer’s admonition about the fallibility of both equations 
and calculations is a call to awareness: the blind acceptance of any formula or sententia may lead 
to error or misunderstanding, while the accurate reckoning of a calculation and its subsequent 
applications requires the reader’s cautious and critical interaction with the assertions being made.  
Without that, erroneous data may be overlooked and accepted, rendering it useless and possibly 
pernicious.  In other words, to understand and utilize the information offered through such 
formulae and such calculations, the reader simply must carefully and critically engage with the 
information with which he is presented, including Chaucer’s own.  While he makes no overt 
recommendation to this practice, Chaucer is able to deduce that all astrolabical treatises contain 
errors precisely because he has the experience of having tested the propositions himself.  Indeed, 
as we have seen in Part Two of the Astrolabe, Chaucer advocates the experience of working 
through the equations as the only true way to learn how to use the device and understand its 
potential and its limits.  
Just as Chaucer denies his own personal authority through his insistence that his 
understanding of the device, and, in fact, knowledge itself, is perspectival, he likewise rejects 
any authoritative claim for his Astrolabe for the same reasons that he is skeptical of the untested 
accuracy of other manuscripts.  By stating that his work excludes those ideas which are too 
difficult for Lowys’ tender years to understand, Chaucer professes that the Astrolabe is, and will 
always be, incomplete.  Further, his pointed lack of specificity, “some conclusions,” underscores 
his claim about knowledge, as he informs his reader that there is additional information about the 
astrolabe and its workings that he does not include.  His intentional ambiguity in this instance 
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reifies the unknown possibilities and, in so doing, urges his audience to acknowledge the 
limitations of the information he proffers and then continue their search for additional and more 
reliable information.  That Chaucer sets up his Astrolabe as a product of deliberation that offers a 
programmatic approach to knowledge and yet refuses to allow it to serve as an expert document 
suggests that he was more interested both in the discourse that this work could initiate and the 
process that he advocates—for Lowys and for others—than he was in creating a definitive 
English translation of scientific information. 
The reliability of his sources and the calculations they offer is not the only problem he 
poses for his audience.  Chaucer’s choice to translate his Latin sources “under ful lihte rewles 
and naked wordes in Englissh” (26-27) suggests that he not only desired to translate his sources 
into the vernacular, but that he was concerned to translate them into a clear and readily 
understandable composition.  Instead of creating a system of communication that merges 
signified and signifier in perfect union, though, Chaucer acknowledges this unattainable 
“absolute.”  Indeed, his appeal to “every discret persone that redith or herith this litel tretis, to 
have [his] rewde endytyng for excused, and [his] superfluite of wordes” suggests that while he 
attempts to present the information in a clear, straightforward manner, that too is problematic.  
Thus he apologizes (in its fullest sense) for the repetition and simple writing of the Astrolabe for 
two reasons: “The firste cause is for that curious enditing and hard sentence is ful hevy at ones 
for swich a child to lerne.  And the seconde cause is this, that sothly me semeth betre to writen 
unto a child twies a good sentence than he forgete it ones” (48-53).66  The point to the writing, 
then, is to make the knowledge of astrologia accessible through a deliberate and purposeful 
attempt to simplify the abstruse composition of his Latin sources and the difficult subject matter, 
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as the combination of complicated writing and complex material is too cumbersome for his little 
Louis to manage.  
While Chaucer draws attention to his personal experience with manuscript errors in the 
Astrolabe’s Prologue, his concern with scribal transcription is most apparent in his poem 
“Chaucers Wordes Unto Adam, his Owne Scriveyn.”67  Likening Adam’s errors to “negligence 
and rape,” Chaucer contends that he engages in a constant struggle to ensure the correct copying 
of his work: “So ofte adaye I mot thy werk renewe, / It to correcte and eke to rubbe and scrape, / 
And al is thorugh thy negligence and rape” (5-7).68  The charge here is clear: Adam has taken 
Chaucer’s words and, through either witless inattention or willful choice, made a new, 
unauthorized text.  By availing his readers of the “thre causes” in the Prologue, Chaucer 
establishes that every text, including his own, may contain errors and faults, and as we learned 
above, the manuscript editions of the Astrolabe do include errors, additions, and deletions.  
Proceeding from this knowledge, then, judgments about accuracy or applicability of information 
become fixed squarely within the purview of each individual reader precisely because, for 
Chaucer, a complete and perfect text, like complete and perfect knowledge, is impossible.   
As Chaucer makes every attempt to guarantee the accuracy of his work, so he offers his 
reader methods to deal with such textual discrepancies productively.  Yet the problem that the 
reader faces is greater than one of textual errors.  Chaucer points out in the Prologue that the real 
issue is one of knowledge, which is communicated through a flawed system of language and 
authority.  Thus a reader’s engagement in identifying useful and reliable information is essential 
to the extraction of the potential knowledge in a text.  Of course, attempting to ascertain the 
utility of information without some type of experiential method of working with that information 
is akin to the providentially-guided but powerless Constance of the Man of Law’s Tale who is set 
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forth in a rudderless vessel that carries her to destinations unknown.  So Chaucer not only points 
out the issues of language, authority, and knowledge in the Astrolabe’s Prologue, but he also 
provides a model of engagement in the Astrolabe proper that shows how one can participate 
actively with the information the text contains in order to experience the discovery and 
acquisition of knowledge.  In fact, this process of knowledge acquisition, Chaucer’s “learning to 
know,” allows his reader a broader, vernacular means of reading through which the individual 
may hone his craft of mindful participation and empower himself to deal competently with these 
imperfect systems.  
Of course, competence, or sufficiency, indicates a degree of ability which is, as Chaucer 
would have us to understand his Astrolabe, one piece of a greater whole.  That is, the process 
that Chaucer offers can help the reader to become a better thinker, but it will not, because it 
cannot, lead to perfect knowledge.   Chaucer’s inclusion of infinity in Part One reinforces this 
idea as it acknowledges the limitations of the physical astrolabe—the division lines not only 
mark delineations of space and time, but these divisions conceptually continue both within the 
parameters of the device, as well as in the translation of that data to the world.
69
  Similar to the 
limitations of the astrolabe, the physicality of the manuscript imposes certain restrictions on a 
text’s capacity to proffer information.  In the first of the three conditions that Chaucer applies to 
his text, he suggests that current knowledge is both incomplete and fractional; further, the true 
magnitude of any one particular idea cannot be assessed.  The second condition highlights the 
possibility that written knowledge is flawed, and the third announces that Chaucer, himself, 
refuses to compose a “complete” work.  Based on these preliminary causes, along with 
Chaucer’s later intimations about the constraints of all mediation—some astrolabes are more 
accurate than others; similar to manuscripts, some devices are flawed; some “astrologiens” cast 
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horoscopes, which require superficial data input and produce subjective results—what Chaucer 
really offers to his reader in the Astrolabe is not simply an opportunity to master the workings of 
the scientific device, though familiarity with the astrolabe and its applications is a consequence.
70
  
Instead, he is providing an occasion for his reader to consider the implications of circumscribing 
entities, while at the same time providing a method of engagement with limited, though useful, 
information.   
As his causal conditions in the Prologue demonstrate, the awareness of the necessarily 
inconclusive nature of what we “know” instructs a continual consideration of different ideas and 
perspectives.  The Astrolabe, Chaucer states, is one such interpretation: “considere wel that I ne 
usurpe nat to have fownde this werk of my labour or of myn engin.  I nam but a lewd 
compilatour of the labour of olde astrologens, and have hit translated in myn Englissh only for 
thi doctrine.  And with this swerd shal I slen envie” (Prologue 63-68).  The envy which Chaucer 
hopes to slay with this statement is envy of expertise.  As I argue above, Chaucer is careful to 
distance himself from the role of authority; here, by extinguishing an emotion that would hinder 
his reader’s ability to engage in the “learning to know” process he advocates, Chaucer 
simultaneously suggests that the Astrolabe is one part of a vast body of knowledge, one 
compilation that results from his own understanding of and approach to this subject.  Beyond the 
compilation of science, though, remains a statement about reading that is everywhere in 
Chaucer—passive, credulous reading at best leads to limited, and essentially useless, 
understanding.  The narrator of the Legend of Good Women, for example, gains knowledge 
through reading and advises “to the doctrine of these olde wyse, / Yeve credence” (F-Text 19-
20).
71
  Yet shortly thereafter, having given these books his “feyth and ful credence, / And in [his] 
herte have hem in reverence” (F-Text 31-32), he excitedly goes into a field and pledges his 
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allegiance to a flower.  Apparently, his “faith and full credence” denied his ability to understand 
the metaphor.  The narrator of the Parliament of Fowls provides another example, as he readily 
admits that he stops thinking when he reads: “To rede forth hit gan me so delite / That al that day 
me thoughte but a lyte” (27-28).  In the Canterbury Tales, the Wife of Bath’s Jankyn reads his 
book of wicked wives “with ful good devocioun” (III.739) because it permits him to proclaim 
superiority, however hollow, over her.  By emphasizing the process of “learning to know” in his 
Astrolabe, Chaucer helps his reader prepare himself to manage differences in astrolabes, errors in 
manuscript transcription, and authoritative entities because it is this method of approach to 
knowledge that the reader can control and authorize.  In short, it allows him to become skilled in 
the way he reads.  It is this process of reading, of understanding that all information is but a piece 
of a larger puzzle, that instructs Chaucer’s modern reader to recognize that the Prologue is one 
part of the Astrolabe-whole.  Such recognition, I argue, better prepares us to realize, if 
incompletely, what Chaucer understood to be the promise of his method of “learning to know.” 
For his contemporary reader, the extension of this “learning to know” philosophy has the 
potential to empower that individual to become the master of his own knowing.  As this potential 
relates to the astrolabe, the reader’s ability to learn how to use the device, with the help of the 
text and its diagrams, facilitates his ability to situate himself within the fixed sphere of the earth 
in relation to the moving spheres of the cosmos.  Through the mediation of tangible tools, the 
reader may embark on a basic discovery of universal space and time, distance, and infinity and a 
consideration about how these factors can, and do, impact his life.  Out of such purposeful 
deliberation, the limitations of astrolabes, manuscripts, and authorities become object lessons in 
the discovery of, and appreciation for, a cosmological understanding that medieval science had 
yet to gain and a language that can never adequately communicate those ideas to which science 
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can only allude.  The translation of this awareness to daily life, then, makes the need for 
participation in learning paramount to any true understanding of the limitations and applications 
of knowledge. 
In the six centuries since Chaucer first wrote his Astrolabe, our understanding of the 
universe has dramatically changed: Earth was repositioned from the fixed center of the universe 
to a rotating and orbiting planet within a solar system; that solar system was discovered to be but 
a small unit on the outskirts of a much larger celestial system—the Milky Way Galaxy; however 
large the Milky Way is in comparison to our own solar system, it is itself a small, peculiar entity 
within the space we know as the universe.
72
  As opposed to the Ptolemaic model that enclosed 
the universe within a bounded actual, modern science has revealed the fact that the universe is 
both infinitely large and continuously expanding and includes not only black holes, but also dark 
matter.  This universe which we study, however, may not be all there is to examine: theories of 
parallel universes and multiverses suggest the possibility of a future understanding to which our 
current knowledge can only begin to fathom.
73
  Though science has allowed us to progress 
beyond the medieval geocentric understanding of the world, it has also, to borrow from Chaucer, 
pointed to an infinitely vast wealth of knowledge that we, one day, “possibly might find.”  So 
while our knowledge base has changed, the need for the methods and processes, the experiential 
way of “learning to know” that Chaucer advocates in the Astrolabe, has not.  What Chaucer 
proposes through the “mediacion of this litel tretis,” then, is that while knowledge may never be 
perfect and language will always be flawed, one can, through a pragmatic, deliberate, and 
reflective approach, understand less imperfectly. 
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 For an alternate reading, see Edgar Laird, “Geoffrey Chaucer and Other Contributors to the Treatise on the 
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 Several critics consider the problem of Lewis as the main audience for the Astrolabe.  For discussions on a larger 
readership, see George Ovitt Jr., “History, Technical Style, and Chaucer’s Treatise on the Astrolabe,” Creativity and 
the Imagination: Case Studies from the Classical Age to the Twentieth Century.  Studies in Science and Culture, 
Vol. 3, Ed. Mark Amsler, Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1987, 34-58.  Also, Edgar Laird, “Astrolabes and 
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29
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Chaucer’s ‘Treatise on the Astrolabe’ as Translation,” Neuphilologische Mitteilunge 84 (1983): 192-200. 
 
30
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and suggests that later devices were created based on the illustrations in the early manuscripts.  For her complete 
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but the function of the illustrations was mainly practical.  That this applies to scientific treatises, in which figures 
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parts of the instrument or as a reminder of the procedures described in the text, and this function is often 
overlooked” (305). 
 
36
 Dd.3.53’s diagram is likewise partial, but it is labeled differently: it does not mark “the bordure,” but it identifies 
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54
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personal examples affect the success of the directions.  For her complete argument, see “‘I N’am But a Lewd 
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55
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as well.  See Rand Schmidt’s The Authorship of The Equatorie of the Planetis, esp. 155, and Skeat’s A Treatise on 
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56
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600-year-old Model for Humanizing Technical Documents”) argue that the “rhetorical technique of involving the 
 106 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
writer as participant engages the audience in the work at hand and strengthens the reader-writer relationship by 
making the exercise, in effect, a joint effort” (91).  While their interpretation of this situation is valid, Hager and 
Nelson do not consider the implications of the absence of the joint effort in later conclusions. 
 
60
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in copying cost Chaucer painful hours of correction” (85).   
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69
 For information on Alchabitius’ Introductorius ad magisterium judiciorum astrorum and a more detailed analysis 
of Chaucer’s use, see Edgar Laird, “Astrolabes and the Construction of Time in the Late Middle Ages.”  
 
70
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Stories.”  Host: Neal Conen.  Talk of the Nation.  National Public Radio.  Transcript.  27 December 2010. 
<http://www.npr.org/2010/12/27/132366223/npr-reporters-reflect-on-2010s-important-stories> 1 January 2011. 
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Chapter Three  
 
Chaucer’s Dialectic of Expectation: Thopas, Melibee, and the Benefits of Effective Listening 
 
 
 
As Prudence catalogues the various ways in which Melibee has erred in his solicitation of 
counsel, she charges him with misconstruing others’ words to his own end: “Ye han erred also, 
for ye han maked no division bitwixe youre conseillours…ne ye han nat knowe the wil of youre 
trewe freendes olde and wise, / but ye han cast alle hire wordes in an hochepot, and enclyned 
youre herte to the moore part and to the gretter nombre, and there been ye condescended” (VII 
1255-57).  Melibee should have, according to this criticism, considered the source of the 
information (true friend or feigned counselor), determined the “wil” or intentions of his old and 
wise friends, and then judged the advice based on these factors.  Instead, he creates a hodge-
podge of words that allows him to justify his desire for vengeance.  Melibee, in other words, 
does not actively listen, a choice which severely limits his potential both to understand the 
situation correctly and to respond to it rationally.  Melibee’s chosen assumption illustrates an 
issue that Chaucer addresses in the both the Tale of Melibee and the Tale of Sir Thopas.  Indeed, 
it is this problem of expectation that incites Harry Bailly’s anger at the Thopas, leads to 
Melibee’s initial rejection of wise counsel, and inspires Chaucer to offer a method of engaging 
wisely and deliberately with this system of unthinking expectations in the Melibee.   
Chaucer crafts his examination of this system into a practical exercise in which the reader 
may participate: by staging himself as a character of the Canterbury Tales—the pilgrim-narrator 
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of both the Tale of Sir Thopas and the Tale of Melibee—he invites his readers to confront their 
expectations about what “Chaucer” will deliver.1  The fact that this Thopas-Melibee union 
represents the only instance in the Canterbury Tales where a Tale is brought to an abrupt end and 
its speaker is invited to tell a new, different story suggests that, for Chaucer, there is something 
meaningful about the relationship between these two distinct works.
2
  Though their superficial 
differences are clear—their compositional forms, their subject matter, and their presentation in 
the manuscripts—I suggest that Chaucer connects these two Tales in order to deal, from different 
perspectives, with the problems inherent in unscrutinized expectations.  This is a lesson similar 
to that which Jill Mann reveals in her groundbreaking analysis of Chaucer’s use of sources in the 
General Prologue.  According to Mann, critical enthusiasm for the Prologue often results from 
“the few characters who provide focus for a critic’s particular interest, whether this is in their 
comic aspects, their psychological complexity, or the moral significance attached to them.”3  
Following this argument, such critics unwittingly impose limitations on their ability to 
understand the Prologue as a whole because of the expectations they place on their assessments 
of the characters.  My analysis of the Thopas-Melibee is comparable to Mann’s study of the 
Prologue.  I argue that in the relationship between the Thopas and the Melibee, Chaucer 
challenges the idea that forms—i.e. types of structure or schema—are the only determining 
factors of meaning, and that one’s expectations of form and unthinking reactions to those 
expectations limit the individual’s ability to judge the information communicated by and through 
those forms wisely.  Indeed, what Chaucer reveals in the Boece, the Retraction, and the 
Astrolabe underscores the fact that meaning can never be determined by one factor alone; 
instead, through his provocation of recursive assessment and “learning to know,” Chaucer 
highlights both the complexity of cognition and the methods that lead to productive learning 
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within that multifarious system.  By exposing the issue of expectation through his Canterbury 
character, Chaucer invites his readers to reconsider the preconceived notions that inform their 
understanding of his Tales, as well as the ways in which such notions are ultimately limiting.  
Through the Thopas-Melibee association, Chaucer presents his audience with an issue that 
impacts their capacity to understand rightly—locally in the Canterbury Tales and generally in 
real-world interactions—and proposes a method of engagement that opens the idea of form 
outward.  This method, offered through Melibee’s Prudence, models a conscious and specific 
process for both reading (of all “forms”) and reasoning that is as necessary to his modern readers 
as it was for his contemporary audience.   
Critical responses to the Melibee vary widely, but there are four distinct approaches that 
inform my argument.  For example, both Judith Ferster and Larry Scanlon locate the work 
among the fürstenspiegel or “mirror for princes” tradition and thus highlight the importance of its 
genre: these writings typically addressed a king or prince and intended to educate him about the 
virtues and duties of a ruler.
4
  Other scholars focus on the Tale’s moral implications.  Karla 
Taylor writes that “the ethical and social problem the Melibee treats is how to diffuse the 
violence of a powerful man, allegorically by fostering self-governance within Melibee’s 
wounded mind, and, more naturalistically, by reconciling Melibee with his enemies,” and Paul 
Ruggiers remarks, “As a serious piece, it must be taken as a guide-post of moral philosophy 
dealing with the correction of the intellect and the practical decisions affecting action in this 
life.”5  Yet another critical approach examines the role of gender in the tale.  Amanda Walling 
argues that “Melibee is concerned with the ways in which gender is refracted in language, and 
with how texts and their reiterations make visible both the gendered conditions of their 
production and the gendered social structures that shape how those texts are used.”6  Speaking 
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specifically about such social structures, Mari Pakkala-Weckstrom calls attention to the fact that 
“even the learned and eloquent Prudence needs to resort to role-play to attract her husband’s 
attention.”7  Jane Cowgill furthers our understanding of this gender dynamic by arguing 
persuasively that women could assume an advisory role provided that they first established their 
authority through the embodiment of their own advice.
8
  While my argument is in keeping with 
these first three perspectives, I contribute to this critical discussion through my emphasis on the 
relationship between the Thopas and the Melibee.  I argue that Chaucer carefully cultivates this 
relationship to draw his reader’s attention to the problematic, though natural, issue of 
expectation. 
The final line of inquiry that is important to my study considers how the forms of the 
Thopas and the Melibee relate to Chaucer-the-poet.  Richard Firth Green contends that “It is 
perhaps not over-fanciful to see in the two tales which Chaucer assigns himself within the 
Canterbury framework an expression of two contrasting aspects of the court author’s role.”9  Lee 
Patterson pushes this idea further and focuses on how the Thopas-Melibee defines Chaucer 
himself: these two tales “represent a further attempt on Chaucer’s part to define both the kind of 
writing that constitutes The Canterbury Tales and, more tellingly, the kind of person who wrote 
it.”10  Patterson interprets the Thopas-Melibee relationship as one that allows Chaucer to align 
his authorial identity with minstrelsy: “the juxtapositioning of the two tales, and the dramatic 
context in which they are located, should lead us to the conclusion that Chaucer is disowning not 
the childish frivolity of Sir Thopas but the pragmatic didacticism of Melibee, and that he is 
defining his authorial identity…in terms provided by the obsolete and disregarded tradition of 
minstrel performance.”11  Like Patterson, I find value in the relationship between the Thopas and 
the Melibee, but my analysis emphasizes what these two works teach the reader about himself 
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and the benefits to prudent reason.  Included in this consideration is my examination of how the 
lessons from the Melibee apply both to the Thopas and to Harry Bailly’s expectations about what 
the Thopas will be.  As I contend, both the Melibee’s position within the Canterbury collection 
and its form of prose encourage a moment of reflection; the affinity that Chaucer creates between 
these two Tales creates a natural starting point for such a reflection.   
My core argument in this chapter is that Chaucer illuminates the relationship between 
form and sentence in the Thopas and the Melibee in order to demonstrate the problems of 
unscrutinized predictions (i.e. those that the individual immediately accepts as absolutely valid) 
and to consider the complex nature of understanding.  I begin this examination by discussing the 
theoretical framework of form and expectation that shape these two Tales.  Next, I focus on the 
assumptions of the characters and the invited suppositions of the reader to illustrate the 
consequences of these self-created limitations for rational decision-making.  As part of this 
analysis, I consider the differences between the verse form of the Thopas and the prose form of 
the Melibee in order to analyze both their superficial differences and how those qualities impact 
initial interpretations.  Further, I argue that the examples Chaucer offers of emotional reaction in 
these works demonstrate not only another impediment to reason, but also indicate the incomplete 
nature of subconscious predictions.  I then turn to the Ellesmere and Hengwrt manuscripts in 
order to assess the correlation between the material text, each Tale’s respective genre, and 
Chaucer’s examination of expectation.  Finally, I draw attention to one of Chaucer’s chief 
concerns in the Melibee: that knowledge is limited by capacity, perspective, and availability, 
which thus demonstrates the need for counsel and then the need to assess all information, 
including advice, before choosing to accept to reject it.  As I argue in Chapter Two, Chaucer 
highlights the need for such assessment due to the fragmented nature of this realm in his 
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Astrolabe.  Through the Melibee, Chaucer suggests another method of dealing with such 
fragmentation productively.  To illuminate this point about the need for counsel and evaluation, I 
offer a comparison between the Melibee’s source, Renaud de Louens’ Livre de Mellibee et 
Prudence, and Chaucer’s version and then move into a discussion of semiotics and Melibee’s 
contract with the adversaries.  Overall, I suggest that because form is both a material and 
rhetorical structure for reasoning, Chaucer’s decision to link the Thopas and the Melibee offers 
his reader a moment in which to reflect about his own expectations of schema and to discover the 
benefits to gathering information, deliberating, and making rational choices, as opposed to 
reacting emotionally.   
“Form,” obviously, is a complex topic, and Christopher Cannon’s work on medieval 
theories of form illustrates the importance of its consideration.  Cannon argues that the 
relationship between form and content allows for the reader to determine a version of the 
originating thought (or thoughts) that govern the text.
12
  This idea of form, Cannon suggests, is 
“simultaneously a theory of literary making (a set of views about how thoughts become things),” 
and a “rigorous, practical interpretive tool” that “allows criticism to move from the most trivial 
of details to the most complex of ideas.”13 Cannon’s theory therefore asserts that there is a 
“necessary and constant relationship between a poet’s originating thought and the shapes in 
which it unfolded.”14  What I would like to suggest is that through the examples of Bailly and 
Melibee in these two works, Chaucer complicates the notion that his reader can discern his 
originating thought by the shape in which he unfolds it, to borrow from Cannon, by highlighting 
the influence of the reader’s own perspective as it informs his initial, and to some extent, his 
continual, understanding of Chaucer’s text.  As Ralph Hanna notes, “Chaucer is oppressively 
conscious of the way in which literature physically subsists and thereby enters culture.  And he 
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retains a fastidious hope that he can arrest that process, apparently down to the level of ensuring 
that words get written with the proper final –e’s.”15  Such concern demonstrates the extent to 
which, as an author, Chaucer tries to ensure a correct representation of his ideas. 
That the Melibee appears in the middle of a work that is, up to the point where “Chaucer” 
offers his “litel thyng in prose” (VII.937), entirely verse must be a part of this representation.  By 
including a composition in prose, Chaucer simultaneously calls upon his readers’ expectations of 
this form and challenges them to investigate the utility of those beliefs.   Helen Cooper’s study 
on prose romances in the Middle Ages illuminates the history of the prose form: “Prose had long 
been the dominant medium for historiography, and the composition of narrative in prose 
immediately suggested the historical.”16  If at its most basic level, “form” tells us what a thing is 
(though not the entirety of what it contains, as the infinity within the astrolabe demonstrates), 
then following Cooper’s argument, the prose form’s connection to history alludes to a stronger, 
real-world significance and application of its information than does verse.   Further, according to 
N.F. Blake, prose “allowed for length, a more leisurely development, a more involved style and 
the introduction of learned words.”17  In short, the prose form allows for a freedom of expression 
that verse cannot match: with prose, greater explanation is possible where it is needed; clarity 
can be more easily achieved through the use of doublets (as in the Melibee) or superfluous 
speech (as in the Astrolabe); the similarity between prose and common speech allows for better 
access to its content. 
Prose can also be poetic.  While the immediate identifiers of poetic expression are rhyme 
and metre, the historical conception of poetry, as a genre, focuses on the potential of language, as 
opposed to its aesthetic structure.  From Aristotle’s suggestion that poetry occurs independent of 
form to Thomas Aquinas’ delineation between secular and Scriptural poetic expression, a 
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common concern among these philosophers deals with what poetic speech can accomplish.  As 
Chaucer’s work contributes to this historical conversation, it is instructive to consider these 
points briefly.  For Aristotle, the designation of “poetry” based solely on rhyme scheme thwarts 
the inherent capacity of true poetic speech: “it is the way with people to tack on ‘poet’ to the 
name of a metre, and talk of elegiac-poets and epic-poets, thinking that they call them poets not 
by reason of the imitative nature of their work, but indiscriminately by reason of the metre they 
write in.”18  Aristotle’s argument, ultimately, is that poetry is distinguished from different types 
of writing because the essence of poetry deals with statements of universals: he explains, “By a 
universal statement I mean one as to what such or such a kind of man will probably or 
necessarily say or do—which is the aim of poetry.”19  In other words, there is an intrinsic quality 
to poetry that elevates the mind to a consideration of larger ideas; the distinction between poetry 
and other forms of writing occurs not by virtue of form, then, but rather in what each message 
communicates.  Aquinas writes that poetic speech, while pleasing in secular writing, is an 
essential component of Scripture: “Poetry makes use of metaphors to produce a representation, 
for it is natural to man to be pleased with representations. But sacred doctrine makes use of 
metaphors as both necessary and useful.”20  Aquinas’ understanding of the potential of metaphor 
to create connections between the esoteric and the material in order for laymen to understand 
religious Truth suggests that, like Aristotle, he believes that poetry invites a consideration of 
larger ideas.  While Chaucer may not have studied these concepts directly, his work is suggestive 
of his interest in creating poetry that makes, to borrow from Aristotle, a universal statement.  
Indeed, the superficial rhyme of the Thopas encourages a reflection about what “poetry” is, and 
the prose of the Melibee invites a consideration about such universal concepts as gender, truth, 
and the methods of sound judgment.  Simply put, through his Thopas-Melibee, Chaucer 
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challenges his audience’s expectations of compositional form by creating poetry in both verse 
and prose. 
Chaucer’s consideration of predictions based on form invites a further reflection: that 
particular forms impose restrictions on their accompanying content, as well as on their textual 
orientation in manuscripts.  Writing about the form of annals and chronicles, Sarah Foot remarks 
that this structure “is not an impediment to comprehension but is a central element in conferring 
meaning on their content.  If sets of annals are read entire, rather than as random assortments of 
variously collected (and unedited) notes, they convey significant narratives.”21  Foot’s caveat—
that one can distinguish narrative in what might otherwise read as a miscellany of observations 
only through reading the annals in their entirety—highlights the importance of recognizing the 
relationship between the form and the totality of its contents, including manuscript orientation, 
before determining significance.  Indeed, as Judith Butler argues, the relationship between form 
and content is indivisible: “If matter never appears without its schema [i.e., its ‘form, shape, 
figure, appearance, dress, gesture, figure of a syllogism, and grammatical form’], that means that 
it only appears under a certain grammatical form and that the principle of its recognizability, its 
characteristic gesture or usual dress, is indissoluble from what constitutes its matter.”22  
Likewise, the relationships between forms and sentence in the Thopas and Melibee are 
inextricably entwined; the meanings of these relationships, however, are influenced by the 
unthinking demands that the characters or the reader place on the schema.  This point bears 
repeating.  Form and content together offer more information and thus a greater chance for 
comprehension, but another factor must be considered along with these elements: the influence 
of the reader’s expectations about form. 
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From a cognitive perspective, expectations are a fundamental aspect of our daily 
interactions.  M. A. K. Halliday notes that in modern linguistic theory, predictions are “the most 
important phenomenon in human communication.  We make predictions—not consciously, of 
course; in general, the process is below the level of awareness—about what the other person is 
going to say next; and that’s how we understand what he or she does say.”23  George Lakoff and 
Mark Johnson’s more recent work on the “cognitive unconscious” reveals exactly how 
complicated this system of prediction is: “Our unconscious conceptual system functions like a 
‘hidden hand’ that shapes how we conceptualize all aspects of our experience.  This hidden 
hand…shapes how we automatically and unconsciously comprehend what we experience.”24  Put 
another way, meaning is constrained not only by form, but also by the unwitting expectations 
that an individual exerts on that form.  Stephen Bax’s study, Discourse and Genre, develops this 
concept.  He writes, “Our mental schemas…set up expectations which help us to predict what we 
will find in any new situation, and scripts help us to predict what will happen next.  Both types of 
conceptual structure help us to function and cooperate effectively in the real world, and both also 
impact our understanding and construction of texts.”25  With both Harry Bailly’s rejection of the 
Thopas and Melibee’s initial dismissal of Prudence’s counsel, Chaucer proffers examples similar 
to these modern theories: both characters anticipate, in each case wrongly, the content based on 
the form through which it is given.  Though modern scholars instruct us that such predictions 
take place at a subconscious level, Chaucer theorizes that wayward interpretations result from the 
assumption that such predictions provide complete information.  By extending this idea to 
include written modes of communication, Chaucer invites his readers to consider the 
expectations that both they and the Canterbury pilgrims place on genre, those that the readers 
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bring to the manuscript, and the assumptions about bodily forms that Chaucer exposes through 
Harry Bailly and Melibee.   
Following Lakoff and Johnson, the complexity of the association between structure, 
prediction, and understanding stresses the need to work within that system as a whole, instead of 
trying to separate one factor from the others: they write, “our categories are formed through our 
embodiment.  What that means is that the categories we form are part of our experience!  They 
are the structures that differentiate aspects of our experience into discernible kinds.  
Categorization is thus not a purely intellectual matter, occurring after the fact of experience.”26  
Thus, experience directly affects, and is affected by, classification, which in turn impacts the 
individual’s ability to understand a given data-set.  In their relation to the Thopas-Melibee, these 
theories underscore the intricacy of expectation.  Foot’s notion of totality demands, I think, the 
consideration not only of the forms that real individuals and fictitious characters see, but also any 
predictions that limit the individual’s capacity to observe that totality.  Butler’s reading of the 
bounded nature of schema and content demonstrates the need to evaluate the entirety of available 
information.  Lakoff and Johnson’s revelation about the mind’s use of categories stresses the 
importance of Chaucer’s consideration of such issues in the Thopas-Melibee.  More specifically, 
by drawing our attention to the consequences of both Bailly and Melibee’s flawed predictions, 
Chaucer suggests that the individual may broaden his perspective, and thus increase his 
awareness, by acknowledging the limitations of his own understanding.    
Along with form of composition (the Thopas is, in form, poetic; the Melibee prosaic), 
there are two different, though complementary, concerns about form raised by the Thopas-
Melibee: manuscript form and bodily form.
27
  A study of manuscript form, which will be 
discussed later in the chapter, examines the orientation of these works in the manuscripts, what 
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their arrangements communicate about the texts, and what predictions might be encouraged 
through their appearance.  To prompt a reflection about bodily form, Chaucer includes reactions 
to the physical bodies of both his Canterbury pilgrim and Melibee’s Prudence.  As part of his 
larger consideration of the expectations that an individual places on a particular form, Chaucer 
includes assumptions about bodies and gender.  As Carolyn Dinshaw explains in her landmark 
study of the role of the body in Chaucer’s work, “A defining characteristic of the female, in both 
classical and Christian exegetical traditions, is her corporeality, her association with matter and 
the physical body as opposed to the male’s association with form and soul.”28  In applying this 
definition to language, Dinshaw argues that “If the first Adam is associated with the spirit of an 
utterance, Eve is associated with its letter, divided from intent or spirit, fragmentary, limited, and 
unstable.”29 Following this reading, Eve, and by extension the feminine, is thus figured as a lapse 
in true signification that requires masculine intervention.  Though Dinshaw’s analysis suggests a 
general trend in medieval attitudes about gender, I posit that Chaucer’s Thopas-Melibee 
demonstrates an exception to this rule.  Indeed, these works criticize both Bailly and Melibee’s 
prescriptive reactions to the bodies they encounter and suggest that each of these characters 
fashions his response in a way that benefits the way he wants to view the situation.  Jane Cowgill 
notes the lengths to which Prudence must go to overcome her gender: “The fictional 
opportunities offered Prudence in the Melibee suggest that woman must prove her worthiness not 
only by being wise and virtuous, but also by embodying the very values which she hopes to 
persuade her male opponent to accept.”30  The role of the body and gendered forms in these two 
works, I argue, underscores Chaucer’s overarching concern with expectation, while at the same 
time challenging his audience to confront their own easy assumptions about the significance of 
gendered bodies.   
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The way these particular structures constrain and, in some ways, invite predictions of 
content is analogous to the medieval understanding of matter and form.  Notably, in his 
discussion about the soul, Aristotle asserts that “matter is potentiality, form, actuality.”31  If we 
consider a form’s sentence as comparable to its matter, then the compositional, textual, or bodily 
form would be seen as an “actual” or concrete entity, whereas the sentence communicated 
through that form is “potential” to the degree that the receiver correctly understands it.32  In the 
Thopas-Melibee, he acknowledges his reader’s role in determining the significance of his work, 
while at the same time instigating the reader’s examination of how well he controls his own 
process of assessment.  Thus, I propose that Chaucer’s examination of form calls attention to the 
perspectival reactions to different structures (compositional, manuscript, and bodily) because any 
meaningful consideration of “form” must first acknowledge and work through the limitations 
that an individual necessarily, and often unthinkingly, places on those forms.  These two works 
together offer the reader the opportunity to reflect upon the different variables that contribute to 
right understanding and to recognize the folly in expecting one factor alone to communicate the 
whole.  In other words, these two works together offer an opportunity for the reader to exercise 
the process of recursive assessment from the Boece and later the Retraction and the 
acknowledgement of fractional understanding from the Astrolabe.  The Thopas-Melibee, then, 
becomes an object lesson in the utility of conscientious, rational deliberation in the determination 
of truth.  
Chaucer illustrates the problem of such unthinking expectations with the Host.  When the 
Prioress concludes her tale of hasty, emotionally-blinded disaster, Harry Bailly turns to the 
pilgrim “Chaucer” and attempts to define, and thus to understand, this character based solely on 
what he sees: the Host “at erst” looks “upon” the pilgrim and asks, “What man artow?” (VII.694, 
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695).  While this question denotes Bailly’s confusion as to how to classify this particular pilgrim, 
the heart of the query is based on his desire to understand what, and by extension who, this 
character is.
33
  Instead of waiting for a response, Bailly attempts to answer his own question by 
relying only on his limited perception; that is, the Host believes that “Chaucer’s” appearance 
holds the answer.  By looking only to this type of schema, Bailly limits his own capacity to find 
the information he seeks.  Though he attempts to define “Chaucer” by assigning different 
labels—“This were a popet” (701); “He semeth elvyssh” (703)—Bailly gets no closer to 
identifying exactly what he is looking at.  When the pilgrim agrees to tell his tale, the Host 
determines, based solely on the pilgrim’s “cheere,” that the group will hear “Som deyntee thyng” 
(711).  These attempts to assign meaning quickly and concretely severely limit Bailly’s potential 
to discover what “Chaucer” is: it remains unclear whether or not Bailly’s ambiguous statements 
are apparent even to him, and his unfounded assessment of what the tale will offer denies his 
potential to profit from its telling.  In fact, it is this assumption-based approach to knowledge that 
leads to his angry interruption of the Thopas:  
“Namoore of this, for Goddes dignitee, 
  …for thou makest me 
So wery of thy verray lewednesse 
That, also wisly God my soule blesse, 
Myne eres aken of thy drasty speche.” (919-23) 
Despite the fact that the pilgrim informs the group that his tale is “of a rym I lerned longe 
agoon,” the Host dismisses this statement in favor of his own baseless assessment: “Ye, that is 
good…now shul we heere / Som deyntee thyng, me thynketh by his cheere.”  Instead of 
providing a “deyntee” poem, Chaucer gives his pilgrim namesake a four-beat couplet, three-beat 
 122 
 
line rhyme scheme.  This choice draws attention to the subject of schema, in this case, verse 
form, the unsupported expectations which can result from predictions about form, and the 
subsequent problems that such unscrutinized presumptions can cause.   
When Harry Bailly declares that the Thopas is “nat worth a toord,” he bases his 
interpretation on the difference between what he expects to hear—“Som deyntee thyng”—and 
what he believes “Chaucer” provides—“rym dogerel.”  His analysis, thus, is driven by his own 
expectations.  Though he doesn’t recognize the flaw in his own process of assessment, Bailly 
certainly reacts to the experience of the rhyme’s vocalization.  Indeed, he calls attention to the 
style of composition four times within the span of nine lines: “Now swich a rym the devel I 
biteche!” (924); “This may wel be rym dogerel” (925); “Thy drasty rymyng is nat worth a 
toord!” (930); and “Sire, at o word, thou shalt no lenger ryme” (932).  Bailly’s repetition of 
“rhyme,” coupled with his vehement irritation with the poem, is further evidence that the 
meaning he assigns to the vague “Som deyntee thyng” differs from what the pilgrim, in fact, 
delivers.  Chaucer’s repeated use of the term “rhyme” in this section serves a different purpose: 
by drawing attention to the declared subject of the Thopas—it is “of,” or about, rhyme—he 
offers readers the opportunity to participate in the long-established conversation about the 
purpose of poetic speech by confronting, initially, their own expectations of what such speech is.  
What does it look like?  What does it sound like?  Does it rhyme?  While Bailly’s response 
implies his answers to these questions, it also highlights the disjunction between his erroneous, 
and thoughtless, prediction about the tale’s content and what “Chaucer” delivers.  Through this 
judgment, moreover, Chaucer presents his audience with an occasion to observe Bailly’s 
emotional reaction to his own miscalculation, which in turn both emphasizes the problem of the 
unconscious prediction and the need to make such responses conscious and considered.  Similar 
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to Bailly’s self-imposed restriction to understanding who and what “Chaucer” is, his expectation 
that he has predicted the content correctly based on schema alone denies his ability to find 
meaning in the Thopas.   
Chaucer crafts an opportunity for his audience to consider their own expectations about 
form: the poetic surface of the Thopas insists upon the reader’s assessment of poetry as a 
category.  Similar to the other verse Tales, it follows a particular format of meter and rhyme 
scheme, save for the occasional bob-lines, and its composition is purposefully aesthetic.  But if 
we accept Bailly’s assessment, it falls short of poetry’s purpose—to inspire the minds of its 
audience to a consideration of larger ideas.
34
  Indeed, as a mélange of various sources and styles, 
the arrangement of the Thopas does seem to favor the creation of poetic design over poetic 
substance.
35
  In this way, scholars who argue that this work is “devoid of sentence” are partially 
correct; because Bailly interrupts the poem, we cannot know what the overt sentence might have 
been.
36
  I would like to suggest a different approach: instead of looking only to the Tale of 
Thopas, I propose an examination of the way in which Chaucer frames the Thopas with its 
Prologue and Bailly’s later interruption.  Inasmuch as “Chaucer” tells his audience that the tale is 
about a rhyme, its episodic narrative is secondary to the work’s stated purpose.  Bailly’s inability 
to understand this design stems from his earlier dismissal of the information that the pilgrim 
provides.  Chaucer’s frame, then, elevates the Thopas sequence from “rym dogerel” to a work 
that invites a larger exploration of one’s personal reactions to and expectations of different 
forms.
37
  So while Bailly misses a chance to learn from “Chaucer’s” poem, the larger, universal 
statement that Chaucer affords is yet open for analysis: the reader can learn from the Host’s 
reaction and reflect on the implications of such unthinking responses.   
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The physical layout of the Thopas in the early manuscripts of Chaucer’s Tales presents 
the reader with another schema, this time of appearance: each couplet is joined by an end-
bracket; the three-beat line extends from the couplet-bracket; the three-beat lines are themselves 
joined by brackets, off of which appear the occasional bob-lines.
38
  This structure overwhelms 
the reader and the page.  While the Prologue to the Thopas requires between four and five inches 
of horizontal page space in the Ellesmere, the layout of the tale itself requires roughly eight 
inches of the approximate 11.25” of possible horizontal space.  With the bob-line additions, this 
requirement expands to nearly 9.5” (see Figure 3.1).39   
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Figure 3.1—MS. Ellesmere, 152r 
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Chaucer’s medieval audience would have been familiar with the graphic tail-rhyme schematic, as 
Rhiannon Purdie points out: “it was regularly employed by copyists of Anglo-Norman tail-rhyme 
poems in manuscripts dating from the end of the twelfth century into the fourteenth century.  It 
was inherited by the scribes of Middle English tail-rhyme verse.”40  Even while his 
contemporary readers would have been accustomed to this visual apparatus, Chaucer’s bob-line 
additions intensify an already complicated structure.  The text in Figure 3.1 reads, 
Into his sadel he clamb anon, 
And priketh over stile and stoon 
An elf-queene for t’espye, 
Til he so longe hath riden and goon 
That he foond, in a pryve woon, 
The contree of Fairye 
   So wilde; 
For in that contree was ther noon 
That to him durste ride or goon, 
Neither wyf ne childe (VII.979-806) 
The inclusion of the bob-line “So wilde” confounds an already elaborate arrangement: in the 
Ellesmere, Adam Pinkhurst, the scribe of both the Ellesmere and the Hengwrt, creates a new 
series of brackets which extend from the second set in order to accommodate the bob; in the 
Hengwrt, he indicates the separation of the bob-line with two forward slashes (“//”) (see Figure 
3.2).  Maintaining this visual form becomes so difficult, in fact, that even Pinkhurst can’t 
produce it flawlessly: in both the Ellesmere and the Hengwrt, he drops “That to him durste ride 
or goon” (805).41  Due to this absence in the Ellesmere, Pinkhurst foregoes the bracket and 
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simply draws a straight line from “For in that contree was ther noon” to “neither wyf ne childe” 
in order to join “childe” with the bob-line “so wilde” (Figure 3.1).  In Hengwrt, he abandons the 
graphic tail-rhyme entirely for the two lines which follow this particular bob-line (“so wilde”) 
and then picks it up again once the rhyme scheme normalizes (Figures 3.2 and 3.3).  These two 
moments indicate that the structure of the Thopas is such that a professional scribe not only had 
difficulty managing it, but that he was dissatisfied with his first attempt in the Hengwrt and thus 
tried a new approach in the Ellesmere.  
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Figure 3.2—MS. Hengwrt, 214r 
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Figure 3.3—MS. Hengwrt, 214v 
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Bailly’s reason for protesting the Thopas becomes both visually apparent to readers of 
these manuscripts and aurally obvious to listening members of a public reading: the reader 
confronts the specific and demanding challenges presented by the graphic tail-rhyme schematic; 
the listener contends with the complications that such schema present.  Purdie notes that the 
structure of this tale “would keep [readers] constantly aware of the process of navigating through 
it, thus interfering with their imaginative submersion in the fiction of the tale-telling contest or 
the tale itself.”42  Indeed, if Chaucer uses the Thopas and its frame in order to examine the issue 
of form and the frustrations inherent in presumptions based on that form, as I argue, then the 
aesthetic construction of this work in the manuscripts underscores these issues by creating an 
experience wherein a structure is separated, to the degree possible, from its content.  The point, 
of course, is to suggest that the one cannot be divorced from the other—they are two components 
of the same entity.  Following Purdie, reading Thopas in the manuscripts forces the reader to pay 
less attention to the story and more attention to its aesthetic arrangement.  The physical 
orientation of this text in the manuscripts, then, creates an opportunity for the audience to 
experience the distraction of form and the difficulty of finding meaning when that form is 
divided from its sentence.  By the time Bailly interrupts the tale, the reader has traversed three 
full pages of graphic tail-rhyme, and one imagines that his eyes ache as much as do Bailly’s 
fictitious ears.   
The Host’s interruption of the Thopas instigates a change in style: after the simplified, 
though visually complicated, graphic tail-rhyme scheme, Chaucer introduces iambic pentameter 
couplets.  In the manuscripts, these couplets require slightly more horizontal page space than the 
rhyming couplets of the Thopas, which not only highlights the visual distinctiveness of the 
rhyme doggerel, but also reminds the reader of its excesses.  In the Ellesmere, the Melibee’s 
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prose requires roughly 6.5 inches of horizontal space, and a portrait of the pilgrim “Chaucer” 
appears with the text (see Figure 3.4).   
 
Figure 3.4—MS. Ellesmere, 153v 
 132 
 
That this portrait, with its left index finger pointing to “Melibee” accompanies the Melibee 
instead of the Thopas suggests the scribe’s belief in Melibee’s greater significance.  Indeed, 
“Chaucer’s” hand seems to mimic the Nota Bene hands commonly used in manuscripts to draw 
the reader’s attention to something particularly important.  While the Hengwrt includes no 
pilgrim portraits, the Melibee’s layout is roughly equivalent, requiring 5.19” of its available 
8.25” of horizontal space (see Figure 3.5).43   
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   Figure 3.5—MS. Hengwrt 216r  
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Though the Melibee consumes more physical space on the page in both manuscripts, due to its 
horizontal layout and its lack of stanzaic breaks, its appearance is visually less demanding: to 
navigate this tale, the reader need only follow the common linear path.  Further, both the 
Ellesmere and the Hengwrt include the names of authorities cited in the text (including Melibee 
and Prudence), next to the line where the reference occurs.  These marginal signposts are specific 
to a readership and serve to facilitate engagement with the text.  In the transition from the 
complicated schematic of the graphic tail-rhyme to iambic pentameter to prose, Chaucer 
continues to challenge his reader’s predictions about schema; here, in the form of prose. 
As mentioned above, the prose form suggested a sense of historicity while allowing the 
writer more freedom in his compositional choices.  In appearance and in accessibility, the prose 
form simulates every-day communication and thus opens its content to a vaster audience and 
permits greater clarity.  While the Melibee’s prose form, in itself, is not particularly striking 
given its sentence, its placement at the center of the Canterbury Tales is.  Paul G. Ruggiers notes 
that the Melibee “has a singular import for a whole range of meaning and structure of the tales.  
Chaucer to be sure does not tie in its special meaning in any overt way, nor does he do so with 
the Parson’s Tale; rather, he allows the Parson’s Tale and the Melibeus to stand as the great 
pauses for definition with regard to the rest of the structure.”44 (88).  Ruggiers has a point: when 
the Host turns to “Chaucer,” the reader of the Canterbury collection has already encountered a 
series of issues inspired by or communicated through the pilgrims, and I submit that many of 
these problems result from erroneous expectations.  The Reeve, for example, expects that the 
Miller intends his story as a direct, personal affront and thereby misses the moral (not to mention 
the connection between the Miller’s Tale and that of the Knight).  The Host labels the Parson a 
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Lollard simply because the latter chastises him for swearing.  The Friar assumes that his 
assertion of superiority over the Summoner will be accepted by his audience: “Pardee, ye may 
wel knowe by the name / That of a somonour may no good be sayd” (III.1280-81).  The Prioress 
believes that no one will reject her anti-Semitism.  When the Host turns from the Prioress to 
“Chaucer,” his initial query—“What man artow?” (VII.695)—suggests that he is trying to 
establish a frame through which to anticipate “Chaucer’s” character.  Thus begins the Thopas-
Melibee’s meditation about expectation and the benefits of examining such assumptions through 
recursive analysis.  By moving from verse to prose during this meditative moment, Chaucer 
draws upon the benefits of the prose form while simultaneously asking his audience to examine 
their presuppositions about this form.  Further, the qualities of the prose form evoke the 
meditation that the Thopas-Melibee requires through its expansive, expository structure.  The 
Melibee’s prose thereby slows the reader’s progression through the text and invites him to reflect 
not only upon the sentence of the Melibee but also upon how these teachings impact his initial 
responses to the earlier Tales. 
When “Chaucer” accepts Bailly’s invitation to “telle in prose somewhat, at the leeste, / In 
which ther  be som murthe or som doctryne” (934-35), he frames the Melibee as “a moral tale 
vertuous, / Al be it told somtyme in sondry wyse / Of sondry folk, as I shal yow devyse” (940-
42).  That is, the story he chooses is moral and virtuous, characteristics which persist through 
different iterations by diverse speakers.  By framing his Tale in this way, “Chaucer” focuses his 
audience’s predictions about the ensuing story by proclaiming its virtues; while the responsibility 
for determining those virtues remains with his audience, the idea of benefit lessens the possibility 
of outright dismissal based on different schema.  Chaucer reinforces this idea of distinct 
“tellings” through his pilgrim-namesake’s statement, “as I shal yow devyse.”  The MED lists “to 
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design or plan (sth.),” “To form (sth.), fashion, shape, or construct; portray (sth.),” or “To tell 
(sth.), say, relate” as possible meanings for “devisen.”  By establishing the pilgrim as the deviser 
and not simply a speaker, Chaucer fashions the Melibee as a tale with which the audience may be 
familiar but that is told in a different way by someone new.  This point that information may be 
communicated in different ways without affecting the message is so important, in fact, that 
“Chaucer” mentions the potentiality four times: 
But nathelees hir sentence is al sooth, 
And alle acorden as in hire sentence, 
……………………………………. 
And though I nat the same wordes seye 
As ye han herd, yet to yow alle I preye 
Blameth me nat; for, as in my sentence,  
Shul ye nowher fynden difference 
Fro the sentence of this tretys lyte 
After the which this murye tale I write. (946-64)
45
  
Though subtle, “Chaucer” suggests that diversity (in both speaker and rendering) can produce 
“oon sentence,” an idea that he substantiates through the example of the Synoptic Gospels (951).  
The idea, in effect, is that all roads lead to Rome.  In borrowing from the Boethian ideal that the 
end of all is the Good, Chaucer implies that there is a similar Good in analogous literary works.   
As a method of curtailing unconscious predictions of content by his pilgrim companions, 
the significance of “Chaucer’s” desire to prepare his audience to deal with the probable 
variations of his version cannot be overestimated.  By calling attention to the differences 
between speakers and renderings of the story, and yet asserting that the sentence does not vary, 
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“Chaucer” reminds both fictional and physical audience members that the appearance of the 
speaker and the genre of speech are not the only indicators of meaning.  Indeed, in the Melibee, 
Chaucer pushes the boundaries of prose beyond linear argumentation and into the realm of poetic 
expression.  Eleanor Johnson’s study of Boethius’ use of prose and metre in his Consolation of 
Philosophy helps to illuminate this point.  She cautions that while “Boethius makes prose the 
form of dialogic argumentation and logic, and meter the form of song,” these forms are not rigid: 
“Part of the Consolation’s goal is to help the character Boethius to appreciate the particular 
aesthetic ‘sense’ of the prose passages, and to understand that the metra, like the prosae, can 
bear serious cognitive content, in addition to providing sensual pleasure and affective 
bolstering.”46  I argue that through the Thopas-Melibee, Chaucer similarly serves his reader: 
understanding comes from considering both schema and content, apart from resolute predictions 
about what the content should be. 
As I have been arguing, Chaucer introduces the issue of form and the complications 
which result from ill-informed judgments in the Prologue to the Thopas: Harry Bailly expects the 
pilgrim-narrator to produce “Som deyntee thyng” based on how the narrator appears instead of 
on what he says.  Chaucer’s inclusion of Bailly’s expectation, along with the unthinking 
dismissal of pertinent information and the angry interruption of the tale stress that the Host’s 
reaction is the result of his own misconceptions.  Similarly, one of the core issues in this “litel 
thyng in prose” is that Melibee errs in his approach to his situation: he permits his emotions to 
govern his response and uses Prudence’s gender to dismiss her sage advice.  Given that he comes 
to accept the profit of her counsel, his initial censure of her words stems from an untutored 
rejection of her schema, her gendered form.  Like the Host, Melibee misdeems the issue because 
he chooses to misunderstand it.  In this way, the Melibee is an extension of the problem of form 
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that begins in the Prologue to the Thopas.  The relationship that Chaucer creates between these 
two works provides examples of reactions based on misconceptions that result from irrational 
expectations of a given situation: Bailly’s willful presumption results in his angry rejection of the 
Thopas, while Melibee’s visceral response, if unchecked, would have led to war. Through these 
examples, Chaucer challenges his readers to evaluate the ways in which their own irrational 
expectations lead to needless complications and futile actions.   
Unlike the collection of sources, tropes, and motifs that comprise the Thopas, Chaucer’s 
main source for the Melibee is Renaud de Louens’ Le Livre de Mellibee et Prudence, which itself 
is a rendition of Albertanus of Brescia’s Liber Consolationis et Consilii.47  Albertanus composed 
his text in prose in 1246, and Lee Patterson describes this work as “above all a piece of 
pedagogy, and one directed specifically to youth.  Addressed to his youngest son, its narrative 
recounts the dangers faced by a juvenis who ignores the good advice proffered by the men called 
in Chaucer’s version ‘thise olde wise.’”48  In 1337, Renaud translated Albertanus’ Latin version 
into French, and although he maintained its original prose form, he made significant changes to 
the character of Prudence.  According to William Askins, the “political and intellectual 
considerations are dropped or muted and the general effect is to domesticate Prudence, to present 
her as someone concerned primarily with how her husband and his circle of advisors think.”49  
Recently, Dominick Grace’s compelling study argues that Chaucer made changes, as well.50  
Noting that Chaucer’s Prudence “is affected by what has happened and by her husband’s 
reaction,” Grace argues that “The emphasis on words, on answering the perceived desires of the 
lord, and on the difference between such words and truth, are all Chaucer’s modifications of 
Prudence’s argument.”51  Further, Grace contends that Chaucer’s version “modifies and expands 
Prudence’s conclusions about how Melibee has judged his counsel” and establishes “the idea that 
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Melibee himself is at fault, both in his previous relations with his enemies and in his plans for 
vengeance on them.”52  Ultimately, Grace asserts that Chaucer’s changes challenge his readers to 
interpret the tale themselves, instead of relying on guides within the text.  The underlying 
sentence in each of these versions remains the same: in order to judge a situation wisely, one 
must eschew emotion, deliberate, and seek counsel.
53
  The possibility that the same message may 
be communicated in different ways by different speakers contributes to Chaucer’s larger 
examination of form.  While the Thopas provokes a consideration of Bailly’s, and by extension 
the audience’s, expectations of what a “rhyme” should offer, in the link between the Thopas and 
the Melibee, Chaucer extends that examination to include not only forms of speech, but forms of 
speakers as well.  The ways in which Chaucer changes the characters of Melibee and Prudence in 
the tale proper challenges the audience, fictive and actual alike, both to confront Melibee’s 
irrational dismissal of Prudence’s guidance, as well as to consider their own expectations of the 
potential of women’s ability to provide wise counsel.   
Whereas some scholars believe that Prudence has to overcome obstacles because of her 
gender, that, in fact, she has to play the role of the medieval woman in order to gain Melibee’s 
attention, the issue that Chaucer highlights is Melibee’s willful emotionality.54  Favoring the 
reckless and hasty encouragement of the youth—“right so as whil that iren is hoot men sholden 
smyte, right so men sholde wreken hir wronges whil they been fresshe and newe” (VII.1036)—
Melibee rejects the request of the “wise men” for time to deliberate.  When Prudence intervenes 
to prevent her husband’s proposed action and likewise suggests that a proper response requires 
time for consideration, Melibee cites four reasons as to why he will not heed her advice: he will 
look like a fool; women are wicked; it will appear as though she has maistrie; accepting her 
counsel would require secrecy.
55
  Though Melibee uses Prudence’s gender to support his 
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thoughtless rejection of her words, each of his reasons deals primarily with the way others will 
perceive him; her gendered schema, then, is less the core issue and more an excuse by which to 
fulfill his impulsive desires.  If we examine this situation with respect to my earlier suggestion 
that schema and content are analogous to form and matter, then Melibee’s rejection of Prudence 
here indicates his participation in a historical narrative about the relationship between physical 
bodies and metaphysical content.  As Judith Butler writes, “it is clear from the start that matter 
has a history (indeed, more than one) and that the history of matter is in part determined by the 
negotiation of sexual difference.”56  Though Melibee draws his four reasons from authoritative, 
historical sources, his reliance upon the prescribed method of restricting the gendered, female 
form weakens his argument because these reasons do not apply to his rejection of the wise men’s 
call for deliberation.
57
  To follow Butler, “To call a presupposition into question is not the same 
as doing away with it; rather, it is to free it from its metaphysical lodgings in order to understand 
what political interests were secured in and by that metaphysical placing, and thereby to permit 
the term to occupy and to serve very different political aims.”58  By calling our attention to 
Melibee’s inadequate and presupposed reasons, I argue, Chaucer invites us to consider both the 
utility of Melibee’s participation in this historical narrative and the validity of such “certain” 
presumptions about gendered forms.   
Melibee’s desire to war with his adversaries highlights another presupposition: he 
believes that his understanding of the situation is complete.  Much like the Host’s hasty and 
witless prediction about the Thopas, Melibee’s conviction denies any potential to make a 
reasonable decision: his initial refusal to consider perspectives that differ from his own 
underscores his assumption that his grasp of the situation is entirely correct.  When the wise men 
and Prudence both advocate a carefully considered response to the situation, one governed 
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foremost by a determination of the most productive resolution, they suggest not only that 
Melibee’s understanding is incomplete, but also that any attempt to increase one’s knowledge-
base requires three factors: an awareness of the limitations of knowledge; a desire to supplement 
one’s understanding by seeking outside perspectives, in the case, counsel; and an ability to 
consider the validity of those perspectives.  To this end, the wise men do not reject Melibee’s 
desire for vengeance, but rather “axen leyser and espace to have deliberacion in this cas to deme” 
(1029).
 
 Asking for time and space to deliberate implies that the wise men will engage in this 
type of rational process: by considering other viewpoints and the consequences of different 
actions, the assembly can determine the most productive response.  As the “wise advocate” 
explains, “the commune proverbe seith thus: ‘He that soone deemeth, soone shal repente.’ / And 
eek men seyn that thilke juge is wys that soone understondeth a matiere and juggeth by leyser” 
(1030-31).  The importance of this approach to a well-reasoned and informed analysis is 
suggested by Prudence’s reiteration: “as ye herde her biforn, the commune proverbe is this, that 
‘he that soone deemeth, soone repenteth’” (1135).59  What this aphorism suggests is that rash 
action leads to unforeseen consequences for which the actor is responsible.  In other words, 
theirs is first a desire to consider the optimum result, followed by a consideration of how to 
produce such an end.  Writing about the process of advice-seeking from an analytical standpoint, 
Thomas Aquinas also advocates this approach to problem solving: he contends, “the principle in 
the inquiry of counsel is the end, which precedes indeed in intention, but comes afterwards into 
execution…beginning that is to say, from that which is intended in the future, and continuing 
until it arrives at that which is to be done at once.”60  The explicit process, stated first by the wise 
men and then repeated by Prudence, emphasizes the importance not only of checking emotional 
responses—of being “prudent”—but also of recognizing the self-imposed limitations that such 
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unrestrained responses invite.  In this way, prudent reason stems from a conscious effort to 
examine one’s own motives, to reduce the power of thoughtless reactions (or predictions), and to 
participate, deliberately and authoritatively, in the acquisition and use of knowledge.  
 The Melibee is not the only work in the Canterbury Tales during which Chaucer explores 
the precarious nature of rash judgments.  In the Physician’s Tale, for instance, Virginius learns of 
the corrupt judge Apius’ ploy to deflower his daughter.  Concluding that “Ther been two weyes, 
outher deeth or shame,” Virginius smites off her head (VI.214).  There were, of course, other 
means of recourse, as the coterminous revolt against Apius demonstrates; the emotionally ridden 
father, however, is unable in that moment to acknowledge alternative possibilities, and Virginia 
dies as a result.  In the Merchant’s Tale, January’s desire to marry hastily leaves little room for 
consideration; indeed, he refuses Justinus’ request for “leyser for t’enquere” (IV.1543) while 
eagerly accepting the sycophantic encouragement of Placebo.
 
 When he witnesses his young 
wife’s pear-tree-tryst, she explains that he misunderstands the situation: “Ful many a man weneth 
to seen a thyng, / And it is al another than it semeth. / He that mysconceyveth, he mysdemeth” 
(IV.2408-10).
 
 Though January’s acceptance of May’s explanation does not lead to the 
irreversible result of the Physician’s Tale, January nevertheless persists in misunderstanding his 
situation, due to his unwillingness to consider anything beyond his perspectival desire.  May’s 
statement also stresses the relationship between conceiving and deeming: in order to judge well, 
one must understand correctly. 
In each case, the character assumes that his understanding of the situation is complete.  
Virginius concludes erroneously that there are only two options available: death or shame; 
January purposefully ignores Justinus’ call to gather more information and opts instead to 
operate in haste.  Likewise, Melibee assumes that there are only two responses to his situation: 
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start a war or accept the label of impotence.  But as Chaucer points out in the Prologue to his 
Treatise on the Astrolabe, any claim to perfect or complete knowledge is a sham: stating that his 
Astrolabe can only offer a “certain nombre of conclusions,” he explains that “alle the 
conclusiouns that han ben fownde, or ells possibli myhten be fownde…ben unknowe perfitly to 
any mortal man in this regioun, as I suppose” (Prologue 17-22).61  In other words, the data which 
the user can gain from the astrolabe, including any future potential of the device, is limited by 
that user’s inability to understand, in perfect totality, the knowledge of each conclusion.  Further, 
Chaucer asserts that, in his experience, all manuscripts have flaws: “sothly, in any tretis of the 
astrelabie that I have seyn there ben some conclusions that wole nat in alle thinges performen his 
byhestes” (22-26).  Though he uses these explanations to frame his Astrolabe as a treatise that 
offers some beneficial information, the underlying principle is that all knowledge is known 
imperfectly and communicated incompletely; to draw reasonable conclusions, then, requires both 
a conscious awareness of the fact that there is always more knowledge to be gained and an active 
deliberation to determine what information to accept and what to disregard.  More specifically, in 
the Astrolabe’s Prologue, Chaucer explicitly elucidates the idea that human understanding is 
fractional, and though one can assess a situation productively, such assessment, as well as 
subsequent future reconsiderations, must include an awareness of the limitations of knowledge.  
When Virginius acts with the expectation that he has a perfect understanding of the various 
contributing factors to his situation, he creates his own devastation; had his consideration been 
governed by an awareness of his own limited perspective, however, the outcome might have 
been different.   
In the Melibee, Chaucer offers an example of a character who employs a recognition of 
her own perspectival limitations: Prudence explains to her husband that while she may not fully 
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understand why “God suffred men to do [him] this vileyne” (VII.1405) she can, “by certeyne 
presumpciouns and conjectynges” (1408) suggest that this experience was just and reasonable.  
Though the point is brief, Prudence frames her response with respect to her lack of complete 
knowledge: she “kan nat wel answere, as for no soothfastnesse” (1405) because “the sciences 
and the juggementz of oure Lord God almyghty been ful depe” (1406).  Her judgment of the 
situation, then, is based on her interpretation with respect to the information she has access to; 
based on such limitations, she remarks that her answer will not be entirely truthful.  This relation 
that Prudence establishes between truth and knowledge, a connection that does not appear in 
Renaud, suggests that while the pursuit of truth in evaluating situations is necessary, a 
determination of absolute truth is inherently complicated and ultimately unachievable.  Daniel 
Kempton notes the perspectival interests that shape what a particular “truth” is: “In Melibee’s 
assembly, for example, every counselor gives advice that pertains to his own character and 
interests, without regard for Truth.”62  Because one’s perception of “truth” results from a 
combination of the individual approach to the issue and the predictions made about that issue, 
any attempt at sound, rational understanding must first acknowledge the ways in which 
information is framed by all contributors. 
A similar point is made when Prudence declares that counsel which asserts an 
unequivocal and unchanging position is delusive: “And take this for a general reule, that every 
conseil that is affermed so strongly that it may nat be changed for no condicioun that may bityde, 
I seye that thilke conseil is wikked” (VII.1231).  Chaucer’s restructuring of this statement is 
significant.  In Renaud’s version, Prudence asserts, “Aprés, tu doiz ce tenir pour rigle general: 
que tout conseil est mauvais qui est fermes que l’on ne le puet changier par condition qui 
surviengne” ‘After, you must keep as a general rule: that all counsel is bad that is so closed that 
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one cannot change by whatever condition might arise.’63  Though the sentence of each rendition 
remains the same, Chaucer’s highlights Prudence’s core concern—a rigidly fixed perspective—
before she offers her own assessment: such counsel is wicked.  By focusing on a process of 
engagement instead of providing a declarative statement, Prudence encourages Melibee’s, and by 
extension the audience’s, consideration of the validity of her judgment.  Of course, both Renaud 
and Chaucer include the qualification that the rule is “general”; as a result, the recipient of any 
advice must assess the information before determining whether or not to accept it.  However 
eager Melibee is to resolve his situation, the changes Chaucer makes to these sections highlights 
the idea that a beneficial solution requires time and deliberation. 
At the end of the tale, Melibee resolves to follow Prudence’s counsel, which is a point 
that concerns some recent scholars, such as Judith Ferster, Kempton, and Dolores Palomo, who 
argue that Prudence’s character is contradictory and thus problematic.64  “Chaucer’s” explanation 
of this scene suggests a different reading:  
Whanne Melibee hadde herd the grete skiles and resouns of dame Prudence, and 
hire wise informaciouns and techynges, / his herte gan enclyne to the wil of his 
wif, considerynge hir trewe entente, / and conformed hym anon and assented fully 
to werken after hir conseil, / and thonked God, of whom procedeth al vertu and 
alle goodnesse, that hym sente a wyf of so greet discrecioun. (VII.1870-73) 
In Renaud’s version, “Quant Mellibee ot oÿ toutes les paroles Dame Prudence et ses sages 
enseignemens, si fut en grant paix de cuer et loa Dieu, qui lui avoit donné si sage compagnie” 
‘When Melibee had heard all of Dame Prudence’s words and her wise teachings, he felt great 
peace in his heart and praised God, who had given him so wise company.’65  The following table 
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illustrates the changes Chaucer made to this passage and thus demonstrates the importance 
Chaucer places on the process of inquiry that his Melibee prescribes.  
 
Renaud 
 
Chaucer 
“toutes les paroles” “great skills and reasons” 
“ses sages enseignemens” “her wise information and teachings” 
“si fut en grant paix de cuer” Chaucer’s Melibee considers both what 
Prudence has said and her intentions in saying 
it before he accepts her counsel; there is no 
discussion of feelings. 
(no equivalent) Once Melibee deliberates, he then immediately 
proceeds to action. 
“Loa Dieu” because his wife is wise. Thanks God for a wife of “so great 
discretion.”66 
 
This final change is particularly illuminating: while Renaud’s Prudence is wise, Chaucer’s uses 
her wisdom with discretion, a point which bears not only on Prudence’s rational arguments, but 
also on her choice to “maken semblant of wratthe” (1687) when necessary to refocus Melibee’s 
attention.  Thus, Chaucer’s Prudence is a wife “of good judgment.”  The differences that Chaucer 
crafts into this passage illustrate that his Melibee recognizes the problems of hasty action, 
incorporates the procedure that Prudence offers, and only then makes an informed choice about 
how to act.  In other words, Chaucer’s Melibee performs an act of recursive analysis by utilizing 
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the process that Prudence defines in order to evaluate and modify his initial responses.  Through 
his effort to reposition his emotional confusion within the larger framework of Providence, this 
Melibee moves from expectation to rational discernment as he comes to listen effectively and 
participate in the dialectic.  Bluntly, Chaucer’s Melibee learns, as do Boethius and the reader of 
the Astrolabe, through recursion.     
That the adversaries also recognize the value of Prudence illustrates the extensive 
benefits both of her method of rational assessment and of the choice to listen effectively.  Indeed, 
when the adversaries “herden the goodliche wordes of dame Prudence, / they weren so supprised 
and ravysshed and hadden so greet joye of hire that wonder was to telle” (1733-34).  Such a 
reaction bespeaks the poetic capacity of prose, as I discussed earlier and also marks a quality of 
listening: the adversaries hear Prudence’s “goodly words” because their expectations, whatever 
they may be, do not override the desire to learn her counsel.  A similar absence of expectation 
informs the final reconciliation.  When the adversaries appear before Prudence at the end of the 
tale, they agree to abide by Melibee’s command, provided that Prudence’s “good will” mediates 
his decision; they condition their promise upon Prudence’s ability to “fulfillen in dede [her] 
goodliche wordes” (1744).  The fulfillment of their oath, in other words, relies upon Prudence 
proving through her actions that her words are truthful.  This suggestion that participants must 
enter into honest agreements in order for such promises to be enforceable recalls Prudence’s 
earlier declaration that dishonest oaths are not legally binding: “For the lawes seyn that ‘alle 
bihestes that been dishoneste been of no value’; / and eek if so be that it be inpossible, or may nat 
goodly be parfourned or kept” (1229-30).  In asking that Prudence match her words with action, 
then, the foes imply their interest in a reliable, contractual obligation.
67
  Prudence herself then 
makes a similar proposition.  When speaking with Melibee, she advises that he send his 
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messengers to convey an offer of peace to the enemies: “that if they wole trete of pees and of 
accord, / that they shape hem withouten delay or tariyng to comen unto us” (1797-98).  Again, 
the implication is that a correlation between words and deeds, not expectation, demonstrates 
truth: if the adversaries want peace, then their actions will show their desire.  
In his final speech, Melibee conciliates with the adversaries, but his pardon is qualified: 
“for as muche as I see and biholde youre grete humylitee / and that ye been sory and repentant of 
youre giltes, / it constreyneth me to doon yow grace and mercy” (1878-80).  Melibee’s 
forgiveness, then, is conditioned upon the adversaries’ actions, not on his expectation of an 
outcome: his inclination to give grace and mercy extends only insofar as their deeds match their 
words.  By creating a parallel stipulation to that which is required for Christian absolution, 
Melibee equates integrity in the secular sphere with truth-telling to the Divine.  As he states, his 
forgiveness is “to this effect and to this ende, that God of his endeless mercy / wole at the tyme 
of oure diynge foryeven us oure giltes that we han trespassed to hym in this wrecched world. / 
For doutelees, if we be sory and repentant…he wole foryeven us oure giltes” (1883-86).  Though 
Melibee praises God’s bountiful mercy, he also declares that one must be both sorry for and truly 
repent of the offense in order that the Divine forgive the transgression.  As the Parson later 
explains in his own tale, “Wepynge, and nat for to stynte to do synne, may nat avayle…And 
therfore repentant folk, that stynte for to synne and forlete synne er that synne forlete hem, hooly 
chirche holdeth hem siker of hire savacioun” (X.90, 93).  In other words, the outward 
demonstration of shame is insufficient; in order to be forgiven, the sinner must act, eschewing 
sin and doing good works.  According to the Parson, “the grace of the Hooly Goost fareth lyk 
fyr, that may nat been ydel; for fyr fayleth anoon as it forleteth his wirkynge, and right so grace 
fayleth anoon as it forleteth his werkynge” (250).  The point here is that behavioral change is 
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central to repentance.  The state of grace and the certainty of salvation, then, are secured through 
the purposeful and continual good works of the repentant sinner; should he either repeat the 
offense or cease his good works, “Then leseth the synful man the goodnesse of glorie, that oonly 
is bihight to goode men that labouren and werken” (251).  In creating an analogy between the 
necessary course of action to receive forgiveness from God and the actions the enemies must 
perform in order to secure his continued mercy, Melibee suggests that the standard for honesty 
between men is just as high as is the standard for truth with God.  Although Melibee’s final 
reconciliation with the adversaries goes against Prudence’s earlier suggestion that old enemies 
cannot be trusted—“For sikerly, though thyn enemy be reconsiled, and maketh thee chiere of 
humylitee, and lowteth to thee with his heed, ne trust hym nevere. / For certes he maketh thilke 
feyned humilitee moore for his profit than for any love of thy persone” (VII.1187-88)—his 
process at the end of the tale differs from his unthinking actions at the beginning.
 
 Instead of 
merely accepting the words of the adversaries as truth or rejecting them without thought, 
Melibee now considers their actions in order to determine their fidelity to the agreement.  In 
order for peace to remain between them, the future actions of the foes must continue to accord 
with their words.   
Just as honesty is an important component of an oath’s validity, so too is the correct 
understanding of its requirements.  Indeed, the necessity of understanding a situation rightly 
before determining a course of action is a consistent theme in the Melibee: from the wise man’s 
comment “that thilke juge is wys that soone understondeth a matiere and juggeth by leyser” 
(1031) to Prudence’s declaration that legal behests are not binding “if so be that it be inpossible, 
or may nat goodly be parfourned or kept” (1230).  The underlying issue in both of these 
statements is that accurate comprehension can lay the foundation for profitable results, whereas 
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uninformed choices create difficulty: “For the commune proverbe seith thus: ‘He that soone 
deemeth, soone shal repente’” (1229).  Chaucer’s use of doublets throughout the Melibee attests 
to the importance of this issue.  In fact, I argue that Chaucer’s inclusion of doublets throughout 
this Tale intend to facilitate his readers’ understanding of the processes which Prudence 
prescribes.  Karla Taylor’s work on civic discourse emphasizes this point.  By her count, more 
than seventy-two percent of the Melibee’s doublets are added by Chaucer.68  She concludes, “By 
giving both (or several) alternatives, the heavily collocated text provides the means for all 
readers to acquire the vocabulary less familiar to them.”69  Of course, the use of lexical doublets 
derives from a much earlier attempt to reconcile Anglo-Saxon and Norman French, so Chaucer’s 
use of this linguistic strategy is not unique.  Yet his choice to use a substantially greater number 
of doublets in the Melibee than Renaud employed in his version suggests Chaucer’s interest in 
the importance of accurate perception to wise decision-making. 
The contracts into which the adversaries and Melibee enter at the end of the tale illustrate 
this point further, as their speech abounds with doublets: the enemies “consideren and 
knowelichen” (1745) that they have “offended and greved” (1747) Melibee; they “oblige and 
bynden” (1878) themselves and their friends to the oath; Melibee sees and beholds that they are 
“sory and repentant” (1879).  In each of these groups, the intentional pairing of complementary 
words serves to promote a greater depth of cognition; the implication of the doublet is that 
neither word is sufficient by itself.  Tim Machan’s explanation of this linguistic strategy in 
translation is helpful here: “Doublets can be an effective way of capturing the semantic range of 
a source word.”70  Chaucer’s use of doublets in the Melibee thus indicates that, along with 
translating the sense of the source word, he was interested to limit the possibility of 
miscommunication.  When Melibee states that the enemies are “sorry and repentant,” for 
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example, he suggests that he recognizes both that they regret their actions and that they have 
reformed their behavior.  Because it is possible both to lament the action without changing the 
behavior, as well as to reform the behavior without regretting it, Melibee’s inclusion of both 
adjectives signifies that his judgment of the situation is comprehensive.  Unlike his initial 
emotional restrictions to understanding, here he looks past the external schema of the 
adversaries’ to consider all information available to him: by considering both what they say and 
how they act as two elements of the same situation, Melibee advances beyond his previous self-
limiting expectations. 
Though Palomo and Grace conclude that the ending of this tale suggests that Melibee 
does not learn how to think for himself but rather exchanges his set of authorities for Prudence, 
this response denies the explanation that Chaucer adds to his text: Melibee accepts Prudence’s 
counsel only after he considers her skills, reasons, information, teaching, and her intentions.
71
  In 
other words, Melibee does not mindlessly agree to follow advice that sounds good or accords 
with his own personal desires; rather, he follows the procedure prescribed by Prudence of 
gathering information and deliberating before making his choice.  Indeed, the medieval 
understanding of prudence—the ability to utilize past and present information to affect a good 
(possible) future outcome—underscores Melibee’s process.  Chaucer develops this definition of 
prudence in Troilus and Criseyde, as Criseyde laments her inability to conceive of the influence 
of her past on her present circumstances:  
Prudence, allas, oon of thyne eyen thre 
Me lakked alwey, er that I come here! 
On tyme ypassed wel remembred me, 
And present tyme ek koud ich wel ise, 
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But future tyme, er I was in the snare, 
Koude I nat sen; that causesth now my care.  (V.744-49)
72
 
Melibee does not suffer a similar fate.  At the end of the Tale, he demonstrates a type of prudent 
recursion, wherein he performs the definition of prudence in his decision-making.
73
  That 
Chaucer includes Melibee’s cognitive process in this final section highlights the value of the 
method of wise judgment that he offers in this Tale: unlike Renaud’s Melibee, whose heart is 
filled with peace by Prudence’s words, Chaucer emphasizes that his Melibee’s acceptance results 
from a consideration not only of what Prudence says, but also of her intentions in saying it.  By 
mulling over Prudence’s advice and motives, Melibee subjects his wife to the same degree of 
scrutiny to which she suggests all advisors are answerable.  In Renaud, Melibee’s acceptance of 
Prudence’s counsel is implied through a quasi-Divine intervention: after hearing “toutes les 
paroles Dame Prudence et ses sages enseignemens,” his heart is filled with peace, he praises 
God, and forgives the enemies.  Renaud emphasizes that the praising of God and forgiveness of 
the enemies results from the peace that Melibee feels in his heart.  More specifically, the words 
of Renaud’s Prudence incite an emotional reaction instead of a thoughtful response.  In contrast, 
Chaucer’s inclusion of Melibee’s deliberative process both underscores the importance of the 
method prescribed in the tale, as well as indicates that this Melibee has learned to set aside his 
unthinking expectations in favor of making an informed choice. 
The goal of Melibee’s extension of grace is to reconcile with the adversaries.  Whereas 
his initial reaction was to start a war, his participation in the Prudence’s programmatic system of 
rational deliberation results in a more inclusive appreciation of the situation, which in turn leads 
to a choice which bears in mind the profit of the entire community.  Though there is no guarantee 
that the adversaries will continue to act in accordance with their words, the emphasis in this final 
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section is on a thought process that is deliberate, comprehensive, and oriented towards a 
favorable outcome that benefits everyone involved.  The idea that the goal of an action is its own 
reward is also offered by Boethius’ Philosophy: “For of alle thinges that ben idoon, thilke thing 
for which any thing is doon, it semeth as by ryght that thilke thing be the mede of that” (IV.p3.6-
9).
 
 Whether the ultimate result of Melibee’s action will be a generation of the good, as we see in 
the Franklin’s Tale, or of its destruction, as we see in the Merchant’s, the point is that Melibee is 
responsible only for the way he chooses to respond to this situation; similar to the grace of God, 
Melibee extends forgiveness only insofar as the adversaries continue to maintain their oath.  
What Chaucer offers in his Melibee, then, is not only a guide to good decision-making, but also 
an example of the inherent benefits of wise judgment which includes a knowledge of the 
limitations of one’s authority. 
 The fact that the Melibee appears in various miscellanies outside the Canterbury Tales 
suggests that audiences through the fifteenth century recognized the importance of this work.
74
  
By including the Melibee in the miscellanies most scribes “omit any material from the 
pilgrimage frame which would connect the tales to particular tellers.”75  MS. HM 144 (San 
Marino, Huntington Library), for example, includes “a very free version” of the Melibee (titled 
“prouerbis”) which is followed by an incomplete Monk’s Tale (titled “The falle of Princis”).76  
Instead of including Chaucer’s prologue to the Monk, the scribe links the two works by 
admonishing the audience to remember the proverbs lest they fall prey to Fortune: “They that 
this present & forseyde tale haue or shal reede remembyr the noble prouerbis that rebukyth 
couetise and vengeaunse taking in truste of ffortune whiche hathe causyd many a noble prince to 
falle as we may rede of them here folluyng.”  According to this warning, the proverbs of the 
Melibee have the potential of protecting the reader against a downfall that results from covetous 
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and selfish action; more telling is the suggestion that this particular tale is potentially as 
applicable to the reader’s daily existence as is Prudence’s fictive instruction of Melibee.  Though 
the HM 144 scribe rightly asserts that the Melibee is a valuable text that can benefit the careful 
reader, his interpretation only highlights a portion of what the Melibee offers within the frame 
that Chaucer creates.  Indeed, readers of the excerpted Melibee not only miss Chaucer’s 
consideration of the relationship between formal expectations and cognition, but because of this 
lack, they miss the force of Melibee’s initial dismissal of Prudence’s counsel and his acceptance 
of the contract with the adversaries.  
 Even though he has been accused of “belaboring the obvious” in the Melibee, Chaucer 
deals with the necessity of the rational mind’s ability to reign in natural, emotional reactions and 
assumptions in favor of implementing the beneficial process of wise judgment.
77
  The 
metaphorical blindness which results from such emotional control is an idea that Chaucer 
encountered first in his translation of Boethius’ Consolation of Philosophy.  At the beginning of 
the work, Philosophy finds Boethius in deep despair: “Allas!  Now lyth he emptid of lyght of his 
thoght, and his nekke is pressyd with hevy cheynes, and bereth his chere enclyned adoun for the 
grete weyghte, and is constreyned to loken on the fool erthe!” (1.m2.28-32).  While she 
recognizes that Boethius is bound by the heavy chains of misinterpretation, she does not express 
concern: “‘Here nys no peril,’ quod sche; ‘he is fallen into a litargye, whiche that is a comune 
seknesse to hertes that been desceyved.  He hath a litil foryeten hymselve’” (1.p2.18-22).  The 
point that Philosophy makes here is that Boethius misconstrues his situation because he has 
forgotten himself; in other words, though Boethius has a rational understanding of his situation, 
he cannot enact that knowledge due to the fact that he has permitted his emotions to dominate his 
mind.  As Boethius observes, his sight, “ploungid in teeres” (1.p1.78), is obscured by darkness.  
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He regains the “light of his thought” and remembers how to assess his situation in a productive 
way through the subsequent dialectic with Philosophy.   
Chaucer continues to explore the potential for emotions to cause a type of intellectual 
amnesia elsewhere in his poetic works, a fact which demonstrates Chaucer’s interest in the 
power of the affective.  In the Knight’s Tale, for example, when Palamon cries out in heart-
struck anguish at seeing the fair Emelya, Arcite counsels him to “taak al in pacience / Oure 
prisoun, for it may noon oother be. / … / We moste endure it; this is the short and playn” 
(I.1084-85, 1091).  When Arcite then espies the maiden, however, he exchanges his own 
patience for emotional attachment, and the two sworn brothers become enemies: “Greet was the 
strif and long bitwix hem tweye” (1187).  Even though Palamon and Arcite are imprisoned 
without the possibility of ransom, their long-lasting friendship quickly devolves into a long term 
and bitter rivalry for the sake of their respective love of Emelya.  Though comical, this 
disagreement highlights the problem of the power of unchecked emotions: both Palamon and 
Arcite understand rationally that they must endure their life in prison, but neither demonstrates 
an ability to use that knowledge to cope with the emotional desire he feels for Emelya.  While 
these characters comprehend the concept of patience, their inability to realize this idea in action 
results first in the petty disavowal of friendship and later in a deadly battle. 
  In the Melibee, Chaucer presents his reader with a topical exploration that pushes beyond 
this type of visceral reaction to consider how Melibee, like Boethius, can recognize the 
limitations of emotion and return to a position from which he can reasonably assess his situation.  
Though Lee Patterson believes that “Melibee counsels self-reflection but enacts a pedagogical 
program that forecloses true understanding, aspires to leisurely exploration but can never evade 
the pressures of linear temporality,” Chaucer calls attention to the necessity of self-reflection and 
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leisure for prudent interpretations in a world in which true understanding is an impossibility; as 
such, the procedure that Prudence outlines and Melibee follows focuses on a method of judging 
incomplete and perspectival information with wisdom and discretion.  Given that linear 
temporality binds both the fictional realm of his pilgrims as well as the world of his audience, the 
point is not that one should indefinitely forego decision-making in order to make that decision 
with leisure, but rather that important judgments should not be made in haste.    
In many of the tales presented on the Canterbury pilgrimage, Chaucer offers his readers 
examples of the consequences of rash assessments: the Friar’s Summoner damns himself; the 
Merchant’s January chooses to metaphorically blind himself; the Physician’s Virginius exiles 
himself.  Each of these actions results from the character’s inability to recognize the ways in 
which his assumptions contribute to the “truth” of his particular situation; by responding only to 
his own expectations, he contributes to his own downfall.  In the Franklin’s Tale, Chaucer 
continues to examine how form, content, and expectation influence understanding: Dorigen 
makes an oath “in pley” that binds her to the eager Aurelius when he misunderstands her 
intention; the clerk’s apparent “magic” is actually predictive science.78  The marriage of Dorigen 
and Averagus provides the most provocative illustration: while the “form” of their marriage is 
traditional—Averagus retains “the name of soveraynetee, / That wolde he have for shame of his 
degree” (V.751-52)—their construction of this relationship is not, as Averagus swears that he 
will never “take no maistrie / Agayn hir wyl…and folwe hir wyl in al” (747-49).  Indeed, even 
while demanding that Dorigen fulfill her oath to Aurelius, Averagus attends to the maintenance 
of the traditional form of their union and forbids his wife, “up peyne of deeth, / That nevere, whil 
thee lasteth lyf ne breeth, / To no wight telle thou of this aventure” (1481-83).  He relies, in other 
words, on the general expectation that an apparatus equals whatever is contained within it and, 
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through this reliance, works to maintain his wife’s good name.  Elizabeth Robertson notes that 
Averagus’ dependence upon such expectations actually undermines his marriage: “To have a 
contradiction between what occurs publicly and what appears privately is a violent breach of the 
harmony of the household.”79  Though the consequences of the Host’s expectation about the 
Thopas are certainly not as unpleasant, his superficial determination leads to his own 
misinterpretation.   
As I have been arguing, Chaucer links the Thopas and the Melibee in order to provoke an 
exploration of the inherent but often unrecognized relationship between expectation and the 
capacity for accurate understanding: Bailly expects “Som deyntee thyng” based on the pilgrim-
narrator’s appearance, just as Melibee initially dismisses wise advice in favor of his hotchpotch.  
These responses, as well as those of the Summoner, January, and Virginius, point to the 
problems of irrational judgments, but it is only in the Melibee that Chaucer puts forth a 
systematic approach to analysis and productive reasoning.  The core issue of this tale is one of 
right judgment: how does one make a rational, well-informed, intentional choice while in a state 
of confusion?  Chaucer’s “devising” criticizes Melibee’s irrational thought-process and his lack 
of engagement in his own situation, but it also emphasizes the benefits afforded to everyone 
when Melibee remembers the advantages of deliberation and counsel.  In the Thopas-Melibee, 
Chaucer provokes a consideration that is as essential to rational analysis as it is to the reading 
process, itself: given the limitations of knowledge and individual perspective, he avers, useful 
responses begin with a process of acknowledging those limitations and acting to correct them 
through self-assessment, counsel, and deliberation.  The theory of cognition that Chaucer 
develops through the Thopas-Melibee demonstrates the possibility of reversing the influence of 
expectation by engaging in this process, which begins by listening (and reading) effectively. 
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Chapter Four  
 
Choosing Destiny: Language, Habits, and the Power of Knowing in the Parson’s Tale 
 
 
 
In the previous chapters, I argue that Chaucer shares methods for recursive analysis in his 
prose works that benefit his audience.  In the Boece, he offers a recursive method for 
understanding one’s own state; in the Retraction, he models this process while encouraging his 
reader to perform his own act of recursive assessment.  In the Astrolabe, he provides a recursive 
procedure for coming to know the physical world through that finite instrument.  In the Melibee, 
he presents a recursive practice for responding to dilemmas in the social world.  In the last Tale 
on the road to Canterbury, Chaucer offers his final recursive method.  Utilizing and yet going 
beyond these other recursive practices, the Parson’s method encourages the development of 
habits that both lead to self-sufficiency in this world and affect one’s salvation in the next.  This 
method requires the individual to recognize patterns of behavior, understand how these patterns 
influence personal choice and agency, and develop purposeful habits of engagement which 
facilitate conscientious and more productive decision-making.  Similar to the other prose 
methods, this process requires self-reflection; it is recursive because it also demands an 
assessment of the product of its reflection through that same process.  An underlying premise of 
this method is that knowledge in the earthly realm is and always will be imperfect and 
incomplete.  Nonetheless, according to the Parson, the ability to distinguish between right and 
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wrong is inherent in the human condition and because we have free-will, we are responsible for 
how we choose to develop that capacity.   
For the Parson, man’s need to regain such understanding is a consequence of Adam and 
Eve’s fall from grace: “She took of the fruyt of the tree and eet it, and yaf to hire housbonde and 
he eet, and anoon the eyen of hem bothe openeden. / And whan that they knewe that they were 
naked, they sowed of figeleves a maner of breches to hiden hire membres” (X.329-30).  Focusing 
not on God’s response to their disobedience but rather on the act and its consequences, the 
Parson draws attention to the operations of knowledge.  In the first clause, Adam and Eve are 
actors: Eve takes the fruit and eats it; she then gives the fruit to Adam, and he eats.  In the second 
clause, Adam and Eve experience the cost of disobedience: after consuming the fruit, their eyes 
are opened not by a conscious choice, but instead by the knowledge they gain of “good and 
harm.”  This “eye-opening experience” reveals the fullness of both pain and sin “that was erst 
but oonly peyne of concupiscence” (334).  The consequence of their transgression, then, is the 
constant threat of unrelenting temptation.  Though this reading is conventional to standard 
religious commentary, Chaucer focuses his reader’s attention on an issue that resonates 
throughout his Parson’s Tale: through the activation of Adam and Eve’s understanding of good 
and harm, they can cultivate personal practices (i.e. habits) to defend against such temptations 
and gain a greater understanding of virtue and sin.  Through exercising the method that Chaucer 
sets forth in this Tale, the reader can practice the habits of reading that are offered in the other 
prose works and developed collectively through the Parson.  Indeed, this personal process of 
reading and analysis that Chaucer develops in the Parson’s Tale calls upon the themes of 
recursive analysis, “learning to know,” fractional knowledge, and expectations of form and then 
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invites a further consideration: that of genre.  The placement of the Parson’s Tale at the end of 
the Canterbury Tales, I argue, encourages such reflection. 
The relationship between the Parson’s Tale and the rest of the Canterbury Tales has long 
been a problem in scholarship.  For some, the Parson’s Tale signals a type of literary, religious 
virtue.  Ralph Baldwin, for example, contends that the tale “unfolds the wey to Him who is the 
way, the truth, and the light.”1  Traugott Lawler argues that “One very large aspect of the relation 
of the Parson’s Tale to the rest of the poem is that it replaces literary truth with moral truths, 
asserting implicitly that this general mode of discourse is more effective than that particular 
mode.”2  Albert Hartung asserts that there is no question “that the prologue, tale, and Retraction 
belong together and are representative of Chaucer’s intention to end the work on a moral and 
transcendent note.”3  For others, the Parson’s Tale responds to the problems that underlie the 
other tales.  For example, Jean E. Jost maintains that “the function of the tales is to present the 
‘problem’—multivalent vowing and foreswearing—in various genres and tones, while the 
function of the Parson’s Tale is to critique that betrayal and offer the means for exonerating 
betrayal in actual life through penance,” while both John Finlayson and Donald Howard view the 
Parson as a “retrospective guide” to the rest of the tales.4    Others argue that the Parson’s Tale 
occupies its position in the Canterbury frame not by Chaucer’s design, but rather because of 
scribal decision.  Most prominently, Miceal Vaughan has argued that the Parson’s inclusion 
results from readers’ and editors’ misguided “feelings”:  
The Parson’s Prologue (about whose placement there is no doubt) proposes a 
Parson’s Tale at the end of the Canterbury Tales, but there is nothing to indicate 
firmly that Chaucer intended to put his double treatise in the Parson’s mouth—
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nothing, that is, except readers’ and editors’ feelings of its appropriateness, 
feelings also evidenced by the extant manuscripts.
5
  
Vaughan’s primary issue is with the scribal rubrics which allow readers and editors to 
circumvent the complications that would arise from a text that transitions from the Parson’s Tale 
to the Retraction without a clearly designated change in speaker.  Excepting Vaughan’s 
argument about the Retraction, which I dealt with specifically in Chapter One, I would like to 
suggest that the tale itself indicates Chaucer’s intention and should be used to reflect upon the 
works that come before.  In this way, the Parson’s Tale explains a method of recursion similar to 
that which Boethius works through in his Consolation.  To be clear, I agree with several of the 
arguments mentioned here, though I maintain that, following the Parson’s instruction, we should 
read them as facets of a more complex issue: Baldwin, for example, is correct in his 
understanding that the Parson illuminates a path to the Divine, but Chaucer’s character makes 
clear that it is a path and one which is constructed and modified by each individual; Lawler’s 
contention that the Parson reframes the discourse is apt, but it fails to recognize the Parson’s 
overarching suggestion that all discourse, all knowledge, will benefit the individual who puts 
himself to the task of discovering the Good; Howard’s idea that the Parson’s Tale is akin to a 
Speculum moralitatis is inspired, but it stops short of considering works outside of the 
Canterbury frame.  And that’s precisely what I think the Parson impels us to do.  At the 
beginning of his Tale, he directs his audience to “Stondeth upon the weyes, and seeth and axeth 
of olde pathes (that is to seyn, of olde sentences) which is the goode wey” (X.77).  In “standing 
on the ways,” we stand on everything that we’ve encountered: the various Canterbury tales, 
Chaucer’s other works, real-life stories, self-narratives, all sources of knowledge.  What I argue 
in this chapter is that the Parson’s Tale provides a methodical approach for identifying, 
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analyzing, and acting on partial, and possibly emotional, data; the underlying issues of 
knowledge, language, and emotionally-driven reaction that run throughout the rest of the tales 
are here highlighted and developed not to promote passive acceptance of human failing, but 
rather to provide opportunities to learn from the various journeys that we embark upon through 
narratives about life.  This is the process of recursive assessment.  That Chaucer offers this 
meditation in prose underscores the importance of its subject.  The verse of the Canterbury 
collection entertains the audience with tales of intrigue and ribaldry, delights them with its 
various linguistic assays, and offers larger ideas for consideration, but it does not provide a 
programmatic method for developing habits of rational engagement or self-authority, nor does it 
intentionally drive its audience to meditate on earlier interpretations and “olde sentences.”  That 
is a responsibility that Chaucer entrusts to the medium of prose and its capacity to convey 
knowledge more fully (though never completely).  It is important to note that this chapter does 
not argue that the Parson’s Tale offers revolutionary ideas to its readers; rather, it aims to 
demonstrate the originality that Chaucer gains by placing this text within the context of a larger 
work that is aimed at a lay audience. 
A brief discussion of Chaucer’s source texts will help to illuminate how the Parson’s 
Tale both contributes to and stands apart from these earlier works.  As is well-known, the 
Parson’s treatment of penance is derived from the chapter “De paenitentiis et remissionibus” 
from Raymund of Pennaforte’s Summa de paenitentia.  The source for the middle section of the 
Tale, which provides information on the seven deadly sins, is William Peraldus’ Summa de vitiis 
et virtutibus.
6
  A third source, which influenced Chaucer’s remedies for the deadly sins, was the 
Summa virtutum de remediis anime.
7
  As Richard Newhauser explains, “Both Pennaforte and 
Peraldus were Dominicans; their works testify to the role of this fraternal order as one of the 
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important institutional vehicles in carrying out the penitential and pastoral canons of the Fourth 
Lateran Council (1215).”8  This evidence leads Newhauser to conclude that “The basis for 
Chaucer’s penitential and moral theology in the Parson’s Tale, thus, has a conservative 
foundation, for it is derived from contextual sources which were roughly 150 years old by the 
time he adopted them for this treatise.”9  Newhauser’s observation is important for our 
understanding of Chaucer’s use of orthodox ideas, but Chaucer also includes contemporary 
concerns about confession and religiosity similar to those of the Lollards.  Indeed, he calls 
attention to this affinity earlier in the pilgrimage.  When the Parson chastises the Host for 
swearing, Bailly casts him as a Lollard and then reaffirms that assessment four lines later 
(II.1173, 1177).  Of course, Bailly’s judgment is flawed, being based solely on the Parson’s 
disapproval of swearing, but it does introduce the possibility that both the Parson and his Tale 
are more complex than initial expectations allow.  Indeed, I argue that Chaucer situates the 
Parson’s Tale within the sentiments embodied in anticlerical, antifraternal, and Lollard 
concerns—all of which challenge the authority of the establishment—in order to stress the 
importance of acknowledging such expectations (as he does in the Melibee) and to invite his 
audience to “learn to know” their individual positions within the debate about lay access to God 
and biblical knowledge.  Though Chaucer utilizes these ideas, he pushes beyond this discussion 
by including the Parson within the Canterbury collection, a move that, by extension, implies that 
this final Tale is beneficial to a courtly audience.  In other words, the Parson’s Tale draws on 
texts that were intended to guide religious leaders (confession manuals for priests) and were 
primarily written for readers within religious institutions; it reaches out beyond these particular 
audiences to proffer its knowledge to a secular readership. 
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As sons and daughters of Adam and Eve, humans are “engendered of vile and corrupt 
mateere” (333),  but they also inherit a sense of right and wrong from that same event, and with 
that, a continuing responsibility to use that awareness.  For the Parson, humans are accountable 
not only for gaining such understanding but then for its habitual employment. Chaucer 
repeatedly points out that human knowledge is fractional and imperfect, and in the Parson’s Tale 
he emphasizes that this quality is part of the pelerinage de la vie humaine.  What Chaucer offers 
through his Parson is a methodological approach to promoting one’s understanding of the self 
through an examination and assessment of one’s thoughts and habitual behaviors; from that, the 
individual then has the responsibility to choose those behaviors which are truly profitable and 
make them routine.  Though many scholars brush this tale aside as either a sermon about 
penitence or as conforming to the standards of a penitential manual, I argue that the Parson’s 
Tale has a far wider scope; indeed, there are fundamental and significant implications for both 
the reader of this particular tale and for those who engage with the other tales of the Canterbury 
collection, implications which concern language, rhetoric, and habits of thoughtful decision-
making.  The issues raised by the Parson do form a sermon: its structure, syntax, use of formulaic 
expressions, and method of audience engagement, for example, correlate to other sermons in the 
late Middle Ages.
10
  Yet this “lesson” from Chaucer is complex and applicable to both an 
examination of one’s own life and to an examination of how others live theirs to the same end: 
gaining the knowledge from this type of inquiry can engender those habits of mind and action 
that result in, first, more effective, rational responses to this fallen world and, ultimately, 
personal salvation.  It is also a lesson about recursive analysis, about “learning to know,” about 
expectation and form.  It is also about genre and how a reader’s expectations about genre, in this 
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case the penitential manual, limit his ability to access whatever information might reside outside 
of that generic qualifier.   
Chaucer deals with these disconnections in his other prose works.  The Boece reminds the 
reader of the limitations of perspective and the need to situate a given viewpoint correctly—for 
Boethius, that context is the framework of Providence.  In the Retraction, Chaucer performs a 
recursive assessment of his writing and his ability to read those compositions effectively; within 
that performance, he invites his audience to engage in their own recursive evaluations of their 
interpretations of his work.  He crafts his Astrolabe to grant access to scientific knowledge but, 
perhaps more importantly, offers a method of “learning to know” that confronts the infinite 
fragmentations inherent in this realm.  In the Melibee, he uses the prose form to create a 
recursive moment for his audience that is modeled by Melibee’s own similar process, as he 
“learns to know” the method from Prudence.  That Chaucer presents these same factors as a 
collective in this work about developing self-awareness suggests that we constitute ourselves, at 
least in part, through reading—how we learn, how we relate to the world and to its inhabitants, 
and how we come to understand both who we are and what we are happens through the act of 
reading.  The inclusion of this prose work at the end of the Canterbury Tales thus provokes a 
second, more comprehensive recursive assessment, as Chaucer encourages his reader not only to 
reflect upon the Tales that have come before but indeed upon all forms of reading and 
responding that create the individual self.   
I develop my argument in four stages.  Beginning with an explanation of the ways that 
expectation influences our understanding of genre, I consider how the Parson’s emphasis on a 
particular, programmatic form of self-investigation pushes the Tale beyond the limits of its 
assumed genre: the penitential manual.   Though subtle, this difference challenges expectations 
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of genre by proffering information that a reading through the generic lens of “penitential 
manual” might miss.  I make this point by comparing the intent of the penitential tracts and the 
ways in which they convey their goals to the ideas that Chaucer presents through his Parson.   As 
part of this discussion, I include the broader tradition about penance and confession to illustrate 
the Parson’s greater emphasis on personal authority.  Next, I turn to Chaucer’s concern with the 
disjointed condition of knowledge and language and consider what such fragmentation means for 
the individual, his habits, and his understanding of the world.  I then situate Chaucer’s 
understanding of the influence of habits in the sublunar sphere within the writings of other 
philosophers with whom he would have been familiar.  Through this positioning, I demonstrate 
the extent to which the Parson’s Tale breaks free from the penitential form due to its inclusion of 
larger, more philosophical considerations about language (Augustine and Alain de Lille), 
knowledge (Boethius and Jean Gerson), and habits (Aquinas and Boethius).  Finally, I reflect 
upon the Parson’s position within the Canterbury frame and argue that this work, which for 
Chaucer demands the employment of prose, provides a methodical process of thinking and acting 
responsibly in a world that is fragmented and fractured.  To this end, I suggest that the lessons 
offered in the Parson’s Tale can, and should, shed new light on the various “life pilgrimages” of 
the other tales.  Through this reading, I argue that Chaucer’s consideration of the disconnected 
natures of knowledge, language, and the self inspire the individual’s recursive engagement both 
with himself, as he comes to understand who that self is through reading, and with the world 
around him.   
 As we learned in Chapter Three, expectations are a natural part of the cognitive process; 
when these presumptions are the main factors in interpretation, misunderstanding results, as 
evidenced by Harry Bailly.  Stephen Bax explains that the idea of genre elicits a similar process 
 173 
 
of expectation: “Genres are akin to mental structures such as concepts and schemas, in that we 
carry mental representations about genres around with us and make use of them to prepare for 
communicative events, and to interpret communicative events.”11  As he defines it, genre has 
several key features which are important for our discussion here.  For instance, “Genres are 
ideals,” that are “shared as mental constructs by members of a particular community.”12  In 
addition, they are “characterized first and foremost by the function(s) which they perform,” 
which in turn “guides the features of the genre.”13  Lastly, “Genres are identified not only by 
formal criteria, but also by social and contextual factors.”14  One issue that these features suggest 
is that genre invites expectation about what is communicated through it.  In fact, Richard 
Newhauser writes that genres “belong to the determinants of comprehension in the relationship 
between an author, his/her literary production, and the reader’s horizon of expectations…In this 
relationship, genres, as ‘literary-social institutions,’ act as the medium of negotiation for the 
necessary consensus between the author and the reader on all matters of instruction, 
entertainment, morality, and the like.”15  If genre is conceived of as a relationship between the 
author, his work, and the reader’s expectations, then the potential for misinterpretation becomes 
obvious when we consider the examples that Chaucer provides in the Thopas-Melibee.  Further, 
if genre is a negotiation, then it is akin to the “mediacioun” through which Chaucer instructs 
Little Lewis in the Astrolabe: it is a construct, another “knowledge machine,” that conveys but 
does not contain information.  And because it is a construct, presumptions relating to a particular 
genre are learned—they do not result from an innate quality of the composition.  Chaucer 
challenges the boundaries that generic assumptions impose in his Parson’s Tale.  By calling 
upon his audience’s expectations of the genre of the penitential manual, he invites them to 
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recognize that genre, like the issue of form in the Thopas-Melibee, is but one component to 
communication.
16
  
Penitential manuals gained popularity in England after the Fourth Lateran Council’s 
proclamations about confession in 1215.  These manuals intended either to help the individual 
prepare for confession or to instruct the priest on methods to tease out the entirety of the 
confessant’s sinful admissions and to determine a proper penance.  Lee Patterson has noted that 
these manuals follow a particular format with “a tripartite structure to match the three parts of 
penance: they begin with contrition and its causes, then deal with confession and the seven 
deadly sins, and conclude with an account of satisfaction.”17  Differences between the manuals 
are not surprising, but Patterson points out that Chaucer’s text is distinct because it contains “an 
elaborate account of sinfulness per se.”18  I argue that Chaucer’s concern to explain sin, its 
causes, and its consequences results from a critical difference between the objective of his 
Parson’s Tale and those of the other manuals.  Examining the ways in which sin is treated in 
Handlyng Synne, The Weye of Paradys, Instructions for Parish Priests, and Jacob’s Well, I 
suggest that Chaucer effectively refashions sin as a deed that one can learn to avoid by creating 
habits of rational analysis.  The manuals, conversely, seem to expect a cycle of sin and 
confession and thus, in following the Council’s twenty-first canon, focus their readers’ attention 
primarily on the acknowledgement but not the avoidance of iniquity.  Moreover, the Parson’s 
process is recursive in that it requires the utilization of its formula to assess both prior 
interpretations gleaned through that formula and whatever new information the individual has 
gathered, while the penitential manuals encourage a rote expression of understanding. 
The twenty-first canon declares not only that “All the faithful of both sexes shall after 
they have reached the age of discretion faithfully confess all their sins at least once a year to their 
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own (parish) priest and perform to the best of their ability the penance imposed,” but those who 
fail to abide by this proclamation are to be “cut off from the Church (excommunicated) during 
life and deprived of Christian burial in death.”19  The severity of this prescription certainly 
intends to incite compliance, but there resides within the imposed obedience a formulaic 
relationship between the individual and the Church that establishes the primacy of ecclesiastical 
authority: “Let the priest be discreet and cautious that he may pour wine and oil into the wounds 
of the one injured after the manner of a skilful physician, carefully inquiring into the 
circumstances of the sinner and the sin, from the nature of which he may understand what kind 
of advice to give and what remedy to apply, making use of different experiments to heal the sick 
one.”  This analogy suggests that, from the Church’s point of view, the priest remedies sickness; 
he does not teach his patient methods to prevent it.   
Given the threat of excommunication, it is not surprising that the manuals were, as Mary 
Flowers Braswell notes, “designed with a double purpose in mind: to teach man the intricacies of 
the doctrine of sin, so that he might learn to recognize and avoid evil, and to confess properly 
and save his soul.”20  Indeed, it is this second purpose—to save the soul through proper 
confession—that drives a very real anxiety in penitential literature.  In Handlyng Synne, for 
example, Robert Mannyng of Brunne proclaims, “Letteþ nat ȝoure synne to telle: / Þenkeþ on þe 
peynes of helle.”21  Mannyng’s point, clearly, is that imagining a future, eternal harm to the 
individual provides sufficient impulsion to reveal his sins.  Similarly, in The Weye of Paradys, 
the author contends that confession “schittyth the ȝate of helle, the whiche was open to the sinner 
er he schrof hym.”22  One of the overarching principles of these manuals is that humans 
perpetually sin; as such, these works admonish the individual to confess in order to forestall 
eternal punishment.  While Chaucer’s Parson would agree that sin cannot be eliminated, he 
 176 
 
illustrates ways of minimizing its propagation through mindful habits.  The manuals, in contrast, 
propose that humanity is redeemable only through confession after sin, which in fact, reinforces 
iniquitous patterns: the individual is to think about Mannyng’s “peynes of helle” with respect to 
confession, not with regards to a consideration about whether the offending deed should be 
committed at all; in the Weye of Paradys, the focus is on how confession shuts the gates, not on 
the fact that a conscious decision not to sin would have made the threat of the gates moot.  Both 
of these authors suggest, as does the Parson, that confession protects the sinner from Hell, but 
whereas the Parson construes confession as one part of a larger whole that focuses prominently 
on repentance and thus places more responsibility on the individual, both of these manuals 
emphasize the operations of the confessor and God’s grace.  Through the Parson, Chaucer thus 
engages concerns raised elsewhere in Lollardy, antifraternalism, and anticlericalism about the 
role a confessor should play in confession and invites his audience to participate in the 
consideration of such concerns. 
It is arguable that Church doctrine saw confession as the only means by which an 
individual could realize himself as warranting eternal life: when the sinner confesses, he 
becomes an individual actor (i.e., has agency); through the act of confession, he rejoins the 
Christian community by acknowledging his particularly human failings.  As Gregory Roper 
explains, “By probing the subjective, personal memory of the actions through the screen of the 
objective list of sins, the penitent comes, that is, to a moment of self-discovery that is 
simultaneously a discovery of how typical and unindividual that self is.”23  Taking a slightly 
different approach, David Raybin suggests that while “it is sin in its infinite variability that 
distinguishes the self,” one retains a sense of individuality within the collective: “the act of 
contrition triggers God’s mercy by signaling one’s individual readiness for salvation even as it 
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joins one into the common mass of penitents.”24  Roper and Raybin are each, individually, 
correct in their readings of Church-authorized confession, but neither addresses the fact that what 
agency the sinner obtains through this process is, at best, pallid: the Church’s focus in confession 
is on the sinner revealing actions already taken, to an individual who is trained (by the Church) 
to ask questions in a particular way to solicit particular responses.  In his Instructions for Parish 
Priests, for example, John Mirk directs the priest to confess sinners in a timely fashion:  
Whenne on hath done a synne,  
Loke he lye not longe there ynne,   
But a-non that he hym schryue,  
…………………………….. 
Leste he forȝet by lentenes day,  
And oute of mynde hyt go away.
25
   
It is the responsibility of the priest, in other words, not only to ensure a complete confession, but 
also to intervene after a sin is committed on behalf of the sinner’s soul.  Chaucer, through the 
Parson, offers a much more progressive form: he reframes the narrative of confession from the 
constraints of the Church to the rigors of repentance.  In so doing, Chaucer’s Parson invites the 
creation, and then continuation, of a program of personal agency (which is required by 
repentance), whereas the Church, via the manuals, works to maintain its own power over the 
community through the power of absolution.   
Manuals such as Mirk’s Instructions for Parish Priests and Jacob’s Well reinforce the 
Church’s claim to authority by suggesting that external forces (i.e. the confessor or the Holy 
Ghost) define the individual’s opportunity for salvation.  Mirk, for example, demands that the 
priest “grope the sore” of the confessant in order to ensure a complete confession: “And when he 
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seyþ I con no more / Freyne hym þus & grope hys sore, ‘Sone or doghter now herken me / For 
sum what I wole helpe þe,’ / And when þow herest what þow hast do / Knowlache wel a-non þer 
to.”26  The anxiety that Mirk communicates in his text hints at a real concern for the safety of his 
fellow Christians, but at the same time, it also implies that the individual can neither be entrusted 
to reveal the entirety of his sins, nor to discover the details without the intercession of the priest.  
Thus, he underscores the clergy’s role as an essential mediator between the confessant and his 
eternal destination.  Jacob’s Well, likewise, argues that man’s capacities are given to him: in this 
case, “þe ȝyfte of knowynge, of kunnynge” comes from the Holy Ghost.27  It is only through this 
gift, the author asserts, that one learns self-knowledge: “it techyth þe to liven ryȝtfully a-monge 
euyll lyuerys, & to teche ryȝtly, & to defende þi feyth wyth resouns fro inpugnyng of 
heretykes…it techyth þe to kun knowe þe-self, whanne þou art synfull, & whanne þou art 
ryȝtfull, and how þou schalt gouerne þe to saue þi soule.”28  In other words, what “good” the 
individual accomplishes results not from free will, but rather from a gift from an external source.  
In this instance, self-knowledge and the ability to make good choices are gifts from the Holy 
Ghost.  Whether attempting to provoke compliance through intimidation or fear, one idea seems 
to govern these manuals’ construction: based on man’s inherent flaws, the Church must assume 
authority over the individual in all matters pertaining to the soul because man simply cannot be 
trusted with that responsibility.
29
  The problem with this strategy is that the Church’s assertion of 
authority overrides the individual’s free will, rendering it, and the responsibility it demands, 
inconsequential. 
The point should be made that the Parson’s instruction is not exceptionally unorthodox: 
to a large extent, he agrees with the authors of the penitential manuals and conforms to the 
traditional confessional texts, such as the Ancrene Wisse.  There are two distinct shifts away 
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from these more conventional works.  The first is in the Parson’s suggestion that man chooses 
his eternal destination for himself.  Christ’s mercy “is alwey redy to receiven hym” (X.1073), but 
the mercy does not force itself onto the individual; man shall have the “strengthe of the help of 
God, and of al hooly chirche, and of the proteccioun of aungels, if hym list” (1075, my 
emphasis).  Here, the Parson refocuses away from the power of God or Christ to save man and 
instead illuminates the authority—and thus the responsibility—of the individual to know and 
thus to save himself.  While this statement, of itself, is conventional, the Parson’s extension of 
this idea is not.  Directly after calling attention to the choice (“if hym list”), the Parson offers 
another: man “may” purchase an eternity in Heaven “by deeth and mortificacion of synne” 
(1080).  To be blunt, the Parson states that it is not God who saves or damns; rather, the 
individual chooses to accept or reject God’s grace after death based on the habits that he has 
cultivated during life.  The second shift away from the penitential manuals and confessional texts 
has to do with the Parson’s position within the Canterbury collection.  By including this work 
within a secular text, Chaucer increases its accessibility while at the same time suggesting that 
the information contained herein is valuable beyond a specifically religious context.  Through the 
Parson, Chaucer argues that one’s productiveness or frustrations in this life and, more 
importantly, one’s eternal destination, are not tendered either through God’s judgment or grace, 
as the manuals proclaim, or through an eleventh-hour intervention by Christ, but rather remain 
choices available to each individual not only throughout life but also into death.  Further, the 
determination of the benefit or futility of one’s actions and the cultivation of productive habits—
both of which are included within the Parson’s method—profit all readers. 
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This interpretation of the interminable nature of man’s free will is strikingly Boethian.  
As Philosophy explains the extent to which wicked people bring about their own misery and 
good people find true happiness, she asserts,  
For yif thou conferme thi corage to the beste thinges, thow ne hast noon nede of 
no juge to yeven the prys or mede; for thow hast joined thiself to the most 
excellent thing.  And yif thow have enclyned thi studies to the wikkide thinges, ne 
seek no foreyne wrekere out of thiself; for thow thiself hast thrist thiself into 
wikke thinges, ryght as thow myghtest loken by diverse tymes the fowle erthe and 
the hevene, and that alle othere thinges stynten fro withoute, so that thow nere 
neyther in [hevene] ne in erthe, ne saye no thyng more; thane scholde it semen to 
the as by oonly resoun of lokynge that thow were in the sterres, and now in the 
erthe.  But the peple ne loketh nat on these thinges.  (IV.p4.194-209) 
This is “the jugement of the perdurable law” (IV.p4.193-94): eternal law allows for man to 
choose his own goodness (and thus his reward) or his own desolation (and thus his confusion).  
What he sees and the way he understands what he sees is determined “by oonly resoun of 
lokynge.”  For Chaucer, the responsibility of such agency requires that an individual develop a 
process of continual self-examination, adaptation, and action (i.e., a habit) that is founded on 
rational choices informed by all of the data, though incomplete and imperfect, that is available to 
that individual.  If the reader is reading within the bounds of his expectations of the penitential 
manual genre, this perspective would be missed.  To follow Philosophy, such readers “loketh nat 
on these thinges.”  Yet, Chaucer makes this knowledge available to those who read beyond the 
boundary.  
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The figure of the Parson and his characterization as a Lollard provides an interesting 
analogy to this discussion of genre.  When the Parson chastises the Host for swearing, Bailly 
answers, “O Jankin, be ye there? / I smelle a Lollere in the wynd” (II.1172-73).  To stress his 
interpretation of the Parson’s religiosity, Bailly repeats this label four lines later: “This Lollere 
here wil prechen us somewhat” (1177).  Katherine Little argues that the Host’s assessment 
“seems to be confirmed by the portrait of the Parson in the General Prologue.  This Parson 
‘Cristes gospel trewely wolde preche’ (I.481), and his single-minded adherence to interpreting 
and teaching the gospel…supports the term Lollere.”30  Frances McCormack agrees: “It 
is…likely that Chaucer wanted his audience to see shades of Lollardy in the depiction of the 
Parson.”31  Labeling the Parson’s Tale as a Lollard work is not as clear-cut.  As Little points out, 
the Tale “does not confirm the heretical tendencies suggested by the Parson’s earlier 
appearances.  Rather, as a penitential manual that reinforces the necessity of auricular 
confession, it concerns itself with one of the practices vehemently opposed by the Wycliffites.”32  
McCormack’s extensive study, on the other hand, traces Lollard threads throughout the text.  
While I find that the Parson creates a role for the confessor that is more supportive and less 
authoritative and places more emphasis on the authority of the individual, I agree with Little’s 
contention that the way the Parson is characterized earlier in the Canterbury Tales is 
intentionally distinct from the Tale he tells.  Further, I believe that McCormack’s investigation 
highlights the importance of looking beyond the negotiations and expectations of genre.  I would 
like to push this argument one step further: in categorizing the Parson’s belief-system via Bailly 
and the pilgrim-narrator, Chaucer evokes expectations about the Tale that this “Lollere” will 
proffer.  Similar to Bailly’s attempt to determine the type of story that “Chaucer” would provide 
based on the latter’s appearance alone, Chaucer draws his reader into the text by placing him in a 
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position that is similar to Bailly’s.  The question, then, is this: can the reader learn from all of the 
information that is presented, or is his understanding circumscribed by what he expects to read?  
Again, I would follow Philosophy: the answer depends on how the reader looks “on these 
thinges.”  
Although the Parson’s Tale is generically similar to penitential manuals, Chaucer signals 
his departure from this form by defining a different genre for the tale.  Having rejected fables, 
rhyme, and alliterative verse, the Parson proclaims that he will “telle a myrie tale in prose” (46); 
more specifically, he offers a “meditacioun” (55).  When the Host accepts—“‘Telleth,’ quod he,’ 
youre meditacioun’” (69)—he places a condition on the telling: “But hasteth yow; the sonne 
wole adoun; / Beth fructuous and that in litel space” (70-71).  Though “meditacioun” in this 
context most obviously indicates a moral discourse or sermon, the use of this word also suggests 
that the subject matter requires space for contemplation.
33
  The distinction between the “litel 
space” that Bailly affords the Parson’s speech and the textual space that the Parson’s 1005 lines 
require invites a consideration of the fleeting nature of speech and the fixity of text.  In the 
House of Fame, the eagle remarks that “Soun ys noght but eyr ybroken, / And every speche that 
ys yspoken, / …/ In his substaunce ys but air” (765-68); while texts remain bound by linear time 
given their physicality, they are able to maintain a quasi-permanence that speech cannot enjoy.  
Their role in both recursive analysis and “learning to know” is essential to these processes.  
Further, considering that the method the Parson advocates requires a lifetime commitment, the 
textual space that the length of this tale demands is, indeed, “litel.”  As the Parson avers 
throughout his tale, the mind, if not actively engaged in the process of productive consideration, 
can easily be overthrown by emotion; by creating this meditation through text, Chaucer invites 
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his readers to return to the Parson’s Tale in order to remember, reevaluate, and recreate their 
individual paths as knowledge and experience demand. 
Chaucer’s choice to compose the Parson’s Tale in prose instead of in verse both speaks 
the importance of its subject matter and provides an example of the potential of language that 
aims to communicate its sentence with clarity.   The malleability of language, however, is not a 
subject unique to Chaucer’s Parson; the authors of the penitential manuals likewise express 
concern about the capacity of words to deceive.  The author of Jacob’s Well, for instance, 
advises that confession be direct and plainly-spoken: “ne telle noȝt in þi schryfte flateryng iapys 
& talys, no oþere processe þat longeth noȝt to þi schryfte; but symplely late þin herte & pi tunge 
acorde in one, & reherse in þi schryfte no proces but þat nedyth.”34  In Handlyng Synne, Robert 
Mannyng informs his readers that sins which are covered “wyþ feyr wrd” benefit the devil and 
harm the sinner: “Yn swyche wrdes þe fend ys queynte / To make þy shryfte fals & feynte.”35  
By calling attention to the potential for language to obscure the sin, either with fair words or 
excessive and misdirecting details, both authors submit that “colored” confessions are worthless: 
in Jacob’s Well, when sins remain unconfessed, “þanne were all lost”; in Handlyng Synne, “Wyþ 
mouþe to speke & noght to hyde, / Elles hyt ys a spyce of pryde.”36  Through the Parson’s 
explanation of this issue, Chaucer again pushes beyond the manuals to assign responsibility 
directly to the individual who uses language intentionally to obscure the truth: “Thow shalt nat 
eek peynte thy confessioun by faire subtile wordes, to covere the moore thy synne; for thanne 
bigilestow thyself, and nat the preest.  Thow most tellen it platly, be it nevere so foul ne so 
horrible” (1022).  Though the “painting” of one’s sins with beautiful, subtle words may minimize 
the shame of the sin or the penance assigned to make restitution not only does this strategy not 
benefit the sinner, but indeed, it entices him to sin again.  Furthermore, by proposing that one 
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confess “platly,” the Parson indicates that a speaker can construe (or misconstrue) meaning by 
the way he constructs his words.  Thus, Chaucer distinguishes his Parson from these other works 
through the responsibility that he places on the sinner-speaker: though the goal of covering the 
sin with words may be to deceive the priest, the fact that Chaucer’s Parson focuses on the 
consequences to the sinner in the earthly realm highlights the degree to which one creates life, or 
the “derknesse of deeth,” through choice.  In offering this meditation in prose, Chaucer models 
an attempt at speaking “platly” to communicate as clearly and as openly as possible within the 
constraints of an imperfect system. 
The fact that knowledge and understanding are limited both by human capacity and the 
incomplete nature endemic to this universal space complicates the Parson’s method of rational 
analysis.  As discussed in Chapter Two, the medieval concept of a determinate universe was 
based on the Ptolemaic model, which placed Earth in the center of nine crystalline spheres, with 
the First Mover governing the ninth.  When this model was adopted into Christianity, God 
became the definable magnitude of the universe.  While everything above the lunar sphere is in a 
state of perfection, what resides in the sublunar sphere remains deficient, incomplete, and 
flawed.  Given that the medieval understanding of infinity allowed for infinite reduction but not 
infinite enlargement, the various imperfections and confusions that are natural to this cosmic 
space increase indefinitely as one moves from the lunar sphere to Earth and then into Hell.  What 
this cosmology suggests is that, while Hell is an irredeemably confused and unproductive space, 
the earth serves as its definable magnitude and thus as the boundary for its infinite, and innate, 
degenerations.  As such, the space between that boundary and the lunar sphere, though inherently 
imperfect, is one that nonetheless permits a rational ordering.  Through reason, man can use the 
knowledge of both the natural qualities of this space and that of his own inherited limitations in 
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order to assume agency over those things which are within his power and avoid or otherwise 
accept those things which remain without.  I argue that for the Parson, such agency is only 
possible over the self—as it is for Chaucer in the Retraction, Boethius in the Boece, and 
Prudence and Melibee in the Tale of Melibee.  Yet through the Parson, Chaucer suggests that 
even self-authority is imperfect, as self-knowledge is constrained by the very factors which 
innately limit both knowledge and language in general.  Further, agency does not, of itself, limit 
the potential to sin.  The force which drives the discipline to make distinctions between what is 
within and without one’s power and then acting on these decisions, therefore, requires the 
development of habitual, rational engagement that not only leads to personal satisfaction as 
defined in the Boece, but in fact permits a choice between posthumous Heaven and Hell. 
While Heaven is perfection and Hell is the ultimate irrational chaos, the sublunar sphere 
is the intermediate space where the individual can either surrender to fleshly desire or else 
develop mindful systems which enhance the intellect and then promote those practices which 
make the individual more in the image and likeness of God.  As the Parson makes clear, it is this 
former assuetude that results in confusion and emotional servitude: “Soothly, synnes been the 
weyes that leden folk to helle” (141).  By using “sins” as the subject of the sentence, the Parson 
at once gives governing control to the transgressions, while at the same time stripping power 
away from the sinner: the individual, then, becomes something that is acted upon instead of 
someone who acts.  When Adam and Eve commit the “original sin,” they temporarily lose 
agency, as their eyes are opened by a knowledge which is at once fractured and imperfectly 
understood (to borrow from Chaucer in his Astrolabe); the more perilous result, however, is that 
sin severs their intimate connection with the Divine.  In this way, original sin further weakens the 
individual’s inherent capacity to understand rightly; nonetheless, while the realization of perfect 
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understanding remains impossible, the individual can strengthen or steadily diminish the bond 
with the Divine through choice.  The fact that Chaucer uses the plural forms of “sin” and “way” 
serves to reify the medieval conception of the universe as discussed above, as well as to 
introduce the peril of habitual sin: the “weyes” serve as the diverse and sundry paths whose 
continual travel lead “folk” to Hell, while “synnes,” driven by a combination of desire and lack 
of reason, pull their cargo in whichever direction temptation inclines.  Such a path has no proper 
destination because it is not considered, is ever-variant because it is guided by each moment’s 
yearning, and is unproductive because it separates, with each step, the individual from his 
intellect.  What the Parson makes clear is that the individual creates his own path to Hell by 
permitting the naturalization—the habituation—of sin and thus the implicit abandonment of the 
ability to reason and act in accordance with that reason.  Through the choice to indulge in 
constant sin, man loses his status as an individual and instead becomes akin to the collective 
“folk” who eternally circle vainly through Dante’s Inferno. 
The intellectual impotence that results from an engrained pattern of irrationality is 
illustrated in both Dante’s Inferno and Boethius’ Consolation of Philosophy.  As Dante’s 
pilgrim-narrator explains, in the second circle of Hell reside the carnal sinners, “che la ragion 
sommettono al talento” [who subject their reason to their lust] (Canto 5.39); in this space, “La 
bufera infernal, che mai non resta,/ mena li spirit con la sua rapina; / voltando e percotendo li 
molesta” [The infernal whirlwind, which never rests, drives the spirits before its violence; 
turning and striking, it tortures them] (31-33).  Not only does the rapid rotation of the 
environment endlessly and violently thrust the powerless souls wherever it pleases, but such 
propulsion also dooms them to an eternity of pursued and pursuing.  Dante’s use of verse 
parallels this sensation, as its structure propels the reader forwards and backwards.  Though the 
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sinners persist in their desires, the constant churning of the winds forbids the consummation of 
their lusts.  Their thoughts and actions, fixedly directed by a ceaseless yearning, are forever out 
of place and irrelevant to their situation; through this, they remain condemned.  In the Boece, 
when Philosophy appears before the grief-stricken Boethius, she recognizes that his amnesia 
results from the fact that his worldly cares have mesmerized him: “Allas!  How the thought of 
this man, dreynt in overthrowynge depnesse, dulleth and forleteth his propre clernesse, myntynge 
to gon into foreyne dirknesses as ofte as his anoyos bysynes waxeth withoute mesure, that is 
dryven with werldly wyndes” (I.m2.1-6).  Of course, the Muses share no small part in the 
creation of these winds, as their immediate banishment by Philosophy indicates.  Similar to 
Dante’s subsequent use of a whirlwind to illustrate the powerlessness of sinners who have so 
permitted their desires to overrule their minds that they are trapped in an eternity of perpetual 
pursuit, Philosophy explains that Boethius’ rational mind is drowned in overthrowing emotions, 
which in turn intentionally propel him with “worldly winds” into the darkness of confusion.   
As the Parson defines it, Hell is a physical, eternal space: it is pure darkness (X.182); it is 
shame and confusion (187); it is degradation and corruption (191); it lacks food (194), drink, 
clothing (for body (196) and soul (197)), friendship (199), and delight (207).  Not only is Hell 
agonizing, but the Parson explains that the “darkness of death” results from “the synnes that the 
wrecched man hath doon, whiche that destourben hym to see the face of God, right as dooth a 
derk clowde bitwixe us and the sonne” (185); strictly speaking, the abject sinner cannot see the 
face of God because of his sins.  This inability to see beyond the cloud of one’s emotions 
represents the incapacity of man to use reason when he has entrenched himself in habitual vice.  
Chaucer’s Parson thereby implies that those who reside in Hell are held in thrall by their own 
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emotions: it is not God who damns, but rather the loss of reason through the naturalization of 
sinful thoughts and actions leads individuals to a place from which they cannot escape. 
Hell, it is important to note, is not just an eternal, subterranean space.  Given the close 
proximity between Earth and Hell in the Ptolemaic model, the potential similarities in experience 
within these two realms are not surprising: the “misese” of shame and confusion and the 
darkness of the mind, in fact, are worldly matters.  Food and drink, companionship, and shelter 
relate to the body, while mental darkness refers to the obscurity of the intellect.  Further, the 
disorder of Hell begins in the sublunar sphere.  As the Parson explains, “And al be it so that God 
hath creat alle thynges in right ordre, and no thyng withouten ordre, but alle thynges been 
ordeyned and nombred; yet, nathelees, they that been dampned been nothyng in ordre, ne holden 
noon ordre, / for the erthe ne shal bere hem no fruyt” (218-219).  What the Parson proposes here 
is that both belonging to and being apart from the order of God occurs during life: they that have 
been damned, i.e. led to Hell by their sins, experience the disorder of damnation while 
opportunities still remain to reform.  By not checking the impulse to sin, by not scrutinizing 
habits and changing them as necessary, and by not considering action but rather reacting, man 
damns himself for an eternity because, after death, he loses the potential to consider alternative 
possibilities inasmuch as the naturalization of his fractured understanding has been irrevocably 
set.    
Though the choice to sin separates man from God’s divine order and creates a personal 
Hell through routine sinfulness, man can redefine his course and thus control his opportunity for 
salvation through contrition: “contricion destroyeth the prisoun of helle, and maketh wayk and 
fieble alle the strengthes of the develes, and restoreth the yiftes of the Hooly Goost and of alle 
goode vertues” (311).  The process of contrition is mentally demanding and particular to each 
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individual, but the impetus is “the verray sorwe that a man receyveth in his herte” (129).  That 
the spark of contrition happens independent of man’s free will indicates that the knowledge of 
good and evil that man inherits from Adam and Eve, i.e. the governing conscience, speaks 
through the darkness and confusion of Hell.  Yet contrition requires more than the experience of 
sorrow: if such remorse results from an intuitive faculty, then its experience is natural and 
irrepressible, provided that one’s habits have not obscured its recognition.37  What one does with 
this sorrow is a choice: one can either dismiss or otherwise excuse it, or one can, “with sad 
purpos to shryve hym, and to do penaunce and neveremoore to do synne” (129).  It is through the 
exercise of this latter sequence that one may destroy the prison of Hell by mindfully creating new 
habits, or reinforcing current routines, that intentionally avoid the circumstances which lead to 
iniquity.   
If this prison is created through the habitual thoughts, speech, and actions that remove the 
sinner from God’s natural order and hinder his ability to see the Divine, it stands to reason that 
developing beneficial habits prohibit its reconstruction.  Not only does contrition destroy the 
prison, but it also restores man to his “goode weye”: “it clenseth the soule of synne, and 
delivereth the soule fro the peyne of helle…and restoreth it to alle goodes espirituels, and to the 
compaignye and communyoun of hooly chirche” (312).  By recognizing the fault, confessing it, 
doing penance, and actively creating different patterns that avoid repeating the sin, the individual 
can return to the path and once again find refreshment for his soul.  More importantly, through 
confession the sinner returns to the company and communion of Holy Church; in other words, 
one has the power to return to and participate in the Divine order even after sinning.  The 
completion of this process does not mean that the penitent will not return to sin: as a flawed 
individual residing in a flawed realm, recidivism remains a real possibility.  As such, the Parson 
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warns his audience that “al the while that a man hath in hym the peyne of concupiscence, it is 
impossible but he be tempted somtime and moeved in his flessh to synne. / And this thyng may 
nat faille as longe as he lyveth; it may wel wexe fieble…but fully ne shal it nevere quenche” 
(339-41).  Even with the formation of new habits, temptation remains and will, at times, 
overpower the sinner, but the point is to create new patterns of behavior to combat temptation, to 
work for the benefit of the self, others, and God, and to respond to the enticements of this world 
in productive ways.  
 The Parson contends that the development of such patterns requires three components: an 
understanding of the power of language, a growing ability to engage effectively with one’s own 
responses and with the world around him, and an appreciation of how important it is to govern 
one’s actions with knowledge.  Chaucer provides an anti-example of a reckless reaction that is 
justified through language directly before the Parson’s Tale in the Manciple’s Tale.  Here, 
spoken truth results in distorted action: when the crow informs Phebus of his wife’s infidelity, 
Phebus kills his wife and blames the bird for his rash action: “thurgh thee my wyf is slayn” 
(IX.302).  To punish the bird, Phebus tortures, permanently silences, and exiles him.  The moral, 
as the Manciple gives his audience to believe, is that, regardless of truth, it is best to remain 
silent: “Kepe wel thy tonge and thenk upon the crowe” (362).  This threat, be silent lest you be 
maimed and discarded, redirects the audience’s attention away from Phebus’ thoughtless and 
disastrous actions and asks them to accept this response as natural because the crow, really, 
should have kept his beak shut.  By following the Manciple’s Tale with the Parson’s, Chaucer 
calls attention to the potential of speech and the degree to which language can be shaped to the 
speaker’s ends, and the fact that Chaucer follows the poetry of the Manciple’s Tale with the 
prose of the Parson’s underscores such potentiality—the elaborate construction of poetry, and 
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here specifically of the Manciple’s verse, invites consideration because the sentence is not 
plainly spoken (though the Manciple would have us to believe otherwise), whereas the prose of 
the Parson invites meditation on themes that are developed clearly and directly throughout the 
tale.  More specifically, the Parson addresses in intentionally plain terms the power of language: 
it can induce one’s damnation, but it also has the promise to correct one’s understanding and to 
turn the world right-side up.   
While the Parson spends much of his time highlighting the mistaken thinking that spirals 
and fractures towards confusion, chaos, and eventual damnation, he also offers a means of 
engaging with thoughts and behaviors that are every bit as individual as are ways of sinning.  
Though less explicit than his discussion of futile and damning routines, the Parson contends that 
the development of beneficial habits must be governed by knowledge, in this case, knowledge of 
the processes of sin: “For certes, ther is no deedly synne that it nas first in mannes thought and 
after that in his delit, and so forth into consentynge and into dede” (297).  With the possible 
exception of the act itself, the process of sinning is framed by language: the thought is 
constructed through words, as is the desire, and the permission to engage in the act requires that 
language be composed in such a way as to make the deed acceptable.  Just as the sinner beguiles 
only himself with a dishonest confession, so he deceives himself by painting the thought and 
desire with fair, subtle words in order to permit a future act or to justify one already committed.  
For this reason, the Parson states that “man oghte sorwe for his wikkede wordes as wel as for his 
wikkede dedes” (300).  In fact, “actual sin” occurs at the moment when the individual sanctions 
the deed: “thus is synne acompliced by temptacioun, by delit, and by consentynge; and thanne is 
the synne cleped actueel” (357).  Sin occurs through language.  As such, the words that 
introduced temptation to desire and crafted it into acceptability should inspire as much sorrow as 
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the physical act.  In order to create new, more profitable patterns, the Parson asserts, one must 
understand the process of sinning.  This awareness empowers the individual not only to inhibit 
action through deliberation, but also to recognize that the power of language can promote virtue 
when it results from reason and then from will.  The promise of personal agency thus allows 
equally for the individual to develop practices that serve the Good or to foster patterns of iniquity 
and vice. 
Chaucer first deals with the issue of human agency in his Boece.  The idea that each 
person asserts his individuality though his choice either to sin or to confess those sins follows the 
Stoic vision as illustrated by Boethius’ Philosophy: “For every thing that may naturely usen 
resoun, it hath doom by which it discernith and demeth every thing; thanne knoweth it by itself 
thinges that ben to fleen and thinges that ben to desiren” (V.p2.10-14).  The difference between 
Philosophy’s interpretation and that of the penitential manuals has to do with the degree of 
personal agency that an individual claims: the manuals intend to reunite the sinner with God via 
the priest or the Holy Ghost, while Philosophy suggests that those who use reason have the 
capacity to determine which actions are just and reasonable before the action itself is performed 
can, through their own faculties, recall and then act profitably on what they once knew but had 
forgotten.  In other words, the manuals focus on remitting actions that have already occurred, 
while Philosophy advocates that the individual use his judgment to “discern and deem 
everything” before he acts.  It is within this latter line of reasoning that Chaucer situates his 
Parson.  Though the Parson clearly acknowledges the necessity of the priest during confession—
he is the “meene and mediatour bitwixe Crist and the synnere” (990)—the purpose of his tale is 
to invite his audience to engage in a process of consideration that empowers them, individually, 
to become agents in the creation of their own destinies.  Chaucer’s Parson thus differs from the 
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medieval Church’s definition of individuality by suggesting that the surrender of free will leads 
to a habituation of thoughtlessness that in turn herds the individual into the faceless multitude of 
“folk”; one remains an individual (i.e. has agency) so long as he thinks and acts rationally.  
What’s more, the Parson’s focus on repentance demands that the individual develop and then 
rely upon his own faculties of reason, whereas the Church’s claimed dominion over the process 
of confession ultimately denies such agency. 
 The Parson advocates this individual, mindful engagement from the very beginning of his 
tale.  He suggests a process that requires gathering and then considering both knowledge and the 
vehicles through which that knowledge is transmitted before determining a response: “Stondeth 
upon the weyes, and seeth and axeth of olde pathes (that is to seyn, of olde sentences) which is 
the goode wey, / and walketh in that wey, and ye shal fynde refresshynge for youre soules” (77-
78).  In using the plural “weyes,” “pathes,” and “sentences,” the Parson calls his audience’s 
attention to the limited perspectives of all knowledge machines and to the idea that “refreshment 
for the soul” is a consequence to understanding the fractured nature of knowing.  Yet if an 
individual dismisses this process in favor of capitulating to earthly delights, he surrenders control 
of both his body and his mind; in essence, he becomes a beast (in Boece, a non-person).  As the 
Parson explains, habitual sinning leads to a change in human nature: 
for biforn that tyme that ye synned, ye were the children of God and lymes of the 
regne of God; / but for youre synne ye been woxen thral, and foul, and membres 
of the feend, hate of aungels, sclaundre of hooly chirche, and foode of the false 
serpent, perpetueel matere of the fir of helle; / and yet moore foul and 
abhomynable, for ye trespassen so ofte tyme as dooth the hound that retourneth to 
eten his spewyng. / And yet be ye fouler for youre longe continuyng in synne and 
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youre synful usage, for which ye be roten in youre synne as a beest in his dong. 
(136-39, emphasis mine) 
While sin alienates Adam and Eve from the Divine, the Parson asserts that man maintains a 
stronger connection to God when he eschews sin; when man chooses sin, he simultaneously 
weakens his bond with God and bolsters his connection to the devil.  Man’s affiliation with these 
ethereal beings fluctuates as he either persists in sin or amends his behavior.  As the Parson 
makes clear, man returns to God during those moments of penitential satisfaction, but these 
moments last only to the extent that he retains his agency; when he chooses to regress to fleshly 
pursuits, then he loses his autonomy once again.  Worse than the vacillation between virtue and 
vice are the deepening effects of one’s unthinking habits, which the Parson construes as a dog 
returning to eat his own vomit.  Through this metaphor, the Parson creates an analogy between 
persistent sinning and natural behavior.  The dog returns and consumes what he has regurgitated 
not because of conscious deliberation and choice to ingest the “spewyng” but rather because it is 
a natural behavior for the dog.  Chaucer’s use of figural language in this passage works to assert 
a new literal condition within the prose medium: sin increasingly strips man of his humanity 
because its regularity cultivates a new, non-human nature.  By including this discussion within 
the Canterbury frame, Chaucer brings a religious commonplace into the courtly realm and offers, 
for the consideration of his readers, the power of habits to shape choice. 
The images of beasts and bodily waste in this passage highlight the divide between man’s 
capacity and his failings.  Though man, through his inheritance from Adam and Eve, is “as 
goddes, knowynge good and harm” (328), his choice to sin and worse, to create unthinking 
habits that become natural, sinful reactions, degrades him to the level of beasts.  In other words, 
man’s character is created by his actions.  As Aristotle writes in his Nicomachean Ethics, “states 
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of character arise out of like activities,” and for this reason, “we must examine the nature of 
actions, namely how we ought to do them; for these determine also the nature of the states of 
character that are produced.”38  In the Consolation of Philosophy, Boethius also addresses this 
issue.  When he faults Fortune for his downfall, Philosophy chastises him for his irrational 
response to Fortune’s character: “Enforcestow the to aresten or withholden the swyftnesse and 
the sweighe of hir turnynge wheel?  O thow fool of alle mortel foolis!  Yif Fortune bygan to 
duelle stable, she cessede thanne to ben Fortune” (II.p1.110-14).  In reminding Boethius of 
Fortune’s nature, she also reminds him of his own, which “were wont to hurtlen and despysen hir 
with manly woordes, whan sche was blaundysschinge and present, and pursuydest hir with 
sentences that weren drawen out of myn entre (that is to seyn, of myn enformacioun)” (II.p1.27-
32).  What Philosophy offers Boethius is a way of rationally analyzing his situation through 
education and reason: in this case, understanding Fortune’s character “maketh that the manaces 
of Fortune ne ben nat for to dreden, ne the flaterynges of hir to ben desired” (II.p1.88-91).  For 
the Parson, the idea that an individual can change his character through the conscious shaping of 
habitual actions, eradicating those that are pernicious and inculcating those that are productive, is 
at once promising and perilous.  The true issue is one of self-knowledge.  Understanding how 
and to what end personal habits direct behavior, as well as the methods for creating and 
reinforcing beneficial habits, provide the individual with the tools necessary to shape his own 
nature and thus his destiny.   
Chaucer, certainly, is not singular in his understanding of the powerful influence of 
habits.  Arguing that the nature of habit “is principally related to the will,” Thomas Aquinas 
distinguishes between the apprehensive and appetitive powers and concludes that “in the 
appetitive powers…no habit is natural in its beginning.”39  Habits created by the appetitive or 
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desirous principle, then, occur as the result of unintentional repetition, and the more often the act 
is performed, the more the habit is reinforced: “repeated acts cause a habit to grow.”40  When 
confronting choices between right and wrong, between accepting and avoiding temptation, 
stronger, established habits dictate the response of those who indulge unmediated reaction over a 
considered response.  As Aquinas remarks, “man differs from irrational animals in this, that he is 
master of his actions.”41  Following this reasoning, the Parson argues that man’s denial of his 
innate ability to control his choices in favor of consenting to emotional temptations makes him 
fouler than the dog that eats his own vomit and more abhorrent than the beast that mires itself in 
its own feces.  By choosing not to “master his actions” and instead to allow sinful habits to 
determine his responses, the sinner departs from the “goode wey” and stumbles into the chaos of 
Hell.  Should he continue in this state, he is damned: “they that been dampned been so bounde 
that they ne may neither wel do ne wel thynke” (686).   
In part, the nature of the sublunar sphere, with its imperfections and inconsistencies, 
creates the potential for the emotions to overwhelm the individual; the fact that knowledge, too, 
is and always will be fragmentary complicates this situation further.  As the Parson consistently 
reminds his audience, his own understanding is likewise incomplete: “this meditacioun / I putte it 
ay under correccioun / Of clerkes” (55-57); “and many another twig that I kan nat declare” (391); 
“Of whiche, smoothly, thise forseyde thynges, and mo than I have seyd, apertenen to Pride that is 
in the herte of man” (410); “And whan they sourden by freletee unavysed, and sodeynly 
withdrawen ayeyn, al been they grevouse synnes, I gesse that they ne been nat deedly” (449).  By 
calling attention to the limitations of his own knowledge, the Parson reminds his audience that 
his is but one perspective of many and that their understanding is dependent upon personal 
investment in acquiring knowledge.  In contrast to the Manciple who expects his audience not 
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only to accept his false moral, but in fact to take in and act upon it unthinkingly, the Parson 
demands his audience’s involvement in the acquisition and analysis of information for the very 
reason that what he offers is not the potential entirety of that which is available: “no man kan 
outrely telle the nombre of the twigges and of the harmes that cometh of Pride” (390), for 
example.  The fact that the Parson’s knowledge, indeed, everyone’s knowledge, is incomplete 
suggests that the very process of understanding that he espouses throughout his tale requires 
continual effort.  Put another way, the way out of Hell is through a perpetual consideration of 
one’s thoughts, desires, permissions and actions; the way to Heaven is through the creation of 
habits of engagement with knowledge of oneself.  Certainly, this discussion of imperfect 
knowledge has a long history in both religious and scientific contexts; its inclusion, instead of 
offering new information, reminds the reader to acknowledge the innate imperfections of 
knowing. 
In view of the fact that language and understanding are necessarily incomplete, self-
knowledge, by extension, is likewise fragmentary.  The method that the Parson offers is therefore 
complicated not only as a result of incomplete knowledge of the external world, but also a lack 
of true understanding of the internal self.  As the late medieval theologian Jean Gerson affirms, 
“The diversity of human temperament is incomprehensible—not just in several men, but in one 
and the same man—and not, I say, in different years or months or weeks, but in days, hours, and 
moments!”42  In proposing that disposition is not a fixed state of being, Gerson offers perhaps the 
chief reason why Boethius succumbs to the seductions of the Muses, why the Parson commits 
the occasional transgression, and why the cultivation of a habit of self-reflection is essential: 
simply, because we live in a realm of flux.  This transience highlights not only the imperfection 
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of knowledge, but also the degree to which the fundamental deficiency of language prohibits a 
concrete understanding of, and ability to rely upon, anything—including the self.  
Augustine’s theory of language is instructive here because it attempts to bridge the 
imperfection of man’s word with the perfection of the Word.  In the Confessions, Augustine 
writes that ideas are not language and that words can only convey the sentiment, but not the idea: 
“I have heard the sounds of the words by which their meaning is expressed when they are 
discussed, but the words are one thing and the principle another.”43  In fact, it is this notion that 
leads Augustine to conclude that his communication with God happens within a space that is 
both linguistic and nonlinguistic: “I make my confession, not in words and sounds made by the 
tongue alone, but with the voice of my soul and in my thoughts which cry aloud to you.  Your 
ear can hear them.”44  Humans obviously cannot receive such extralinguistic information, and 
language, as Augustine notes, offers verisimilitude at best: “When they hear me speak about 
myself, how do they know whether I am telling the truth, since no one knows a man’s thoughts, 
except the man’s own spirit that is within him?”45  His criticism hints at a concern about the 
potential for language to create impressions of truth which intend to mislead the receiver. While 
Augustine asserts that the flaws of language are corrected by God’s intercession, his skepticism 
also encourages the reader, as Chaucer later does through his Parson, to remember that 
communication offers perspectives of a greater, and often unknown, whole.
46
   
Similarly, in the Anticlaudianus, Alain de Lille draws attention to the issues of language 
when Theology steps forward to help Phronesis and Reason, as they cannot progress into the 
heavenly spheres because their language no longer functions in that space.  He explains, “What 
the tongue cannot tell the picture does: how language, since it fails to reach the essence of God, 
grows senseless when it tries to take refuge in its old meaning.”47  Alain’s suggestion points to 
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the complex nature of language: when words fail, meaning is communicated through the vision 
alone, but since the mind interprets images through language, the individual must rely on faith, 
Alain’s Theology, to complete the design.  Any degree of self-knowledge, according to these 
philosophers, is fractional and fleeting, at best; for Augustine and Alain, such awareness requires 
divine intervention.  The Parson, in contrast, argues that man is capable of acknowledging the 
flaws of language and yet using that language competently and virtuously.  Again, Chaucer 
empowers the reader to develop his own personal agency, through which he can make rational 
choices born of conscious habits, instead of relying solely on outside involvement.  The Parson’s 
Tale, then, exposes the benefits of both religious commonplaces and philosophical 
considerations of language and self-awareness to a larger audience. 
The impossibility of ever knowing one’s self fully is not, as it might seem, an obstruction 
to the process but rather a crucial component in the equation. By acknowledging his own 
limitations, the Parson highlights the limitations of the individual: confession, for instance, must 
be complete “as ferforth as he kan” (319).  Given the limitations of the human mind, a total or 
complete confession is impossible, but the Parson’s focus on intention allows for the inevitable 
lack of both understanding and the ability to communicate that understanding in toto while at the 
same time affirming the potential of the attempt to “do well and think well.”  Moving away from 
the strict and threatening demands of the manuals, which insinuate that salvation results 
primarily from a recommitment to Church doctrine, the Parson argues that it is through the 
acceptance of ultimate imperfection coupled with the intention to think and act rationally that in 
fact leads to salvation.  The point, then, is that the individual must engage in the process of 
scrutinizing thoughts and behaviors in order to make informed choices instead of reacting 
emotionally, binding oneself to worldly concerns and so creating a Hell of futility and distress.  
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Though new habits of engagement increasingly protect the sinner from the chaos of 
continual sin and allow for a fruitful path through a life of right reason, the imperfect nature of 
the human condition makes future sinning inevitable.  The objective, then, is not to destroy 
temptation but to understand its nature and respond to it rationally.  When this awareness fails to 
redirect the self from temptation towards a profitable response, the individual, in effect, forgets 
himself through the emotionally-driven confusions which result from sin.  In the Boece, for 
example, Lady Philosophy recognizes that Boethius’ abasement results not from a true 
corruption of his nature, but rather from his inability to appreciate his situation rationally: “‘Now 
woot I,’ quod sche, ‘other cause of thi maladye, and that ryght greet: thow hast left for to knowen 
thyselve what thou art’” (I.p6.68-70).  The process that they subsequently engage in intends to 
help Boethius re-member himself, and through that re-collection, to understand the world and his 
place within that world once again.  This manner of recursive progression through life, according 
to the Parson, is unavoidable: given the inexperience in dealing with constantly varying stimuli, 
even individuals like Boethius who have trained themselves to deliberate and act rationally will, 
at times, falter.  Indeed, the Parson, himself, reveals his own struggle with temptation: “Wherfore 
I woot wel sykerly…that everich of us hath matere and occasioun to be tempted.”48  The goal of 
active self-awareness is to create a personal, individual path that carefully and thoughtfully 
navigates the temptations, darkness, confusion, and imperfections of this world in a productive 
way.  The failure to remain steadfastly on this path presents the individual with an opportunity to 
engage in the method of reflection and consideration that the Parson advocates in order to 
develop greater self-knowledge and a stronger resolve to “do well and think well,” should the 
individual choose.   
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Given the ever-present quality of temptation and the propensity to surrender to desire, the 
individual must continue to revise his path throughout life.  Similar to contrition, which the 
Parson maintains “moste be continueel…for to amenden hym of his lyf” (305), one’s personal 
engagement with his thoughts, desires, and actions must be continual with a steadfast purpose for 
amendment precisely because knowledge is constantly acquired through various means.  One of 
the processes that the Parson stresses throughout his tale deals with the purposeful gathering of 
information: with regard to penitence, for example, he suggests that one must first understand the 
meaning and the purpose of contrition, confession, and satisfaction before the individual can 
learn how to engage with these different processes.  However, as he ruminates about the 
significance of the name of Jesus Christ, Iesus Nazarenus rex Iudeorum, the Parson also 
indicates that the contemplation of language in general is important in order to understand its 
larger meanings and possible applications.  As such, the habit of continual engagement includes 
all knowledge that one gathers, along with one’s perspective, emotions, and rational 
consideration of the different factors as new data, situations, and experiences arise.  The purpose 
to this method is to acknowledge, actively, the innate limitations of one’s understanding and then 
continuously to reassess that perspective in order to stay on the path.  
The Parson highlights the benefits of such habits in his discussion of the seven deadly 
sins, a discussion which interrupts his explanation of the conditions and benefits of confession.  
In fact, the Parson spends over half of his tale, a full 568 lines, detailing the various sins which 
result from the seven “chieftaynes” and their respective remedies.  After listing sixteen sins 
specific to pride and alluding to countless others, the Parson devotes the subsequent eighty-three 
lines of this section to the exposition of these faults, which he argues harm both sinner and 
society.
49
  Superfluous clothing, for instance, “which that maketh it so deere” (416), distracts 
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those who erroneously accept the fallacy that one’s moral fiber is directly related to the degree of 
ornamentation of dress, while at the same time driving up the price of fabric through needless 
excess.
50
  While the demand for ostentation affects everyone, inordinate lack of clothing is 
equally detrimental.  Speaking specifically of men’s “wikked entente” in dress, the Parson 
proclaims that “somme of hem shewen the boce of hir shap, and the horrible swollen members, 
that semeth lik the maladie of hirnia, in the wrappynge of hir hoses; / and eek the buttokes of 
hem faren as it were the hyndre part of a she-ape in the fulle of the moone” (423-24), which aims 
to distract and inflame the desires of others.  Pride in the accoutrements of riding and pride of the 
table, i.e. the “delices of luxurie” (446), likewise disserve the community.  Along with pointing 
out the various degrees of pride, this section also consistently highlights the negative effects that 
these actions have on others: one person’s transgression negatively impacts another, guides 
someone else to sin, and reinforces the primary sinner to sin again.  Through his attempt at a 
comprehensive (though admittedly limited) explanation of pride, the Parson demonstrates the 
degree to which this one sin extends in various directions, while at the same time increasing its 
extension via the mindless permission of those who allow it to reign with abandon.  While this 
discussion is orthodox, the Parson’s use of the chieftains, in part, creates an analogy with the 
fractured nature of language and knowledge, which, like the sins, continue to splinter with each 
misuse.  By drawing attention to the nature of this root sin, the Parson prepares his audience to 
make informed choices about their individual thoughts, actions, and outward demonstrations, as 
well as to consider the deeds and appearances of others, while reflecting upon how the 
imperfections of language shape those choices. 
The Parson’s illustration of the confusion promoted by the chieftains also serves to 
reinforce his theme of personal agency: thoughtless participation in sinful behavior leads to 
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powerlessness, while mindful choice facilitates understanding and self-authority.  In order to 
protect oneself from the complicated snares of Pride, the Parson contends, the individual must 
understand that pride springs from three things: “somtyme it spryngeth of the goodes of nature, 
and somtyme of the goodes of fortune, and somtyme of the goodes of grace” (450).  Given that 
these goods are outside of one’s control, the Parson argues that it is “outrageous folie” to assign 
them value.  Instead, he argues that one’s character is defined not by goods, but rather by what 
one chooses to do with them.  Indeed, similar to the hag’s proclamation in the Wife of Bath’s 
Tale “That he is gentil that dooth gentil dedis” (III.1170), the Parson claims that gentility is not a 
societal position but a compilation of actions: “Now been ther generale signes of gentillesse, as 
eschewynge of vice and ribaudye and servage of synne, in word, in werk, and contenaunce, / and 
usynge vertu, curteisye, and clennesse, and to be liberal – that is to seyn, large by mesure” (464-
65).  According to this description, gentility is a trait of character, given that the individual 
chooses and cultivates his own nature.  Throughout his description of each deadly sin, the Parson 
consistently calls attention to the uncontrolled, and seemingly uncontrollable, generation that 
each of these “root sins” initiate: when the sinner permits these faults to propagate unhindered by 
consideration or rational deliberation, emotional reactions escalate and remove the individual 
further from the “goode wey” and closer to disorder and chaos. 
There are opportunities to recognize the chaos and create anew the path of productivity: 
should the individual so choose, he can apply the remedies for each sin.  Unlike the continual, 
outward extension of the twigs which grow from the branches of the seven deadly sins, the 
remedies for each are rather concise: the remedy for pride, for example, is humility or meekness.  
As the Parson explains, “That is a vertu thurgh which a man hath verray knoweleche of hymself, 
and holdeth of hymself no pris ne deyntee, as in regard of his desertes, considerynge evere his 
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freletee” (477).  In order to escape the temptation of pride, one need only have self-knowledge: 
“verray knoweleche” instructs the individual that he, indeed, is “no pris.”  Following the 
Parson’s theme that self-knowledge is fragmentary, the only way in which a person might have 
pride is through tricks of language.  Though the Parson does provide a brief explanation of this 
remedy, which includes the three types of humility and the four factors which contribute to the 
humility of speech, the eight lines of text that are required here pale in comparison to the eighty-
seven lines of text that the twigs of pride—those that he does include—consume.  
The explanations of the remaining six deadly sins likewise require much more textual 
space than their accompanying remedies.  In fact, the virtues necessitate only slightly more than 
one quarter (25.85%) of this section.  This difference between the space devoted to the 
explanation of the sins and that to the virtues implies that the seven “chieftaynes” inspire a 
continual devolution of thoughts and actions, in that each encourages patterns of behavior which 
work to distance the sinner from the faculty that distinguishes man from beast—his reason.  The 
mindless involvement in such patterns results in, and consequently from, a series of extending 
and unseen outcomes: man is separated from his reason, stripped of protection for his soul, 
removed from God, and bereft of his rationality.  Applying the cosmological model to this 
image, the seven deadly sins create infinite complications, as they match the continually 
fractured and expanding possibilities that begin at the sublunar sphere and splinter into the inner-
most region of Hell.  The remedies, in contrast, are more simplistic because they attempt to 
include the awareness of the fractionality of knowledge in the determination of thoughts and 
actions.  One combats wrath, for example, by being meek and having patience.  Both of these 
qualities proclaim a lack of perfect intelligence: meekness comes from “verray knoweleche” of 
the self, which is by no means complete, and patience is governed by an appreciation that the 
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cause of hardships, providentially, must be accepted as working toward some future good, while 
an immediate good can be achieved by disengaging the emotions and scrutinizing any given 
situation rationally.   
The life that self-knowledge and providential awareness create must also acknowledge 
and overcome the inherent hardships of this realm: frail and feeble bodies, weak wills, 
incomplete knowledge, limited intellects, and ever-present temptations.  For the Parson, the 
creation of an individual “heaven” is achievable through the development of and consistent 
participation in habits of right understanding.  At the end of his tale, he explains that there is no 
“wo ne grevaunce” (1077), no pain or insecurity, no hunger, thirst, or cold in Heaven; likewise, 
there is “the blisful compaignye that rejoysen hem everemo, everich of otheres joye” (1077), and 
“every soule replenyssed with the sighte of the parfit knowynge of God” (1079).  With the 
exception of the bodily comforts that result from completion in death, the other benefits can be 
enjoyed on Earth: one can rejoice in another’s joy, for instance, by incorporating the virtues of 
humility, love, and patience, instead of permitting the sins of pride, envy, and ire.  Though 
perfect knowledge of God is forbidden during a life of limitation and incompletion, one “shal 
fynde refresshynge for [his] soule” through walking the “goode wey.”  Such refreshing, of 
course, is momentary in this realm, but the phrasing of this statement suggests the certainty of 
the experience if one develops the habit of “standing upon the ways.”  By the end of the tale, 
there is an additional sense that this method of standing, observing, and scrutinizing applies just 
as much, if not more, to one’s own various paths and the respective lessons therein, as it does to 
the teachings of authorities.  In fact, the more one engages in this method, the more the habit is 
established, and the more often one’s soul finds refreshment. 
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The habits that one cultivates during life both increase one’s productivity in this realm 
and ultimately determine the destination of one’s eternal soul.  The Parson ends his tale by 
explaining how an individual gets to heaven: “This blisful regne may men purchace by poverte 
espiritueel, and the glorie by lowenesse, the plentee of joye by hunger and thurst, and the reste by 
travaille, and the lyf by deeth and mortificacioun of synne” (1080).  Offering this endless 
experience as both a choice and an exchange, the Parson hints at the power that the individual’s 
habits finally have upon his soul.  If an individual habitually permits sin to guide his actions, 
then he will be ill-equipped to make a conscious choice when the need arises; instead, his sins 
will continue to dictate his response and, as the Parson states, will “lead him to Hell.”  Those 
who have formed intentional habits of wise judgment, on the other hand, will be prepared to 
accept the offer of eternal bliss because they are not bound in the chains of worldly concerns.  
The Parson reinforces this idea in the final clause: one may purchase life both by death and by 
the killing of sin.  Given the impossibility of obliterating sin entirely during this life, the choice 
to expunge the capacity to indulge bodily temptations must happen after death.  Bluntly, whether 
the individual has cultivated a habit of mindful analysis or one of mindless reaction will 
determine his choice: he can continue sinning, which would increasingly bind him to his Hell 
and continually distance him from his rational mind as do the inhabitants of Dante’s Inferno, or 
he can choose to release himself from worldly concerns in favor of finding absolute fulfillment.  
The importance of the Parson’s message here cannot be overstated: because God gave free-will 
to man, it is within man’s control to accept or to reject God’s extension of eternal salvation.  
Such ability, as the Parson outlines in his tale, requires active participation in a process that is 
imperfect but workable, linguistic but containable, flawed but redeemable. 
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One “wey” to acquire the habit of rational analysis is to follow the methods that Chaucer 
develops in his prose.  Through the Boece, Chaucer offers a dialectic which stresses the primacy 
of contextualization, the need for clear communication, and the benefits of self-awareness to 
wise judgment.  In the Astrolabe, Chaucer highlights the fact that one’s approach to 
knowledge—the way one “learns to know”—is just as, if not more, important than the 
knowledge gained through that inquiry.  Additionally, he submits that one gains greater 
understanding by revising former conclusions to include new information.  Through the Thopas-
Melibee, he illustrates the problems of relying solely on expectations of form to understand 
content, and in the Melibee, he utilizes the form of prose to communicate Melibee’s own 
recursive analysis and to inspire the reader to perform a similar assessment of his own responses 
to the Tales that came before.  In the Retraction, he models (albeit ambiguously) the process of 
recursive assessment and invites his reader to analyze, via recursion, the validity of his 
interpretations of Chaucer’s writings.  Through his Parson, he suggests a similar process of 
recursion and reflection that can, and should, influence earlier interpretations of the narratives 
told on the journey to Canterbury.  It is this very process, I argue, that supports the Parson’s final 
position in the Canterbury line-up and calls upon the processes of reclaiming reason that the 
reader learned in the other prose works.  In this final moment in the journey to Canterbury, 
Chaucer creates an opportunity for meditation about the Tales that have come before; it is here 
that he welcomes his reader to “Stondeth upon the weyes, and seeth and axeth of olde pathes 
(that is to seyn, of olde sentences) which is the goode wey” (X.77).  A brief analysis of a few of 
these “olde pathes” will demonstrate the utility of the prose methods to finding that “goode 
wey.”  
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The Friar’s Tale illustrates an example of the perils of willful blindness, for example.  
The Friar’s summoner, upon meeting the shape-shifting fiend from Hell, decides to best him in a 
competition of chicanery.  The summoner’s desire to demonstrate his superior skill deafens him 
to the demon’s warning, though it is offered plainly—“Thou shalt herafterward, my brother 
deere, / Come there thee nedeth nat of me to leere, / For thou shalt by thyn owene experience.”51  
The summoner dismisses it in favor of boasting about his ability to manipulate people.  When the 
pair comes upon the carter damning his horses, the demon refuses to take them because “It is nat 
[the carter’s] entente” (III.1556).  Recognizing that the carter’s words result from a moment of 
frustration and are thus not representative of his actual intention, the demon draws the distinction 
between words spoken truthfully and those spoken in haste.  His earlier suggestion that fiends 
work only with the consent of God—“Withouten hym we have no myght, certayn, / If that hym 
list to stonden ther-agayn” (1487-88)—signifies a partial redemption of language: in the perfect, 
superlunar realm of the Divine, God recognizes when words and intentions correlate.  Had the 
summoner paid attention to the knowledge offered by the demon, he might have saved himself 
from damnation; instead, his mind is clouded by pride and greed.  When the widow offers both 
the summoner and her new frying pan to the devil, the demon asks after her intent: “Is this youre 
wyl in ernest that ye seye?” (1627).  She confirms her statement, but then offers the summoner 
the chance to redeem himself through repentance.  He immediately refuses—“Nay, olde stot, that 
is nat myn entente” (III.1630)—and the demon takes both man, and pan, to Hell.   
Though the Friar takes great pleasure in damning the summoner through the will of God, 
an act for which he is repaid when the Summoner proclaims that all friars spend eternity safely 
tucked within Satan’s “ers,” the underlying issue of this tale is that man damns himself through 
his own choices.  Certainly the summoner’s emotions work against him, but the fact that he 
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consciously decides, at different moments in the tale, to agree to the fiend’s stipulations indicates 
his character: as he states, “Stomak ne conscience ne knowe I noon; / I shrewe thise shrifte-
fadres everychoon” (1441-42).  Though he, himself, is part of the Church, he uses his position to 
extort money and material goods from the poor and curses those who perform their duties 
religiously.  What’s more, he refuses to shrive himself of these behaviors (1439-40).  In other 
words, the summoner’s habits of sin are so firmly rooted in his mind that when the widow allows 
him a chance to redeem himself, he cannot make a conscious choice; instead, to his endless peril, 
his habits answer for him. 
While the Friar’s summoner and the Summoner’s friars spend eternity in Hell, the Parson 
offers his audience a means of escape: the salvation of the soul, as well as the destruction of 
one’s personal Hell-on-Earth, is achieved through the creation of beneficial habits.  The Parson 
points out at the beginning of his tale that salvation is specific to each individual’s free will: 
“Stondeth upon the weyes, and seeth and axeth of olde pathes (that is to seyn, of olde sentences) 
which is the goode wey, / and walketh in that wey, and ye shal fynde refressynge for youre 
soules, &c” (75-78).  In this passage, God neither saves nor damns humanity; instead, he hopes 
that no man perish and wishes for all “to come to the knowledge of him and to the life that is 
perdurable.”  Thus, man’s salvation or damnation lies not within God’s proclamation, but rather 
in the choice that he makes of his own free will.  Though God hopes that man chooses wisely, he 
does not actively intervene in that choice and instead provides guidance, in this case, through 
Jeremiah.
52
  This counsel provides an opportunity, not a defined solution, as it places 
responsibility squarely on man: while Jeremiah advises that one observe and gather the sentence 
of old teachings, walking the “goode wey” requires the construction of the best path, as well as 
the resolve then to act in accordance with that choice.  In contrast to the “weyes that leden folk to 
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helle,” the Parson introduces his treatise by reminding his audience both of the power of free 
will, as well as the more productive path toward the Good.
53
  By framing his tale in this way, the 
Parson suggests that it is ultimately the ability to match words, deeds, and intentions, which are 
governed by reason, that allows man to “find refreshing for his soul.”  God recognizes man’s 
capacity to discern, to gain knowledge, and to make a sensible choice; given that ability, man is 
responsible for how he chooses to use it. 
Though the benefits of the mindful habits that the Parson advocates are readily apparent, 
creating and acting on such habits with constancy and intention is a complicated process, as we 
witness in the Clerk’s Tale.  During the course of Walter and Griselde’s marriage, two habits 
develop: Walter’s obsessive testing of his wife, and her ability to suffer his machinations as was 
implicit in her blind oath of fealty.  As the Clerk remarks, Walter’s desire to see her fail caused 
him to escalate his attempts each time she withstood the challenge: “He hadde assayed hire 
ynogh before, / And foond hire evere good; what neded it / Hire for to tempte, and alwey moore 
and moore” (456-58).  By evaluating this situation through the lens that the Parson offers, we can 
see that Walter’s endeavors result from an increasingly irrational urge to prove her inconstant; 
his attempts intensify because he has bound himself to the will of his desire and thus each test is 
worse than the former.  As Walter’s habit progresses, so Griselde strengthens her ability to 
withstand his unrelenting attempts to cause her to break her oath.  Not only is she “sad stidefast” 
(564), but her capacity increases with age: “the forther that she was in age, / The moore trewe, if 
that it were possible, / She was to hym in love, and moore penyble” (712-14).  What the Clerk 
suggests here is that Griselde intentionally cultivates, over years, a habit of patience that has 
become “evere in oon ylike sad and kynde” (602).  If, as the Parson explains, “Horrour is alwey 
drede of harm that is to come, and this drede shal evere dwelle in the hertes of hem that been 
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dampned” (X.224), then Griselde’s steadfast ability to accept whole-heartedly those things over 
which she has no control allows her to reject the anguish of an earthly-Hell and instead create a 
space of productivity and love. 
Yet as the Clerk declares, the absolute patience that Griselde embodies in the tale is not 
achievable: “Grisilde is deed, and eek hire pacience, / And bothe atones buryed in Ytaille” 
(IV.1177-78).  Not only are she and the perfect sufferance she exemplified dead, but the Clerk 
separates such potentiality even farther from his present company by burying her in a foreign 
land; in other words, Griselde and her patience never existed in England.  Distance aside, 
unqualified patience was, and is, impossible by virtue of the incompleteness inherent to this life; 
what is possible, though, is the development of habits that remind one to consider the profit, or 
lack thereof, of one’s own thoughts, feelings, and actions, as well as to take others’ dispositions 
into account in order to make informed choices.  Through her marriage to Walter, Griselde 
develops a practice of actively considering all available information before determining the best 
course of action: as the Clerk states, her “wise and rype wordes…And juggementz of so greet 
equitee” (IV.438-39) provide significant service to the people.  Griselde then uses that ability to 
deal with Walter’s strategems of torment.   
Though the strength of Griselde’s character is made clear by her consistent actions, 
Walter’s inability to recognize this quality stems from his presumption that character is 
determined by outward appearance.  According to the Parson, this erroneous assumption results 
from pride: “Eek for to pride hym of his gentrie is ful greet folie; for ofte tyme the gentrie of the 
body binymeth the gentrie of the soule” (X.461).  Walter’s expectation that the body, or the style 
of dress, demonstrates character leads him to “translate” Griselde by changing her clothing: 
“Unnethe the peple hir knew for hire fairnesse / Whan she translated was in swich richesse” 
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(IV.384-85).  David Wallace argues that this passage signifies Walter’s power “as both ruler and 
rhetor,” and given the rapidity with which the people accept Griselde’s gentility, his argument is 
persuasive.
54
  But Walter’s power in this tale also invites a criticism of the superficiality of both 
Walter and his people: the elaborate adornments and combed hair conceal Griselde and 
“translate” her into someone else.  In these clothes, the people laud her talents: “That she from 
hevene was, as men wende, / Peple to save and every wrong t’amende” (440-41).  Yet when she 
is stripped of these garments, the people’s initial sadness gives way to jubilation when they see 
the rich array of Walter’s next “wife”: “For she is fairer, as they deemen alle, / Than is 
Griselde…And moore plesant, for hire heigh lynage” (988-91).  Even though Griselde 
consistently demonstrates her integrity, both Walter’s relentless trials and the people’s eagerness 
to judge based on physicality alone point to the value of appearance in this society.  It is only 
when Griselde continues to demonstrate her character in her “rude and somdeel eek torent” 
clothing that Walter finally understands the distinction between outward appearance and inner 
capacity.  In the Clerk’s Tale, then, habits not only cause hardship and provide the ability to deal 
with those difficulties rationally, but they also inspire change: Walter recognizes Griselde’s 
character independent of her appearance, and “Ful many a yeer in heigh prosperitee / Lyven thise 
two in concord and in reste” (1128-19).  
 Given the severity of Walter’s treatment of Griselde, it is initially difficult for modern 
readers to accept that he subsequently enjoys a life of love and prosperity, but this life is a direct 
result from his perspectival transformation.  The Parson, I argue, would suggest that the potential 
to create such a life is available to everyone independent of the habits they have formed and the 
natures they have cultivated.  Indeed, though this possibility is not explained in any of the other 
tales, the Parson’s explicit theme of “the journey of life” underlies every tale in the Canterbury 
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pilgrimage.  The Knight’s Palamon and Arcite detour from the path of brotherhood and 
camaraderie to one of conflict and competition based on their individual, emotional responses to 
the object of their shared desire: the fair Emily.  The Man of Law’s Constance journeys through 
dangers and hardships, often without personal control or ability to protect herself, as she converts 
people to Christianity.  The Friar’s summoner walks a path to Hell.  Not only do the tales offer 
journeys of life, but often the characters themselves divulge their own paths in their prologues.   
In the Pardoner’s Prologue, for instance, he explains his method: he cultivates “an 
hauteyn speche” (VI.330), shows his bulls and relics (336-376), and publicly shames his 
audience into participation (377-386).  Though the Pardoner’s “entente is nat but for to wynne” 
(403), what he unknowingly explains is that his methods have stuck him in a circular path: he 
boasts, “For I kan al by rote that I telle. / My theme is alwey oon, and evere was – / Radix 
malorum est cupiditas” (332-34), and later reveals, “I preche of no thyng but for coveityse. / 
Therfore my theme is yet, and evere was, / Radix malorum est cupiditas” (424-26).  In case his 
audience has missed the significance of this statement, the Pardoner continues, “Thus kan I 
preche agayn that same vice / Which that I use, and that is avarice” (427-28).  Chaucer’s 
rendering of the Pardoner’s cupidity as mindless participation illuminates the futility of his 
actions: by preaching against his own vice, the Pardoner nullifies the meaning of the words that 
he, himself, uses.  This nullification of language results in the ultimate impotence of his own 
speech, which he figures as a circle: “I peyne me to han an hauteyn speche / And rynge it out as 
round as gooth a belle” (330-31).  In “ringing” his sermon out as “round as a bell goes,” the 
Pardoner boasts that his speech, essentially, goes nowhere; instead of considering and 
incorporating new teachings, his sermons perpetually follow a course that simply goes round and 
round.  As with his speech, the Pardoner is trapped in this circular path: “For myn entente is nat 
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but for to wynne, / And nothyng for correccioun of synne” (403-04); “But shortly myn entente I 
wol devyse: / I preche of no thyng but for coveityse” (423-24); “But that is nat my principal 
entente; / I preche nothyng but for coveitise” (432-33).  The repetition of his objective—“nought 
but for to win,” “nothing but for covetous,” “nothing but for covetous”—calls attention to the 
fact that it is not only his sermon that he performs by rote, but indeed, he acts by rote as well.  
Having cultivated his habit of “winning” to the extent that he no longer thinks, the Pardoner 
damns himself to a perpetual cycle of futility. 
The Pardoner’s desire to demonstrate his expertise in preaching against the very vice that 
he willfully enjoys speaks to the senselessness of his choices: though he wins gold and silver for 
his efforts (VI.440), his actions are entirely thoughtless because he permits his vice to consume 
him.  The Pardoner again highlights his own lack of awareness at the end of his tale.  After 
having told the story of the three young rioters who kill one another in their search for Death, the 
Pardoner then turns to his audience and attempts to perform the very trick that he explained in 
the prologue.  Though he commands, “Com forth, sire Hoost, and offer first anon,” Bailly denies 
the Pardoner’s attempt to force his acquiescence and declares, “Thou woldest make me kisse 
thyn olde breech, / And swere it were a relyk of a seint, / Though it were with thy fundement 
depeint” (948-50).  The trick fails because the Pardoner’s habit of deception disallows a true 
perspective: he gives his audience the means to respond rationally to his methods, and Bailly 
uses that awareness to protect himself. 
The ultimate pointlessness of the Pardoner’s habits highlights the benefits to active, 
rational engagement; in the Canterbury pilgrimage, the Wife of Bath is the character who most 
exemplifies this process.  Though some scholars view her prologue as either an autobiography or 
a confession, both her prologue and her tale are also narrative accounts of journeys through life.  
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In the prologue, the Wife demonstrates the profit of engaging with and using knowledge based 
on practical experience.  Through her five marriages, the Wife’s responses to her various 
situations change as she gains self-awareness and adapts to a lack thereof in others: with her first 
three husbands, she learns how to establish dominion over her own body; with husband four, the 
“revelour” (III.453), she realizes how to communicate through suggestion an experience that, 
through her intelligent analysis, allows her to avoid reciprocating with her own sinning and 
instead offer her husband the opportunity to experience a “purgatory” of benefit to his soul; with 
Jankyn, she discovers how to overcome his eager acceptance of male superiority to reach a 
mutual accord of respect and affection.  Through this narrative, the Wife explains what she 
learned about herself and how she used that knowledge not only to her advantage, but to the 
profit of others as well.  It is through her willingness to engage with knowledge and experience 
that allows her to reject the definitions and expectations assigned to her by others and instead to 
create her own, individual path of productivity.  
While the idea of a “life journey” underlies both the Wife’s prologue and her tale, neither 
is offered as a programmatic scheme.  As she explains, the process for everyone is different: 
“God clepeth folk to hym in sondry wyse, / And everich hath of God a propre yifte – / Som this, 
som that, as hym liketh shifte” (III.102-4).  The point, of course, is that each person has his own 
talents and capacities, and as such, individual responses to the same stimuli will necessarily 
differ.  What the Wife offers in her prologue, then, is her own personal example of the 
productivity of engagement with authorities, language, and experience; in her tale, she illustrates 
the promise of such engagement when the knight, instead of being killed for raping the maiden, 
is given an opportunity to learn how to become a better person.  The Parson, in contrast, does 
offer a system of self-analysis which affords his entire audience the tools with which to escape 
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the circularity of the Pardoner’s journey, to create a personal path through life, and to return to or 
reconstruct that path as reason and experience require.  
Earlier I suggested that the Jeremiah quote offers a method of organizing knowledge in a 
way that allows the individual to understand what has come before in order to shape future 
thoughts and actions.  As opposed to retrospective quality that Finlayson and Howard have 
observed, I suggest that Chaucer offers the Parson’s Tale not as a lens through which the other 
tales gain a truer meaning, but rather as a meditative moment that permits the consideration of 
how each tale, each narrative journey, can benefit the reader.  Simply put, Chaucer invites the 
audience to consider the stories that have come before, to identify their respective benefits and 
failures, and to incorporate that knowledge insofar as it instructs the individual to do well and 
think well.  Using the Pardoner as an example, I would argue that the observer does not benefit 
from simply judging this character as prideful, avaricious, envious, gluttonous, or wrathful; 
rather, it is what one chooses to do with that judgment that matters.  Here, the recognition of the 
Pardoner’s perpetual cycle of mindlessness offers the lesson without the danger of the 
experience.  The profit of the Wife’s habitual engagement with her own thoughts and actions 
likewise serves the individual through example.  As the Parson maintains, there are lessons to be 
learned from all “ways” if one observes, interrogates, and determines the best course of action in 
light of the knowledge gained through the process.  The Parson, then, not only belongs with, but 
is indeed integral to, the Canterbury Tales because it is through the Parson that Chaucer frames 
his collection not as a group of stories that are told to win a game, but rather as a series of paths 
from which his audience can benefit through the cultivation of right reason, self-scrutiny, and 
deliberate choice.    
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The point to creating such habits is to cultivate rational responses that become part of 
one’s nature.  If, within human nature, there resides an innate tendency toward the Good, 
however obscured or otherwise warped that inclination might be, then it is through one’s habitual 
responses that such trends are supported.  Chaucer’s framing of the Parson’s Tale with an 
introduction of the “Good way” and a conclusion which gestures toward the eternal destination 
underscores the idea that one’s habits ultimately enable one to choose not only that final 
destination, but also the way one lives this present life.  Just as contrition must be continual with 
steadfast purpose to confess and amend the behaviors, so the “goode wey” through life is a 
process of continual engagement that considers personal thoughts, desires, ideas, language, 
habits, and new teachings in order to determine, at each moment of consideration, whether or not 
the path (i.e. the habits) are as productive as they might be.  For the Parson, the point is not to 
create a perfect path to a perfect life and a perfect death; failure and misapprehension are native 
to this life.  What he does offer, rather, is a process of learning how to avoid the apparent pitfalls 
of life, as well as of understanding how to return to the “goode wey” every time one detours off 
of the path.  In a world in which so much is outside of our control, the Parson’s Tale 
demonstrates the fruitlessness of serving desire; by choosing not to walk that path and instead 
create our own, the Parson’s Tale provides a system of creating meaning and purpose, indeed, of 
creating life, that is just as necessary today as it was in the Middle Ages. 
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Epilogue 
 
A Student of Chaucer 
 
 
 
During the process of writing about Chaucer’s prose, I have become increasingly aware 
of, and invested in, my own habits of engagement.  I have learned, and accept fully (to the extent 
that my limitations allow), that this current attempt at working through the prose and revealing 
its profit, first to myself and second to my readers, is just that—an initial assay.  It has informed 
my path (to borrow from the Parson), my understanding of the tangible and potential life-altering 
profit to studying literature, and my appreciation for my place within the universe (though this 
cosmos is far different than that which Chaucer knew).  And it is at this point that I stop to reflect 
upon this work, this product of a passion born of a desire to confront two questions that have 
remained unresolved in Chaucer scholarship: why did the Father of English Poetry choose prose 
for these particular works, and how does this medium reveal the utility of these writings in a way 
that poetry could not?  Through my own “litel tretis,” I have endeavored to begin to work 
towards the answers to these questions.  Should the reader find anything useful these writings, 
may he be grateful to himself for having engaged with this fractional knowledge to discover its 
benefit.  Should the reader be displeased with anything, may he attribute it to the nature of my 
personal limitations and not to my will that would most eagerly have written better if I had the 
ability.  As Chaucer says, “‘Al that is writen is writen for oure doctrine,’ and that is myn 
entente’” (X.1083). 
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Heere taketh the makere of this book her leve. 
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